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ABSTRACT
Rising Powers and Foreign Intrastate Armed Conflicts: Trends and Patterns of China’s
Intervention in African Civil Wars
by
HODZI Obert
Doctor of Philosophy

What influences one state to intervene in another’s intrastate armed conflict? In answering
this question, existing scholarship has tended to emphasise the position of the intervening
state in the international system; suggesting that, that is the main determinant factor of a
state’s external intervention behaviour. As a result, existing research on intervention in
foreign intrastate armed conflicts is dominated by a focus on great powers and their
intervention methods. Employing the neoclassical realist causal logic, this thesis argues, on
the contrary, that whether a state intervenes in a foreign intrastate armed conflict is a
factor of both systemic and state level factors. A state’s intervention behavior is therefore
determined, first, by the increase in its relative economic power, then by its changing
perception of threat to its interests abroad. What it means is that a state’s position in the
international system, rising power, great power or small power, is not the only determinant
factor in exploring its intervention behavior, unit level factors also matter. In advancing that
argument, this thesis significantly challenges the prevailing assumption that intervention in
foreign intrastate armed conflicts is a preserve of great powers, and an instrument of their
foreign policy; and thus, broadens the intervention discourse to include the intervention
behavior of rising powers. Yet, still there exist, in current literature, a lack of research which
systematically connects the above neoclassical realist theoretical reasoning with empirical
analysis of intervention in foreign conflicts by rising powers vis-à-vis the 21st century global
order recalibrations. By exploring the intervention behaviour of China, a rising global power,
in intrastate armed conflicts in three countries, Libya, Mali and South Sudan; and by using
the comparative case study method to assess trends and patterns in its intervention
behaviour, as its relative economic power increases and its perception of threat evolves,
this thesis highlights a more systematic interlink between theoretical and empirical analysis
that takes into consideration the changing status of rising powers in the global system and
its effect on their intervention behaviour. It therefore makes a case for an empirical study
of China’s intervention in intrastate armed conflicts in Africa that considers the interactive
dynamics between systemic and domestic variables in its causal explanation of China’s

foreign intervention behaviour. In doing that, it points out that understanding intervention
in terms of great powers and military action limits our exploration of the emerging
re-conceptualization of intervention, its practice and methods as employed by rising
powers in foreign intrastate armed conflicts. The thesis therefore makes a case for an
innovative (re-)definition of intervention that enables an analytical assessment of the
emerging intervention practices.
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CHAPTER 1: Rising powers and intervention in foreign intrastate
armed conflicts – Introduction to the study
1.1 Introduction
How does a rising power behave when its relative economic power increases? Does it expand
its economic interests abroad? And does it increase its intervention in foreign intrastate armed
conflicts which threaten those interests? Conventional arguments in International Relations (IR)
suggest that generally as states’ economic power rise they follow the same pattern of
behaviour. “They expand. They send their soldiers, ships, and public and private agents
abroad…, [and] they exert influence on foreigners in a variety of ways” (Mandelbaum 1988, p.
134). However, although in principle they follow the same pattern of behaviour, they express
their expansionist projects in varied ways. “Some emerging powers in modern history have
plundered other countries’ resources through invasion, colonization, expansion, or even large
scale wars of aggression” (Zheng 2005, p. 20). Others are more covert, employing ‘nonthreatening’ strategies to take over sector by sector of another state without soldiers being
involved until their economic and political interests prevail. China is a case in point. As put by
Janice Gross Stein “in America’s backyard, in Africa, in the Gulf and on its southern and western
peripheries, China is making deals for resources with no strings attached. Its overseas
investments are growing as its trade surplus is mounting. And tens of thousands of Chinese aid
workers and dam builders are found in virtually every corner of the globe – and all this without
firing a shot” (2010, p. 12).
The overall common denominator amongst these rising powers is that expansion of their
interests and foreign policy abroad is often preceded by high levels of domestic economic
growth, which if sustained over a protracted period of time will result in rise of the state’s
relative economic power vis-a-vis other existing global powers. In turn, this enables increases in
the rising powers’ other material capabilities such as military, diplomatic, and political, such
that the combined growth of the economy and other material capabilities endows upon them
“newly acquired power into greater authority in the global system to reshape the rules and

1

institutions in accordance with their own interests”1 and more importantly intervene in the
internal affairs of other states in order to protect and safeguard their interests there. In March
2016, Wang Yi, China’s minister of foreign affairs captured the linkage between the rise in a
state’s relative economic power, expansion of its economic interests abroad, and the need to
protect those interests when he said: “Like any major country that is growing, China’s overseas
interests are expanding. At present, there are 30,000 Chinese businesses all over the world and
several million Chinese are working and living in all corners of the world…, China's non-financial
outbound direct investment reached 118 billion dollars and the stock of China's overseas assets
reached several trillion dollars. So it has become a pressing task for China's diplomacy to better
protect our ever-growing overseas interests.”2 This is because “over the course of history,
states that have experienced significant growth in their material resources have relatively soon
redefined and expanded their political [economic and security] interests abroad” (Zakaria 1998,
p. 3). And, in order to systematically give effect to their expansionist endeavours, they
incrementally revise and expand their foreign policy within the constraints of their domestic
and international capabilities.
It is therefore not automatic that once a state’s relative material capabilities increase it can
revise international rules and institutions to its taste because states do not rise and expand
their interests abroad in a vacuum. Instead, they rise in an anarchic systemic order already
dominated by other global powers; and how they express their emergent power is not just
reliant on their relative capabilities but also on how other states, particularly existing global
powers, perceive of, and respond to their rise. For instance, “the growth of Athenian power led
Sparta to conclude that there was no recourse but to fight;”3 while the rise of expansionist
Germany under the leadership of Adolf Hitler led to a global war. On the other hand, the rise of
the United States at the twilight of Britain’s imperial power was largely peaceful4 because
Britain, “while still enjoying preponderant strength, looked over the horizon…, [and] was able
to successfully adapt its grand strategy to a changing distribution of power” (Kupchan 2012).

1

Ikenberry, GJ 2008, ‘The rise of China and the future of the West: Can the liberal system survive?’
Foreign affairs, vol. 87, no. 1, p.26; Hoge Jr, JF 2004, ‘Global power shift in the making: Is the United
States ready?", Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 4, pp. 2-7.
2
People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016, Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets the press, 9
March, viewed 22 May 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1346238.shtml
3
Tritle, L.A. 2010, A new history of the Peloponnesian war, Wiley-Blackwell, pp.36.
4
Feng, Y. 2006, "The Peaceful Transition of Power from the UK to the US", The Chinese Journal of
International Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 83-108.
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But in all this the root of the rising powers’ rise in the international system and their ability to
withstand competition and pressure from existing global powers is sustained high levels of
domestic economic growth; for upward mobility in the international system is no fit for states
with a low relative economic power.
An additional factor that determines how a rising power articulates its foreign behaviour as it
expands abroad are political dynamics in countries that it expands into. By expanding its
economic interests into a foreign country, a rising power effectively entangles itself with the
political, social and economic dynamics of that particular country. Unlike the United States and
West European powers, non-western rising powers such as India, Brazil and China still do not
give adequate consideration to internal dynamics in countries they expand into, particularly if
those countries are considered to be of no global consequence, the majority of which are in
Africa where most lack essential elements of a state and can best be described as ‘quasistates’.5 Typically, when rising powers expand their economic interests into such ‘quasi-states’
their preoccupation is on wadding off competition from other global and rising powers that
have rival interests there, yet it is from the ‘quasi-states’ themselves that major challenges to
their foreign interests emanate from. The reason being that “since the end of the Cold War,
weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for
international order” (Fukuyama 2004, p. 92).
Intrastate armed conflicts6 are the dominant7 challenge in some countries that rising powers
expand their economic interests into. What makes the intrastate armed conflicts in those
countries challenging for rising powers is that they pose ‘uncontemplated consequences.’ The
consequences are uncontemplated because the conflicts are usually fought over issues local to
the developing country and often have little to do with the rising power, or its interests in that
country. Yet, the effects, albeit unintended by the warring parties, are indiscriminately felt by
rising powers with interests there. Examples abound - in the armed conflict between the
National Transitional Council (NTC) and Muammar Gaddafi’s government in Libya, US$18-20
billion worth of investments owned by Chinese private and public enterprises were either
5

Jackson, R.H. 1993, Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World, Cambridge
University Press.
6
In this study, the terms, civil war and intrastate armed conflicts are used interchangeably.
7
Cilliers, J & Schuenemann, J 2013, ‘The future of intrastate conflict in Africa more violence or greater
peace?’ Institute for Security Studies Paper 246, p.2, viewed 3 January 2014,
https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper246.pdf
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destroyed or suspended. In Sudan, China invested US$20 billion mostly in the oil industry
before the country split after a protracted armed conflict. Two-thirds of its investments ended
up in the new state of South Sudan, which in 2013 descended into a civil war resulting in major
losses to Chinese companies. 8 Chinese nationals working abroad were also affected. For
example, in 2011, the Chinese government evacuated more than 35,000 Chinese citizens
working in Libya 9 due to the armed conflict. In Sudan, 10 Mali, 11 and the Central African
Republic12 Chinese workers were kidnapped or otherwise killed by rebels; and in 2014, Chinese
companies had to evacuate Chinese nationals and scale down operations due to the armed
conflict in South Sudan.13
The dilemma for rising powers such as China is that the biggest concentration of energy and
other strategic natural resources needed to sustain their domestic economic growth, which is
critical to maintaining their relative economic power and global power status lie in countries at
risk of both political instability and intrastate armed conflicts. As noted by Michael Klare, the
high concentration of energy resources in countries such as Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, and
Sudan mean that access to such resources is “closely tied to political and socio-economic
conditions within a relatively small group of countries”14 at risk of instability and armed
conflicts. Without the military power of the United States or socio-economic and political ties
that Europe has with developing countries, especially in Africa due to their colonial heritage,
non-Western rising powers are compelled to engage even more unstable countries like Libya
and South Sudan for their raw material and energy needs, which plunges them into intrastate
armed conflicts that they neither contemplated nor possess enough experience to handle.

8

Attree, L 2012, China and conflict-affected states: Between principle and pragmatism, Saferworld:
London, viewed 3 January 2014,
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/FAB%20Sudan%20and%20South%20Sudan.pdf
9
‘35,860 Chinese evacuated from unrest-torn Libya’ 2011, Xinhua, 3 March, viewed 10 January 2014,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/03/c_13759456.htm
10
‘Sudan rebels kill 5 Chinese hostages’ 2008, The Telegraph, 27 October, viewed 10 January 2014,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/sudan/3270057/Sudan-rebels-kill5-Chinese-hostages.html
11
‘China strongly condemns Mali hotel attack, confirms 3 nationals killed’ 2015, Xinhua, 21 November,
viewed 21 November 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/21/c_134839619.htm
12
‘Two Chinese kidnapped on Cameroon-C.Africa border’ 2012, AsiaOne, 15 October, viewed 12 March
2014, http://news.asiaone.com/print/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Crime/Story/A1Story20121015377828.html
13
‘97 Chinese workers evacuated from South Sudan to Khartoum’ 2013, People Daily, 25 December,
viewed 3 January 2014, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8495532.html
14
Klare, M 2001, Resource wars: the new landscape of global conflict, Henry Holt, New York, p.44.

4

What it means is that when the relative economic power of rising powers increase and they
expand their economic interests abroad in search of markets and sources of raw materials to
keep their economies growing, they become even more dependent on foreign sources of raw
materials for their economic growth, thus compelling then to align access to such primary
commodities with their national interest and security considerations.15 How then do they
respond to foreign intrastate armed conflicts that threaten those economic interests? In other
words, do they increase their intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts as their
interests expand abroad? What form do their interventions in those intrastate armed conflicts
take, and are the methods of their intervention evolving?

1.2 Theoretical and empirical research puzzle: Making sense of the
intervention behaviour of rising powers
Based on the above questions, and specifically focused on examining the intervention
behaviour of China in intrastate armed conflicts in three African countries - Libya, Mali and
South Sudan, the nature of this study’s focus of enquiry is such that it requires both a
theoretical and empirical analysis of external interventions in intrastate armed conflicts. What
makes the enquiry significant is that there is a simultaneous increase in intrastate armed
conflicts in resource-rich countries in Africa, and an unprecedented expansion of rising powers
such as China into Africa as they search for strategic primary commodities and markets to
maintain their domestic economic growth and relative economic power.
As discussed in Chapter 2 and 3 below, research on how these rising powers respond to
intrastate armed conflicts in countries they expand their interests into is still limited. Part of the
reason is that IR scholars and policymakers are predominantly fixated on geostrategic and geoeconomic competition among rising powers and/or dominant global powers rather than
political and security dynamics in developing countries and how they affect the external
behaviour of rising powers. In addition, dominant discourses in IR still portray intervention as a
foreign policy instrument of major global powers, not rising powers. The result is a limited
scope in understanding of the intervention behaviour of rising powers in intrastate armed
conflicts in developing countries and how such a phenomenon is transforming the conceptual
understanding of intervention in international politics.
15

Ibid, pp. xii, 14.
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Accordingly, focused on exploring the intervention behaviour of rising powers, particularly
China’s in foreign intrastate armed conflicts within the domain of foreign policy theory, this
study is focused on exploring the paradox highlighted above – that rising powers need primary
commodities to sustain their domestic economic growth in order to maintain their relative
economic power, but those primary commodities are concentrated in countries with high
probabilities of intrastate armed conflicts; so for rising powers such as China that have a stated
general policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of their trading partners, how do they
balance observance to their non-intervention principle and protection of their interests in cases
of intrastate armed conflicts in a foreign country, which under normal circumstances require
some degree of intervention in that country’s internal affairs?
In probing the linkage between a state’s rise in relative economic power, expansion of
economic interests abroad, and consequent external intervention behaviour where those
interests are threatened, this study explores the theoretical argument that a state’s foreign
policy behaviour is determined by its position in the international system. Employing the
neoclassical realist argument, the study explores whether rising powers increase their external
intervention behaviour when their relative economic power increases, and when their
perception of threat to their interests abroad evolves. Since the ‘change in threat perception’ is
a unit-level variable, the starting point of this study is assessing the impact of the increase in
China’s relative economic power on its external intervention behaviour. To some extent, this is
a complex but not entirely novel question – yet with the rise and decline of global powers it
remains puzzling and relevant to understanding the evolutionary process of contemporary
rising powers’ external intervention behaviour in areas beyond their geographical regions and
how that is challenging conventional understandings of intervention and global governance in
the 21st century. Besides, although states may behave similarly in rising from obscurity to global
significance, they rise in different domestic and international contexts16 and therefore respond
differently to both local and global issues – making their succeeding foreign behaviour peculiar.
The peculiarity of each rising power’s foreign policy behaviour can by no means be fully
understood from a theoretical perspective without concomitant empirical assessment of the
behaviour in question. Departing from the tendency to focus on geo-political and geoeconomic rivalry among rising powers and dominant global powers with ‘token’ consideration

16

Zheng, B 2005, ‘China's" peaceful rise" to great-power status’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 5, p.24.
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to the colossal implications of intrastate armed conflicts in developing countries, this study
empirically concentrates on China’s intervention behaviour in intrastate armed conflicts that
started between 2011 and 2013 in Libya (2011), Mali (2012), and South Sudan (2013). The main
question that is explored is how and why increases in China’s relative economic power, and
changes in its perception of foreign intrastate armed conflicts as threats to its economic
interests abroad, influenced its intervention in the intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and
South Sudan over time. In pursuing that line of enquiry, this study seeks to empirically explain
the temporal variance in China’s intervention behaviour in the three intrastate armed conflicts,
with the aim of deciphering emerging trends and patterns of China’s intervention in intrastate
armed conflicts in Africa.

1.3 Why China?
China is not the only rising power with expanding economic interests across the globe South
Africa, Brazil, India and Russia have also been classified as rising powers due to their domestic
economic growth and expanding global influence. This study, however, gives primary focus to
China because it is undoubtedly the biggest rising power of the 21st century.17 Powered by
extraordinary economic growth and a demand for natural resources that outstrips its domestic
supply capacity, China has been compelled to expand outward in search of new markets,
primary commodities, and energy resources to fuel its domestic economic growth. Its resultant
global commodity campaign has been breath-taking. “In just over a decade China has risen
from relative insignificance to pole position in underwriting numerous resource-related
transactions across the globe” (Moyo 2012, p. 1). Combined with its official policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries, the implication of China’s insatiable
demand for natural resources meant that it engaged resource-rich countries such as Sudan,
South Sudan, Mali and Libya that are susceptible to intrastate armed conflicts and political
instability, effectively bringing to itself “high geopolitical risks, vulnerabilities and uncertainties”
(Pang 2009, p. 247).
Although at first intrastate armed conflicts did not affect China’s interests directly, over the
past decade, Chinese workers have been targeted while Chinese-operated oil facilities in Sudan
and South Sudan have been attacked by rebels, putting China’s adherence to its principle of
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non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states to the test. With respect for state
sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of its African partners forming the
core of China-Africa engagement, China is caught between the need to maintain access to
strategic resources and protecting its economic interests abroad, both of which require some
degree of intervention. This situation makes China a compelling study in assessing whether
rising global powers expand and revise their intervention behaviour in developing countries
when their economic interests there are threatened.
Notably, with the rise of its relative economic power leading to expansion of its economic
interests overseas, China has begun to increasingly express interest in peace and security
cooperation with the African Union, pledging to support efforts toward conflict resolution and
management in Africa, particularly where intrastate state armed conflicts on the continent
directly threaten its interests. There have however been some perceivable inconsistences in
implementation of its non-intervention principle.18 Its intervention in African intrastate armed
conflicts seem to vary with each country. For example, in 2013, Beijing sent its special envoy for
African Affairs, Ambassador Zhong Jianhua, to mediate between the warring parties in the
South Sudanese civil war,19 yet it did not do the same for the conflict in the Central African
Republic despite the conflicts emerging at the same time. In the Libyan conflict, China
vehemently argued that “there must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil
war by any party under the guise of protecting civilians,”20 but it was largely supportive of the
French military intervention in Mali. These contradictory policies make a case for a systematic
analysis of what really explains this variation in China’s intervention behaviour regarding
African intrastate armed conflicts.
On a broader scale, dominant IR theories presuppose that intervention is a preserve of great
powers (Tillema 1989; Steiner 2004, p. 16). Accordingly, studies on intervention in foreign
intrastate armed conflicts tend to exclude rising global powers such as China. Where China has
been specifically included in such research, the focus has mainly been on its role in
18
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peacekeeping operations or in providing ‘no-strings’ attached aid to states in conflict. By
including China as a rising global power in the broader ‘intervention in foreign intrastate
conflicts’ discourse, this study deepens the current research agenda by expanding the
discourse on China’s evolving foreign policy and behaviour in Africa. It also extends the current
research on China-Africa relations beyond trade and economics to security and intervention.
Through a systematic analysis of China’s economic, diplomatic, political and multilateral
intervention strategies, the study probe peculiarities of China’s intervention strategies in
African conflicts, questioning whether the strategies are influenced first by an increase in its
relative economic power, and then secondly by its changing perception of threats to its
interests abroad. The study therefore contributes to the growing research on China’s ‘nonintervention’ practice by assessing its intervention strategies in African countries - an area that
is still developing in scholarly research.
More importantly, an analysis of China’s intervention behaviour in African intrastate armed
conflicts is critical to an understanding of its impact on global governance and that of other
rising powers in general. Considering the combined shift in economic and political power from
the West to the rest as noted by Fareed Zakaria, how China takes on the responsibility toward
international peace and security commensurate with its rising global status is not just of
interest to the United States, but also to the African Union and African countries engaging with
China. This analysis is particularly compelling for the African Union as it transitions from nonintervention in the internal affairs of its member states to a more proactive non-indifference
approach that demands intervention in cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide
and unconstitutional military takeover of governments in line with international norms leaning
toward responsible sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect. China’s intervention in
African intrastate armed conflicts is therefore critical to the emerging global peace and security
order.

1.4 Methodology
As stated above, this study employs the neoclassical realist theoretical framework to explore
how increases in China’s relative economic power vis- à -vis other states and changes in
perception of threat to its interests abroad combine to explain China’s intervention behaviour
in intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan. What is distinct about neoclassical
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realism is that “it carries with it a distinct methodological preference for theoretically informed
narratives… that trace the ways different factors combine to yield particular foreign policies”
(Rose 1998, p. 153). In this study, the theoretically based narrative is combined with historical
analysis of China’s rise in the international system, the evolving of its perception of threats to
interests abroad, and their consequential impact on its intervention behaviour.
The resultant methodology is therefore a qualitative theoretically based narrative and historical
analysis which supposes a dual-causal focus on both systemic and domestic level factors and
how they combine to explain China’s intervention behaviour in African intrastate armed
conflicts. Furthermore, the study entails interpretation of critical historical events and
processes relating to China’s relative economic power in the international system and
articulation and understanding of its non-intervention behaviour over time – this is principally
done in Chapter 4. A historical analysis of China-Libya, Mali, and South Sudan relations since
the countries’ independence is also conducted in a way that leads to an understanding of
various intervention methods employed by China in the three African countries’ intrastate
armed conflicts, further enabling an assessment of trends and patterns of China’s intervention
in African intrastate armed conflicts.
The use of the theoretically based historical narrative and analysis entail the use of case studies
to effectively trace how an increase in relative economic power translated through perception
of threat to interests abroad combine to explain China’s intervention behaviour in Libya, Mali
and South Sudan. Not only is the case study method suitable for a theoretically based historical
narrative and historical analysis method, it also is suitable for studies that employ the
neoclassical realist theoretical framework. For, neoclassical realism often “employs the casestudy method to test general theories, explain cases and generate hypothesis… [In order to]
address important questions about foreign policy and national behaviour, and… produce a
body of cumulative knowledge” (Elman and Elman 2003, p. 317). As this study is aimed at
explaining China’s intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts, case studies are the best
suited method in order to adequately address the matter and assess the emerging trends and
patterns of China’s intervention behaviour in African armed conflicts.
With a large number of intrastate armed conflicts across the African continent, the main
challenges that confront studies of external intervention in intrastate armed conflicts include
the overwhelming need for an all-encompassing analysis of every possible conflict. The
10

reasoning is often that the more the case studies then the better it is to generalise the findings,
hence, multiple cases can potentially enhance the scope of a study. Although it is plausible to
use multiple case studies, taking into consideration time and resource constraints, a choice has
to be made between scope and depth. Besides time and resource limitations, this study opted
for only three cases in order to be able to analyse the cases in depth in a manner that would
enable production of comprehensive ‘cumulative knowledge’. The study therefore employs the
method of structured, focused comparison. The method is structured in that a general set of
questions are asked of each case study in order to standardize the collected data, making a
systematic comparison and cumulation of the case study findings possible; it is also focused
because it does not deal with every random aspect of the case study instead, it centres on a
specific aspect of the case being studied. 21 Overall, the method of structured, focused
comparison employs “a well-defined set of theoretical questions or propositions to structure an
empirical inquiry on a particular analytically defined aspect of a set of events” (Levy 2008:2), a
method which provides a systematic comparison conducive for generating empirical
generalisation and testing hypotheses.22
Intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts can be attributed to multiple causality, which
places considerable pressure on data collection and selection of cases to be studied in order to
come up with plausible explanations of why states intervene in some intrastate armed conflicts,
and also to help explain temporal variation in external intervention behaviour. As observed by
James Rosenau, single case studies or a collection of multiple case studies may be instructive,
making interesting contributions to knowledge,23 but without systematic comparison and
‘scientific consciousness’ they do not add value to hypothesis testing and theory
development.24 This is where the use of the method of structured, focused comparison
becomes compelling because it specifically “seeks to investigate causality and attempts to
isolate those factors that cause (independent variable) a particular outcome or phenomenon
(dependent variable)” (Smith-Hoehn 2010, p. 46).
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In addition, the comparative method also entails two predispositions. The first predisposition
has a bias toward qualitative analysis and tends to look at cases as wholes, comparing one with
the other. Secondly, premised on the assumption that history matters, the method values
interpretation and context - showing “how historical processes and practices, as well as longestablished institutional arrangements, impact and shape the contemporary environment in
which decisions are made, events unfold, and struggles for power occur… demonstrating a
meaningful continuity between the past and the present” (Lim 2010, p. 18). This method
therefore enables “stating lessons in a systematic and differentiated way from a broader range
of experience that deliberately draws upon a variety of historical cases” (George 1979, p. 4243). Notably, there are four purposes of comparing cases. Cases can be compared in order to
control, to understand, to explain or to predict. The focus of this study is to explain China’s
intervention behaviour in African intrastate armed conflicts; therefore, the purpose of the
comparison of cases is to “build theoretical generalisations by collecting case-based
knowledge…[because] each case or each small-n comparison gives the comparativist another
piece to work into a larger puzzle” (Smith-Hoehn 2010, p. 47). In this study, the larger puzzle is
to explain why China’s interventions in African intrastate armed conflicts vary over time.
While acknowledging that “African conflicts are widely varied… [and that] case studies do not
fit into tidy packages that present themselves for direct comparison” (Boulden 2013, p.16), the
study notes that the comparative method is “uniquely suited for analysing complex causality,
i.e. the fact that a particular social phenomenon is probably affected by several economic,
political, cultural and/or socio-economic factors” (Smith-Hoehn 2010, p.43). The set of events
that will be analysed are intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali, and South Sudan. Specifically,
the study analyses the Libyan armed conflict between the armed opposition groups later
organised under the National Transitional Council and Muammar Gaddafi’s government. The
period under study is February 2011, when the conflict began, until October 2011, when
Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed, signalling the end of the armed conflict between
the two sides. For Mali, the study focuses on the 2012 Tuareg rebellion and the Malian army’s
2012 coup d’état. The Tuareg rebellion began in January 2012, and the coup took place in
March 2012 resulting in the establishment of a government of national unity in August 2012.
Third the study analyses the intrastate armed conflict between rebels led by Riek Machar and
the government of President Salva Kiir that began in December 2013 in South Sudan.
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By focusing on the above specific cases, the study seeks to explain China’s varied intervention
in these three different intrastate armed conflicts, making it possible to explore trends and
patterns of China’s intervention behaviour in African civil wars, thus enabling the yielding of
“useful generic knowledge” 25 about China’s intervention behaviour. The “systematic
comparison and cumulating of the cases”26 therefore makes it possible to hypothesise, make
theoretical generalisations and produce generic knowledge relating to external intervention in
foreign intrastate armed conflicts. This is something that could be replicated and tested in
other similar studies, particularly those relating to intervention in foreign intrastate armed
conflicts by rising global powers.

1.4.1 Selection of intrastate armed conflict cases for study
The Uppsala/PRIO conflict database categorises conflicts as minor or major wars depending on
the number of battle-related deaths. A minor war is where there are “between 25 and 999
battle-related deaths in a given year” while “at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year”
are designated as war (Themnér 2013, p. 8). According to the Uppsala/PRIO conflict database,
25 countries in Africa experienced minor and/or war between the year 2000 and 2013. Out of
the 25 countries, 12 experienced civil war. The table below shows the number of conflicts that
were experienced in Africa between 2000 and 2013.
Figure 1.1: Intrastate armed conflicts in Africa, 2000-2013
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As shown in Figure 1, the peak of internal armed conflicts in Africa was reached in the year
2001, when 16 minor wars and four intrastate armed conflicts27 were recorded. In 2005 there
were no recorded civil wars, while conflicts surged in 2006 and reached the level of four
intrastate armed conflicts in 2013. The highest number of civil wars were recorded in Sudan,
Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nevertheless, the armed conflicts in all three
countries have been protracted, that is, they have occurred over extended periods of time,
sometimes stretching over several decades and consist of “several crisis episodes of varying
frequency and intensity.”28 Because of that fact, the profile, causes, and actors involved in the
conflicts vary over time making it difficult to determine the duration of each episode of the
conflict. This situation presents significant challenges to a study that seeks to analyse external
intervention in intrastate armed conflicts over a specific period of time. The intrastate armed
conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have been ongoing for
decades, hence they are excluded from this study because they fall outside of the period under
study.
Furthermore, intrastate armed conflicts that occurred between 2000 and 2005 were not
included in the study because prior to 2005, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle had
not been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as an international norm. The
significance of R2P to this study is that it placed a general responsibility on states to protect
their populations from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, but were they fail to
discharge that duty, it authorised the international community to take collective action through
the United Nations Security Council. Since then the principle has been evoked in Cote d’Ivoire
and Libya. As a member of the United Nations Security Council, China’s intervention behaviour
in foreign intrastate armed conflicts is therefore affected, hence it is a major factor in that it
provided legitimation and justification for members of the international community to
intervene in order to protect civilians in cases where their government cannot protect them
from genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Although China has maintained its noninterference principle, the adoption and implementation of the Responsibility to Protect puts
this principle to the test and has had an effect on its intervention behaviour. While this study
does not focus on the impact of the Responsibility to Protect on China’s external intervention
27
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behaviour, it nevertheless recognises that R2P was a significant milestone in global perceptions
of foreign intervention in other states’ intrastate armed conflicts. Thus the adoption of the
Responsibility to Protect at the 2005 United Nations World Summit marked the beginning of a
new external intervention dispensation in global governance.
After excluding intrastate armed conflicts that occurred before adoption of the Responsibility
to Protect in 2005, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, and Libya were the only countries that had civil
wars between 2005 and 2013. Of these four countries, Chad and Sudan are excluded from the
study because, like the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia they are
protracted conflicts that have been ongoing since 1966 and 1971 respectively and could
potentially skew the results. Another reason for their exclusion is that the conflicts in Chad and
Sudan tended to be state-sponsored massacres of civilians who were represented by militia
groups fighting to protect minority rights rather than seize political power. In Sudan, the Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel groups fought
against the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed, s government of Sudan-sponsored militia
group. The main reason for the conflict was oppression of Darfur’s non-Arab population. Hence
they sought recognition and equal rights for the Darfurians rather than to usurp political power
from the Khartoum government. Meanwhile, the armed conflict in Chad lasted only for a
month. In April 2006, rebels seeking to oust the government of President Idris Deby fought
government forces. By May 2006, the conflict had subsided and President Deby was declared
winner of a presidential election. The armed conflict in Chad was therefore too short to assess
China’s intervention.
In the end, two countries remained as suitable case studies, that is, Libya and South Sudan
whose intrastate armed conflicts began in 2011 and 2013 respectively. However, selected cases
should be able to provide “the kind of control and variation required by the research
problem.”29 Three controlling variables are therefore critical to the selection of cases that
would be able to explain why China’s interventions in foreign intrastate armed conflicts vary
over time. The three are: (1) severity of the conflict; (2) level of economic and diplomatic
engagement with China; and (3) intervention. In terms of ‘severity of the conflict’, South Sudan
and Libya had at least 1 000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year, hence they are
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designated as civil wars in terms of the Uppsala/PRIO database on armed conflict. Secondly,
both had diplomatic relations with China before the outbreak of their respective intrastate
armed conflicts and in terms of economic engagement, Chinese private and state-owned
enterprises had extensive investments in the two countries - oil in South Sudan, and
telecommunication and infrastructure development in Libya. Thirdly, China’s intervention in
the two countries’ intrastate armed conflicts varied; in the case of Libya it largely opposed
foreign bilateral intervention but reluctantly supported limited multilateral intervention, while
in South Sudan it actively engaged in both bilateral and multilateral intervention. Both cases
are therefore relevant to discussing why China’s intervention would vary in countries where it
has comparably significant economic interests and diplomatic relations, and where the severity
of the conflicts was also largely the same – at least 1000 deaths in one calendar year.
Yet, two cases that are largely similar are insufficient to determine the trend and pattern of
external intervention. In addition, the two cases do not provide “the opportunity for finding
novel theoretical relationships as well as confidence that a study has been conducted in a
rigorous way… creating a robust set of findings that have relevance in a wide range of contexts”
(Wicks 2010, p. 289, 290). There is need for a deviant case where China intervened either
bilaterally or multilaterally even though it had no comparably major economic investments in
that country, and where the severity of the conflict was less than 1000 battle-related deaths in
one calendar year. The Uppsala/PRIO database on armed conflict defines such conflicts as
minor wars because the battle-related deaths in one calendar year were at least 25. The
purpose of the deviant case is to identify underlying influences30 of China’s varied intervention
behaviour in African intrastate armed conflict and to dispel the obvious conclusion that can be
drawn from the cases of South Sudan and Libya that China intervenes on the basis of severity of
the conflict and/or economic investments. In that respect, a deviant case assists in probing “for
new – but as yet unspecified –explanations”31 of China’s varying intervention in African
intrastate armed conflicts over time and with each country.
Of all the countries that experienced minor wars between 2005 and 2013, China only
multilaterally intervened in Mali, which makes it a suitable deviant case because China did not
30
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have significant investments compared to the Libya and South Sudan, and the conflict was
minor in terms of battle-related deaths. Considering the above caveats, three cases are
analysed in this study: (1) Libya, (2) Mali, and (3) South Sudan. What distinguishes these three
cases from other countries that experienced intrastate armed conflicts in Africa is that the
armed conflicts in the three countries occurred within months of each other - the armed
conflict in Libya started in February 2011 ending in October 2011; the Tuareg rebellion that
culminated in a military coup in Mali took place in January and March 2012 respectively ceasing
in August 2012 when a government of national unity was established, and lastly, the intrastate
armed conflict in South Sudan began in December 2013 and is still ongoing. The utility of the
intrastate armed conflicts happening within months of each other is that it becomes possible to
examine the trend and pattern of China’s external intervention behaviour and also to examine
why the intervention varied within a three-year period. Furthermore, unlike single case studies
which are common to studies on China’s intervention in African conflicts, multiple case studies
increase the methodological rigor of a study by "strengthening the precision, the validity and
stability of the findings," (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 29), suggesting that "evidence from
multiple cases is …more compelling” (Shakir 2002, p. 191).
In addition, what makes the selected cases comparable is that China’s main interest in each of
the three countries is a dominant single primary commodity. In the case of Libya and South
Sudan it is crude oil while cotton dominates trade relations between China and Mali. From
2011 when South Sudan officially seceded from Sudan, China’s imports from South Sudan are
100 per cent crude petroleum valued at US$446 million in 2012, US$2.25 billion in 2013, and
US$3.96 billion in 2014.32 During the same period, China’s imports from Libya constituted of an
average of 97% crude petroleum valued at US$3.58 billion (2010), US$1.81 billion (2011),
US$5.55 billion (2012), US$1.81 billion (2013) and US$650 million (2014).33 Although Mali has
no crude petroleum for export yet, China’s major economic interests in Mali are cotton and
agriculture. China imports an average of 80 percent of Malian cotton and related products such
as as oily seeds.34 Mali is also among top African countries that China has agricultural projects
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in. In total, Chinese companies hold approximately 26 174 hactares of land under rice and
sugarcane crops.35
The tables below show Chinese imports from, and exports to Libya, Mali and South Sudan.
Figure 1.2: China's imports from Libya, Mali, Sudan (North + South) and South Sudan (Unit:
US$ thousand)
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Figure 1.3: China's exports to Libya, Mali, Sudan (North + South) and South Sudan (Unit:
US$ thousand)
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As shown in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3, China’s imports from and exports to Libya and Sudan
(North + South) are comparable in that there is a marked reduction in Chinese imports from
Libya and South Sudan in the years that the countries had intrastate armed conflicts. For
instance, China’s imports from Libya fell from US$4.515 billion in 2010 to US$2.063 billion in
2011, although they peaked to US$6.375 billion in 2012 as Libya stabilized, renewed armed
conflicts explain the downward spiral from 2013 to 2015. By 2015, Libya’s total exports to
China amounted to only US$949 million. Similarly, Libya’s imports from China fell from US$2
billion in 2010 to a meagre US$720 million before they peaked again. A similar trend is also
noticeable in South Sudan, whose trade statistics are combined with those of northern Sudan
due to the intertwined nature of their economies. The outlier nature of the Malian case is
reflected in that trade relations between Mali and China are significantly lower than Libya and
South Sudan. This makes a case for challenging the assumption that China intervenes only
countries that it has major economic and trade interests in.
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1.4.2 Data collection and analysis
Conducting research on China-Africa security engagements is difficult for two reasons: First
there is lack of easily accessible data, and secondly, the subject is considered highly sensitive by
both China and African countries, including organisations such as the African Union, so few are
willing to talk about the subject. Thus, the research began with desk-top data gathering and
analysis. This effort focused on the theoretical underpinnings of the study; China’s engagement
in Africa, in particular the selected cases; and also on the context and conflict assessment of
the selected cases. During this stage, data was mainly obtained from official statements issued
by international organisations such as the United Nations, and the African Union, and also
statements of Chinese government ministries, in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
the Communist Party of China. In addition, information from the PRC’s official state news
agencies such as Xinhua, newspapers, and publications of Chinese international relations and
security think tanks such as the State Council’s China Centre for International Studies, the China
Institute for Contemporary International Relations, Shanghai Institute of International Studies
and the China Institute of International Studies were used. To avoid overreliance on Chinese
and African sources of information, the research also utilised publications from Western and
African think tanks such as the Chatham House and the South African Institute of International
Affairs, as well as official statements from the United States of America, France and the
European Union on the topic. This constituted the background analysis upon which field
research and interviews were based.
What became clear from the analysis of primary and secondary data is that Chinese internal
policy discussions and documents are not easily accessible. Official data from governments of
Libya, Mali, and South Sudan was not available online and was hardly accessible. Also, the data
from African governments, the African Union, and China tended to be official and standardised
in a manner that suggested it was mostly public relations-cum-propaganda information.
Because of these difficulties there was need for extensive interviews with Chinese, African
policymakers, and other relevant stakeholders. Using semi-structured interviews to get
opinions and views that are not so often contained in official statements, the researcher
conducted a total of twelve interviews in Hong Kong, Ethiopia, the United States, Taiwan and
Germany, and also by email with respondents in China, South Sudan, Mali and Libya. Selected
interviews that were conducted include: an interview with a researcher in China’s Ministry of
Commerce and six interviews with senior researchers at the Shanghai Institute for International
20

Studies, China Institute of International Studies, Chinese Communist Party School, the China
Foreign Affairs University, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at the University of Addis
Ababa (Ethiopia), and the Center for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch (South Africa).36
From June to August 2015, the researcher was hosted at the Institute for Peace and Security
Studies at the Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia as a visiting researcher. The strategic
importance of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies is that it jointly organizes the Tana
High-Level Forum on Security in Africa which is attended by former and current African
presidents as well as high level officials from major countries such as the United States, China,
and Britain; and it also jointly runs the Africa Peace and Security Programme with the African
Union’s Peace and Security Department. In the course of the three months, the researcher had
access to the Institute’s extensive library, and other African peace and security studies experts
at the Institute. Affiliation to the Institute also enabled the researcher to conduct semistructured interviews with three African Union high level officials directly working on intrastate
armed conflicts in Libya, Mali, and South Sudan. Three other interviews were conducted with
conflict analysts at the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional
organization for eight countries in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. IGAD has been playing the
mediatory role in the South Sudan conflict. Other ad hoc, unofficial discussions on the subject
matter held with a Chinese diplomat working at the Mission of the People’s Republic of China
to the African Union, as well as a Norwegian diplomat who had participated in South Sudan
conflict mediation as part of the IGAD – Plus initiative which includes United States, Norway,
United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union and the United Nations. Discussions with academics
in panels on China-Africa security relations at several academic conferences such as the
International Studies Association conferences in Buenos Aires (2014), New Orleans (2015), and
Atlanta (2016), as well as other academic conferences in Taiwan and Germany helped in
gathering insightful opinions that proved helpful to this study.
Due to the aforementioned data collection methods, the “high proportion of it [collected data]
is text based, consisting of verbatim transcriptions of interviews or discussions, field notes or
other written documents” (Ritchie and Spencer 2002, p. 309). To provide structure, meaning
and coherence to the data, the researcher employed preliminary data analysis ‘in order to
36
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highlight emerging issues, to allow all relevant data to be identified and to provide directions
for the seeking of further data’ (Grbich 2007, p. 25); this was done during the data collection
process. The preliminary data analysis allowed the researcher to identify and follow-up on
issues previously not considered as central to this research but that emerged from the
preliminary data analysis as significant research issues. In order to reduce the data into
meaningful categories, the conceptual mapping approach to thematic analysis was used to
systematically identify, analyse and categorise patterns within data. Content analysis was
useful in analysing trends in the three selected case studies, making it possible to develop
hypotheses about China’s intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts through the
emergent “trends and patterns of words used, their frequency, their relationships and the
structures and discourses of communication” (Grbich 2007, p. 112).

1.5 Definition of key terms
1.5.1 Intervention
In this study, intervention shall be in reference to political, military, economic or diplomatic
actions or inactions undertaken by a governmental or intergovernmental actor of the
international system [with or without consent of the target state], the purpose of which is to
affect the direction, duration or outcome of an intrastate armed conflict.37 As put by Karen
Feste, the definition of intervention can be extended “to include various forms of involvement
and assistance by an external state in an ongoing civil war (e.g., U.S. commitments to Greece in
the 1940s and covert aid to Afghan resistance fighters in the 1980s)” (2003, p. 178). Similarly,
Earl Conteh-Morgan (2001) also broadly conceptualizes intervention to include “both
coercive/military forms of intervention, and non-military coercive forms of intervention.”
Specifically, this study is concerned with unilateral actions or inactions such as mediation,
diplomatic, political, economic or military taken by the government of China or its appointed
agents, or multilaterally taken through the United Nations Security Council with or without the
consent of the appropriate authorities in Libya, Mali, and South Sudan. Actions or inactions
taken through the United Nations Security Council include abstaining, vetoing, or voting for
resolutions that lead to multilateral actions such as imposition of no-fly zones, sanctions,
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deployment of peacekeepers or other forces under the United Nations. The purpose of these
unilateral and multilateral actions should be to affect the duration, direction or outcome of the
intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan.

1.5.2 Intrastate armed conflicts
In Africa, intrastate armed conflicts rather than interstate wars are more prevalent and “remain
the dominant form of conflict.”38 The paucity of interstate wars is attributable to the de facto
and de jure committal by founders of independent African states to non-interference, respect
of national sovereignty, and adherence to pre-independence territorial borders.39 However,
while there was ‘peace’ among states, the majority of newly independent countries
experienced a surge in civil wars and military takeover of governments. Part of the reason
these events is that a significant number of African countries gained independence at the
height of “the Cold War politics of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. [Therefore] Independence converted
Africa into a battleground for East-West Cold War rivalry” (Francis 2006, p. 46). Within that
period, there was a steady increase in proxy wars in countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Angola, and Mozambique. “After the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, some previously
frozen conflicts in Africa reignited violently, including those in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda,
and the Democratic Republic of Congo” (Cilliers and Schuenemann 2013, p. 3). Intrastate
armed conflicts reached their peak in the early 1990s before subsiding. Although there has
been a significant decline in civil wars compared to the 1990s, they still remain extensive, their
nature and intensity as well as the complexity of actors involved has also evolved, making them
more devastating and difficult to conceptualise.
Scholarly focus on causes and consequences adds to the complexity of reaching a common
definition of intrastate armed conflicts, hence, it is “an imprecise and poorly observed
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phenomenon”40 to which different conflict databases and studies apply varying methodological
approaches to defining and analysing it. The resultant effect is that “scholars and analysts
interested in intrastate conflict are defined and divided by their epistemological worldview and
methodological approaches,”41 which are usually the result of subjective and ad hoc variables
such as, ethnicity, poverty, inequality, religion, regime type, resources scarcity that are
employed to explain the causes and nature of civil wars.42 Consequently, the definition of what
is a civil war is not universally acknowledged.
Due to varying methodologies and emphasis on different variables, several definitions of civil
war exist. In her book, Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts, Aydin Aysegul
defines civil war as “intrastate violence that crosses the threshold of 200 fatalities” (2012, p.
131). The Correlates of War Project conceptualises civil war as being a “sustained combat
between/among organised armed forces taking place within the territorial boundaries of a
state system member and leading to 1,000 battle-related deaths (of combatants) per year (or
12-month period starting from the war onset” (Sarkees 2014, p. 242). On the other hand, the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)
describes civil war as an internal contested incompatibility between the government of a state
and internal opposition group(s) that concerns government and/or territory where the use of
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in
at least 25 battle-related deaths. Unlike the others, Gersovitz and Kriger (2013) do not give a
death threshold in their definition of civil war; rather, they define it as “a politically organised,
large-scale, sustained, physically violent conflict that occurs within a country principally among
large/numerically important groups of its inhabitants or citizens over the monopoly of physical
force within the country” (Gersovitz and Kriger 2013, p. 160-161). Although varying in emphasis,
these definitions “converge around the same key dimensions of the phenomenon,”43 that is, (1)
a sustained armed resistance/combat, (2) within the boundaries of a recognised sovereign
state, (3) between the government of the state and one or more internal organised armed
opposition groups, and (4) reaching a certain numerical threshold of deaths.
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The existence of a state, particularly for African countries such as Somalia whose statehood is
questioned, is the starting point in determining whether an armed conflict constitutes a civil
war. Max Weber envisaged a state as “the form of human community that (successfully) lays
claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory – and this
idea of ‘territory’ is an essential defining feature” (Weber, cited in Owen and Strong 2004, p.
33). An intrastate armed conflict is therefore a civil war, first, because it occurs within the
territorial boundaries of a sovereign state. What further distinguishes civil wars from other
equally large scale internal violent conflicts, however, is the civil war belligerents’ objective of
capturing and possessing the monopoly of force within an international system state. Unlike
‘one-time-events’ such as political assassinations, a civil war entails “large-scale and sustained
internal political violence that contests the monopoly of force” (Gersovitz and Kriger 2013, p.
161). A civil war is therefore distinct from other forms of internal violence because it is ‘political’
in nature and purpose; meaning that, the interest and purpose of the civil war actors must be
to influence “the distribution or preservation of power, or a shift in power … [Therefore, they
strive] for power, either power as a means in the service of other goals, whether idealistic or
selfish, or power ‘for its own sake,’ in other words, so as to enjoy the feeling of prestige that it
confers” (Weber, Owen and Strong 2004, p. 33-34). Thus, for as long as the purpose of the
violence is not for political power, as is the case with organised criminal organisations, or
terrorist insurgent groups like Al Shabab in Somalia and Kenya, it cannot be defined as civil war.
A third distinct component of the definition of civil war regards the involved actors, that is, the
armed opposition groups(s) challenging the monopoly of violence within a state on one hand
and an incumbent government that possesses such authority on the other. “The challengers
may seek to replace the incumbents in control of the monopoly of force within the extant
territory of the state, or they may seek the secession of part of the original territory” (Gersovitz
and Kriger 2013, p. 161). The incumbent or national government is codified as those “forces
that were at the start of the war in de facto control of the nation’s institutions, regardless of
the legality or illegality of their claim” (Sarkees 2014, p. 242), while national institutions are
defined as “institutions of governance and whichever party begins the war in possession of the
institutions of governance (parliament, the palace, etc.) may be termed the government. When
each side in a civil war controls an institution (e.g. Chile’s Congressionist rebellion that pitted
President against Congress), then the executive or monarch’s faction ought to be termed the
government” (Dixon 2003, p. 4). “This excludes a number of internal wars from the civil war
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definition, most notably wars of liberation from colonialism…, [that] are instead listed as extrasystemic wars” (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, p. 714); or other internal armed conflicts between
non-state armed groups, or one-sided violence perpetuated by either a government or an
armed group. The involvement of an incumbent government in an armed combat with one or
more organised armed opposition groups is therefore essential in distinguishing a civil war
from other forms of internal violence.
Although conflict databases such as the Correlates of War (COW) project, Heidelberg Institute
for International Conflict Research, the UCDP/PRIO and the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) agree
that a civil war is a sustained armed combat/resistance within a sovereign state between an
incumbent government and internal armed opposition group(s), they differ on the numerical
threshold of deaths. The Correlates of War sets the threshold at “1,000 battle-related deaths
(of combatants) per year (or 12-month period starting from the war onset” (Sarkees 2014, p.
242). For the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute,
Oslo (PRIO) the internal armed conflict should result in at least 25 battle-related deaths.44 In
contrast, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, set the threshold at more
than 1 080 battle-related combatant and civilian fatalities.45
Differences in the death threshold reflect the divergence of methodologies, data gathering
approaches and analysis of conflicts by the different databases. Depending on the database,
death thresholds may relate to the cumulative monthly or annual number of battle-related
deaths. In some cases, it can be combatant deaths only, as is the case with the COW database,
or may include both combatant and civilian deaths as in the case of the Uppsala/PRIO database.
While the death threshold may be used to either include or exclude a conflict from the
database, both the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research and the
Uppsala/PRIO database use it to classify conflicts according to their intensity. However due to
varying numerical death thresholds among conflict databases, the same conflict may not be
classified in the same category. Thus, reliance on the numerical death threshold criterion alone
makes the definition and classification of conflicts uncertain – making it problematic to
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comprehensively analyse the duration, pattern, trend, dynamics and recurrence of the conflict
over time. So, although, the databases agree on other elements constituting a civil war, they
significantly differ on the operationalization of the concept. In that case, when “databases are
so different that they are not based on the same types of raw data, then they probably should
not be used to test exactly the same theory” (Kauffmann 2008:6), because it would lead “to
different views of where and when conflict occurs” (UNCTAD 2004, p. 161).
Debate on the conceptualisation and operationalization of ‘civil war’ by various conflict
databases is complex, the debate therefore falls beyond the scope of this study. For that
reason, the study bases its conceptual and operational understanding of ‘civil war’ or intrastate
armed conflict on one international database, the Uppsala/PRIO database on armed conflict;46
and focuses on civil wars that happened in Africa between 2005 and 2013. Uppsala/PRIO
defines armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.”47 The
death threshold of a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths is less than the usual 1 000 battle
related deaths used by databases such as the COW. However, Uppsala/PRIO categorises
conflicts depending on their intensity – which is measured by the number of battle-related
deaths. It codes the intensity variable in two categories: (1) minor – between 25 and 999
battle-related deaths in a given year, and (2) war – at least 1 000 battle-related deaths in a
given year.
This study is concerned with war, that is, intrastate armed conflicts (civil war) defined as a
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed
force between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with or
without intervention from other states, of which at least one is the government of a state
results in at least 1 000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. Uppsala/PRIO defines these
conflicts as internal armed conflict if there is no intervention from other states, and as
internationalised internal armed conflict if there is intervention from other states. In this study,
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the term ‘civil war’ and ‘intrastate armed conflict’ is used interchangeably to refer to both
internal and internationalised armed conflicts as defined by Uppsala/PRIO.

1.6 Study outline
This study contains nine chapters. The background and introduction of this study has been
given in this first chapter. The chapter laid the general background of the research context. The
theoretical and empirical significance of the study was discussed, and a brief introduction of
the main arguments was made. In a nutshell, it mentions the main case studies - Sudan, South
Sudan and Libya as well as the minor cases that will be intermittently referred to in the study. It
then shortly made reference to the neo-classical realist theory, which is the main theoretical
framework applied in this study.
The second chapter reviews existing literature on intervention in foreign conflicts by rising
powers. It assessed the prevailing discourse on the topic and the emerging gaps. The main
argument advanced in the chapter is that the major gap in existing literature is the lack of
systematic theoretical and empirical study of intervention in foreign conflicts by rising powers,
particularly China. Most of the literature on intervention focuses on traditional powers such as
the United States, France, Britain and multinational institutions such as the European Union
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
Chapter 3 makes an argument that in external intervention studies, practice has preceded
theory. The focus of IR theorists has remained on ‘states-that-matter’ such that the theories do
not explain the behaviour of small or rising states. It therefore made an argument for the use of
neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework able to explain the foreign policy behaviour of
rising powers.
The fourth chapter explores the argument that a state’s position in the international system
determines its foreign policy and external intervention behaviour. It begins by giving a critical
historical analysis of China’s evolving understanding of foreign intervention, its foreign
intervention policy and external intervention behaviour from imperial times to the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and until 2015. The aim is to trace the
historical evolving nature of China’s foreign policy regarding intervention in other states’
internal affairs vis-a-vis changes in its relative economic power and position in the international
system in order to understanding current Chinese intervention behaviour.
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Chapter 5 is the first of the three chapters that discusses China’s intervention in specific
intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. It explores Sino-Libya diplomatic, political and economic
relations from a historical perspective, and then focuses on China’s economic interests in Libya
and how the outbreak of the intrastate armed conflict in 2011 affected those interests in a
manner and scale never before experienced by China in Africa. The main argument advanced in
the chapter is that China’s response to the intrastate armed conflict in Libya changed from noninterventionism to ambivalent interventionism.
Following onto the previous chapter on Libya, the sixth chapter examines China’s intervention
in the Malian intrastate armed conflict. Through a historical analysis of Sino-Mali diplomatic,
political and economic relations since diplomatic relations were established in 1960, the
chapter discusses China’s response to previous Tuareg rebellions and coup d’états in Mali. The
argument pursued in this chapter is that in hindsight based on its experience in Libya, China’s
intervention in Mali was, although indifferent, more alert to the threats imposed by the Malian
armed conflict, enabling it to take more pragmatic strategies.
As the last in the three chapters assesses China’s intervention in African intrastate armed
conflicts, the seventh chapter examines China’s intervention behavior in South Sudan. The
argument advanced in the chapter is that, unlike in Libya and Mali, China’s intervention in
South Sudan was proactive, purposeful, and assertive, suggesting that its perception of African
intrastate armed conflicts as threatening to its external economic interests is constantly
evolving. Like the previous chapters, this argument culminated from a tracing of Sino-South
Sudan relations.
The last chapter in this study assesses trends and patterns of China’s intervention behavior in
African intrastate armed conflicts. The assessment is based on discussions of the historical
evolvement of China’s external intervention behavior in other states’ internal affairs as its
relative economic power and perception of threat to its interests abroad changed over time.
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CHAPTER 2 - Bringing rising powers into the foreign intervention
discourse – A review
2.1 Introduction
Literature on external intervention in intrastate armed conflicts is expanding. But does it
consider intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts by non-Western rising powers? This
chapter explores this question by assessing whether existing literature does account for such
intervention, especially considering that most non-Western rising powers do not entirely
subscribe to the western-centric order48 or western norms of intervention, Responsibility to
Protect,49 human rights, good governance, and democracy.50 In exploring the question, this
chapter examines the adequacy of current Western-centric theoretical and empirical narratives
in explaining interventions by these rising powers. It then notes that having been explained at
different levels of analysis using various methods and approaches, intervention has often been
portrayed as a foreign policy tool employed by global powers to protect their national interests
and expand their foreign influence. As a result, the discourse on intervention is fixated on nonconsensual intervention by powerful Western states such as the United States, Britain and
France which possess extensive military power and global influence. Meanwhile, intervention
by rising powers is either neglected or at best relegated to the peripheries of third-party
intervention, international politics, and foreign policy discourse.
Assessing works by international relations and foreign policy scholars, this review of existing
literature also advances an argument that lack of research which systematically connects
theoretical reasoning with empirical analysis of intervention in foreign intrastate conflicts by
rising powers is a major gap in current intervention discourse. This is despite the 21st century
global order recalibrations necessitated by non-Western rising powers. By advancing that
argument, it exposes the limitations of current empirical scholarship on intervention in
intrastate armed conflicts and argues for a more systematic interlink between theoretical and
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empirical analysis that takes into consideration the changing status of rising powers in the
global system and its effect on their intervention behaviour, thereby making a case for an
extensive empirical study of China’s intervention behaviour in intrastate armed conflicts in
Africa.
The objective of this chapter is that any resultant theoretical and empirical study of external
intervention in intrastate armed conflicts should consider interactive dynamics between
systemic and domestic variables in its causal explanation of a non-Western rising power’s
foreign intervention behaviour. This objective is a result of the synthesis of theoretical
arguments from both international relations and foreign policy fields in order to develop
explanatory variables that can adequately capture the evolving nature of the foreign policy of
rising global powers vis-à-vis their evolutionary but competing national and international status.
This, then contributes to the overall objective of this study, which is to offer explanations for
the emerging general trends and patterns of intervention by rising powers in foreign intrastate
armed conflicts.

2.2 International Relations and intervention in foreign intrastate conflicts
by rising powers
Hans Morgenthau’s argument is that intervention is a foreign policy instrument used by great
powers on behalf of their interests. To others such as Tillema (1989) and Steiner (2004, p. 16),
intervention is a preserve of great powers. Such statements as Morgenthau’s are instructive to
the theoretical and empirical study of intervention and world politics such that a mention of
intervention invokes the idea of a great power intruding into the domestic affairs of a small
state. Part of the reason why intervention is conceived of in that way is because realism is the
dominant paradigm in the study of international politics51 and, specifically in the scholarship of
intervention that focuses on great powers (Morgenthau 1967; Bull 1984; Feste 1992). At the
core of the realist thinking is that although theoretically all states exist within an interstate
system that supposedly guarantees their sovereign equality, “the strong do to others what
others cannot do to them” (Mandelbaum 1988, p. 135). Hence, beyond great powers, IR
theorists, especially classical and neo- realists, have no interest.
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Following in the mould of Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz emphasised the marginality of
small states in IR when he stated that ‘Denmark does not matter’ in international politics.
Stephen Krasner is also reported to have argued that states without hegemonic power were
irrelevant to IR and the study of global politics. He reasoned: “Sure people in Luxembourg have
good ideas. But who gives a damn? Luxembourg ain’t hegemonic” (Nossal 2001, p. 176). In
addition, Robert W. Cox suggests that to the neorealist, “middle and small states do not matter;
they can be ignored in calculating the configuration of effective power relations” (1992, p. 143).
Such reasoning among renowned scholars is somewhat representative of the attitude toward
small states in the capitals of major powers. Pinar Bilgin therefore argues that the primacy of
Western-centric IR compels both students and scholars to focus on great powers while
relegating small states to the peripheries of their thinking.52
Nowhere is the relegation of non-great powers, that is, rising powers and small state to
insignificant status evidently ubiquitous than in the literature on state intervention in another
state’s internal affairs. Immanuel Wallerstein, architect of the World Systems Theory put it that
“strong states find it far easier to ‘intervene’ in the internal affairs of weaker states than vice
versa,”53 the major factor being that strong states possess military and economic capabilities
that other states do not have. For that reason, a distinction is made “between states of general
interests (system-wide interests) and states with limited interests” (Handel 1990, p. 22). Since
great powers are states of system-wide influence, their interests, which they ought to protect,
extend beyond their borders and regions; hence, their “basic foreign policy consists of
protecting and safeguarding [their] sphere of interest” (Reczei 1971, p. 74).
This distinction falls into Morgenthau’s assertion that great powers intervene where their
national interest requires it and where their power enables them to succeed.54 It also follows
that in order to explain intervention, realists emphasise national interest (Morgenthau 1967;
Bull 1984; Feste 1992) and power (relative material capabilities) as the causal explanatory
variables of why global powers intervene in foreign intrastate conflicts and why other states do
not. The focus on interests and power as factors compelling states to intervene in other
sovereignties demands further but brief explanation. First, national interests, whether
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domestic or foreign, are not exclusive to great powers. Principally, every state, great or small,
has interests that may extend beyond its territorial boundaries. What, however, differs among
them is the scope of those interests and the methods of intervention they employ on their
behalf. More so, the scope of a state’s interests is not static or ‘cast in stone’ so to speak.
Neoclassical realists understand this better because their main proposition is that states
expand their interests abroad when their relative material capabilities increase (Taliaferro 2004,
p. 3; Mandelbaum 1988, p. 134-135; Kennedy 1987, p. xxii; Zakaria 1998, p. 3). Because of their
concern with interests and power, classical and neo-realists do not explain the intervention
behaviour of states whose relative material capabilities are increasing and whose interests are
expanding abroad. Instead, they ridicule them as “states whose ambitions run ahead of their
material capabilities”55 – that is, rising powers whose expanding foreign interests are not
commensurate with their military capabilities.
Secondly, power is a central concept to international relations theory. Generally, the concept of
power can be defined either as relational or material. However, “by far the majority prefers a
material definition of ‘power’ as the capabilities or resources, mainly military, with which states
influence one another. Power in this view is the actual capacity to raise armies, deploy navies,
occupy territory, and exert various forms of pressure against other states.”56 Power is therefore
usually defined as capabilities, “that may or may not be translated into influence over many
issues” 57 rather than control, as argued by those who define power from a relational
perspective. In his conceptualisation of great powers, Kenneth Waltz defines power in terms of
material capabilities. He notes that "states, because they are in a self-help system, have to use
their combined capabilities in order to serve their interests. The economic, military, and other
capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately weighed because state power is
multidimensional. States are not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or
another. Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population
and territory; resource endowment; military strength; political stability; and competence"
(Waltz 1979, p. 131).
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It can be argued that because great powers possess comprehensive capabilities, they tend to
have interests that other states do not have, and in turn, their intervention behaviour is
broader. Although Kenneth Waltz advocates an aggregate understanding of states’ overall
capabilities in deciding their global power status, scholars such as Christopher Layne (1993),
give preeminence to military capabilities to determine whether a state is a great power or not.
They are preoccupied with the “utility and fungibility of military power” (Mastanduno 1997, p.
49). As a result, according to Jack Levy there are four characteristics that distinguish great
powers from other states, that is, they possess immense military capabilities which guarantees
their security from other states; they are able to project their power abroad; they have a
system-wide concept of security; and they are able to protect their interests abroad more
effectively than other states.58
While acknowledging the propensity of great powers to intervene in the internal affairs of small
states, Richard Little notes that even small states also have a tendency to interfere in each
other’s domestic affairs on behalf of their interests. 59 For instance, Zimbabwe, Uganda and
Rwanda are small states in the construct of most IR theory, yet they have militarily intervened
on several occasions in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) intrastate armed conflicts.
Although it might be rare for a small state to intervene in states beyond its region, that alone,
does not mean small states and more so, rising powers should be in the periphery of the
intervention discourse as they presently are. In that regard, the demarcation of states into ones
with limited interests and others with system-wide interests only serves to show the scope of
the reach of their interests and does not explain their intervention behaviour. Accordingly, the
pervasive argument that the world’s weakest states are the targets of intervention, with the
world’s most powerful states being the executors60 which is propagated by realists and widely
accepted in IR, does not hold in elucidating the intervention behaviour of states, great, small or
rising in foreign intrastate conflicts.
In an anarchic system as envisioned by neo-realists’ interpretation of international relations,
“the distribution of power among these units [states] will be the most important variable
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conditioning their behaviour and the outcome of their interactions over the long run”
(Wohlforth 1993, p. 2). Steve Chan challenges this neorealist perspective that state behaviour is
determined by the systemic structure. He maintains that “structure is not everything or even
the most important thing”61 because it is not always the case that states in the same systemic
structure behave in a similar manner;62 neither do they share the same interests. One of the
major effects of focusing on the systemic structure is that it perpetuates stereotyping and
profiling of state behaviour, which has an effect on how intervention is analysed. Pearson fell
into the ‘stereotyping trap’ when he concluded that “major powers seem inclined to undertake
economic or diplomatic-military protective, ideological, or regional power balance
interventions in distant targets, while middle and small powers are likely to undertake
territorial and social-protective interventions, as well as regional power balance interventions
in nearby targets” (1974, p. 262-263). To the contrary, history is awash with states that attempt
to punch above their weight. Therefore, narratives that confine state behaviour to structure of
the system disregard those ‘ambitious’ states and expressions of their capabilities in foreign
interactions.
Accordingly, the focus on the distribution of power in the interstate system and a bias toward
military power has significant implications on the study of intervention. First, by explaining
state behaviour as a function of a state’s international attributes, particularly its relative
military power,63 the focus of intervention scholarship is transfixed on military intervention by
great powers, disregarding the economic power and geo-economic influence that rising powers
such as China have. Even though “markets can have as much influence as militaries”64 realists
would still argue that rising powers simply are not great powers, hence they cannot do what
great powers do - “great powers intervene in the periphery because they enjoy a favourable
international power position” (Toliaferro 2004, p. 3). Second, literature on third-party
intervention in foreign conflicts is written from the perspective of great powers,65 particularly
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the United States; and, is predominantly focused on intervention strategies used by such great
powers. This suggests that intervention is a foreign policy tool66 used by major powers to
extend their influence and establish hegemony beyond their regions at the exclusion of other
competing powers.
This prevalent focus on military capabilities of great powers also promotes the erroneous
conception of intervention as coercive military action taken by states with higher relative
capabilities against weaker states. 67 The implication is that it effectively inhibits critical
investigation and analysis of other forms of intervention employed by different states that have
material capabilities other than military capabilities. As a result, “the foreign policy choices of
second-tier states [rising global powers] are arrived at deductively, irrespective of whether or
not they correspond particularly closely either to policy options that have actually been
adopted or to understandings of those choices within second-tier states themselves” (Hurrell
2006:6). This is apparent in existing literature. For instance, Stephen Walt asks two questions:
“How do the great powers choose which states to protect, and how do weaker states decide
whose protection to accept?” (1987, p. 1). He completely ignores rising global powers, and
does not ask what they do. The disregard of rising global powers in current theoretical analyses
is therefore distinct, hence the realist narrative fails to explain intervention by non-global
powers in foreign intrastate armed conflicts.
Contrary to realists’ perspectives, “constructivists focus on identity and ideas through
enlightened agency” (Snyder 2005, p. 56). They dispute that interests and identities “follow
either logically or causally from anarchy,” arguing that they are “due to process, not structure…
structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process” (Wendt 1992, p. 394-395). In
her book, The Purpose of Intervention, Martha Finnemore posits that state interests are
indeterminate because “in any case of intervention, one could impute a very reasonable set of
interests that would explain intervention and another equally plausible set that would explain
non-intervention” (2003, p. 5). So, instead of focusing on interests, she argues that focus
should be on changing perceptions of interests and the utility of intervention as a tool of policy
(Finnemore 2003, p. 5). She therefore proposed a theory of ‘strategic social construction’ to
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explain how powerful states determine the values and perceptions regarding intervention
depending on their current geostrategic and security interests. Nicholas Wheeler concurs, but
he notes that those values and perceptions have to be accepted by other states in the
international system as being legitimate and justifiable (Wheeler 2000; Finnemore 2003, p. 73).
Thus, “intervention is not just a fig leaf for powerful states to cover their geopolitical pursuits
but also a result of shifting views within societies about acceptable behaviour” (Ikenberry
2001).Yet still, like the realists, constructivists acknowledge that “rules about intervention are
strongly if not entirely shaped by the actions of powerful states that actually have the capacity
to intervene” (Finnemore 2003, p. 5). This consolidates the realist argument that the
international system and the status of a state within that system plays a crucial role in
determining as state’s foreign policy and behaviour.
A follow-on question to the constructivist’s perspective on intervention is whether states
intervene on the basis of objective national interests or on interests that are constructed over
time based on existing and constructed values. Alexander Wendt argues that how a state acts is
dependent on its identity and related interests. He maintains that “each identity has associated
needs or objective interests, and actors’ understanding of these in turn constitute the
subjective interests that motivate their action” (Wendt 1999, p. 198). What Alexander Wendt
supposes is that a state’s identity shapes its interests upon which its foreign policy actions are
based. Since he defines “national interest as the objective interests of state-society complexes,
consisting of four needs: physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective selfesteem” (1999, p. 198) states’ foreign policy behaviour is foundationally based on its objective
national interests. The interpretation of those interests, however, vary depending on how a
state identifies itself. A state that identifies itself as a global power will act differently from a
state that identifies itself as a rising power or a small state in the Global South.
The underlying factor among constructivists is that “the political and cultural context in which
national interests are forged” matters (Burchill 2005, p. 205). Although states have the same
objective national interests, their self-identity compels them to re-interpret those objective
interests which explains why a state may behave differently at different times. How a state
identifies itself determines how it acts in order to protect its interests abroad. National
interests are therefore subjective interests because states interpret their identity and needs
based on their different political, economic and cultural contexts. While constructivists assist in
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understanding identity and interest formation among states, their assumption, particularly
Alexander Wendt’s proposition that there are objective national interests (physical survival,
autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem) upon which a state’s subjective
interests are based suggests that a state’s relative position among other states determine its
foreign policy actions. When a state expands its interests abroad and increases its material
capabilities enabling it to have system-wide interests then it will act differently that a state
experience economic depression and shrinking material capabilities. The implication is that as a
state interprets its interests broadly, it tends to behave differently. Thus, as put by Alexander
Wendt “states’ interpretation of these needs tend to be biased in a self-interested direction,
which predisposes them to competitive, ‘Realist’ politics but that this does not mean that
states are inherently self-interested” (Wendt 1999, p. 198).
Other studies on intervention have used economic liberalism to explain how and why thirdparty states join ongoing intrastate conflicts. In an article aptly titled “Choosing Sides: Economic
Interdependence and Interstate Disputes,” Aysegul Aydin notes that “states that are
interdependent with the conflict participants have a strong incentive to enter these conflicts on
the side of their trade partner while they avoid supporting the opposite side” (2008:1099).
After testing her framework against militarised interstate dispute cases from 1870-2001, she
found that “economic interdependence in the form of bilateral trade is a critical factor in
understanding whether an ongoing conflict will be joined by third parties” (Aydin 2008, p.
1099). In the book, Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts, she consummated her
arguments into a liberal economic theory, arguing that interveners are motivated by the need
to protect financial and economic interests of their domestic actors in the conflict states. She
therefore concluded that states with high levels of trade, foreign direct investments, and
preferential trade agreements with belligerent states are more likely to intervene than those
without (Aydin 2012).
Aydin’s (2012) findings are crucial to this study because states are not just influenced by their
relative material capabilities in the international system, as realists argue and to some extent
as constructivists infer, instead, they are also motivated by domestic political processes and
actors. Hence there is a relationship between a state’s economic interests, domestic processes,
and foreign policy. However, there are three major distinctions between Aydin’s research and
this study. (1) Aydin principally concentrated on interstate conflicts, whereas this study entirely
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focuses on intervention in intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. (2) Aydin applied her theoretical
framework to United States’ intervention in international armed conflicts, while this study
focuses on China, a non-Western rising power. (3) In Aydin’s study, motivations and constraints
for intervention in foreign conflicts are internal to the intervener, that is, the intervener is
motivated by internal economic interests.68 To the contrary, this study combines systemic and
domestic motivation and constraints, and departs from the dominance of the United States in
the existing literature on intervention. Rather, it focuses on a rising global power, China, thus
putting to test the efficacy of current great-power-focused theoretical analyses of intervention.
Nonetheless, economic liberalism as advanced by Aysegul Aydin in Foreign Powers and
Intervention in Armed Conflicts demonstrates the fundamental link between domestic politics
and economic interests in intervention decisions, but without considering the systemic factors
that influence foreign policy decisions on external intervention, it lacks the critical ingredient of
a foreign policy theory. According to Fareed Zakaria a ‘good’ theory of foreign policy
would first examine the effect of the international system on foreign policy, for the
most important general characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative
standing in the international system. [Hence] a good account of a nation’s foreign
policy will point to the role played by systemic as well as other factors (Zakaria 1998, p.
16, 17; Zakaria 1992, p. 198).
The effect of the international system on rising powers and vice-versa is too imperative to be
ignored – because rising powers are states whose global status is in a transition prompting a
shift in interests, domestic and international identity, capabilities and domestic processes. In
effect, broadly “the ascent of these states is addressing imbalances in the global system – and
in the globalisation process- that up until now have mainly reflected the greater influence of
traditionally powerful states and commercial actors” (Cooper and Flemes 2013, p. 944).
Based on the above review, there are several limitations within the classical realist, neo-realist,
constructivist, and liberal components of IR literature on external intervention in foreign
intrastate armed conflicts. To begin with, realists and constructivists overly focus on material
and structural factors in the international system to explain foreign intervention in both
intrastate and interstate conflicts. By narrowly focusing on systemic variables as the key
sources of foreign intervention behaviour, their analysis does not explain variations in the
intervention behaviour of states within the same systemic rank or variations in the intervention
behaviour of a particular state over time. Secondly, the liberal strand of IR literature on
68
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intervention emphasises economic interdependence among states and domestic processes and
actors such as business interest groups to explain why states intervene in foreign intrastate
conflicts. Although fundamental, on its own, this approach does not adequately explain
whether or not the rise in a state’s relative power has an influence on its intervention
behaviour. The third point is that IR literature focuses on states of global significance, hence
literature on external intervention is from the perspective of major global powers. By only
considering major global powers as interveners and the small powers as targets of intervention,
it disregards the intervention behaviour of states in transition from small powers to great
powers that is, rising powers. This encourages the “tendency to overstate the causal power of
structural-global variables” (Regilme 2014, p. 1392); which in turn limits their explanatory
power and scope of analysis.
How then can theories of foreign policy and IR explain the external intervention behaviour of
rising powers? Broadly, there has to be an acknowledgement that the emergence of nonWestern rising powers such as China, Brazil, South Africa, and India “is transforming the
geopolitical landscape and testing the institutional foundations of the post-World War II liberal
order… they are intent on altering rules, not adopting them hook, line and sinker. These
countries do not grant the United States the sole authority to define the limits of responsible
sovereignty. They believe they are entitled to reshape international arrangements to suit
themselves” (Patrick 2010). Indeed, the rise of these powers is causing a recalibration of the
global order. Inevitably, their rise has led to a “relative decline of the United States’ position in
the world – and with this relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and
independence, [hence] today’s world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than
concentrated power” (Haass 2008, p. 46). Where once the United States could unilaterally
intervene, or influence the international community to support its interventionist policies, it is
now beginning to face resistance not just from China and Russia, but also from democracies like
South Africa and Brazil. Libya and Syria present good examples of the diminished dominance of
major powers’ influence as far as intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts is concerned.
On the other side, the rise in power by these states has had an impact on their domestic
political processes and subsequently their foreign policies. No longer are they confined to their
regions or neighbourhoods; instead they are venturing further afield – challenging assumptions
that geographical proximity is a factor in their intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts.
In the process, new domestic actors are emerging that are beginning to influence domestic
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political processes and seeking to influence their countries’ foreign policy and behaviour. There
is therefore need for a theory that examines both sides, starting from the effect of the
international system on the foreign policy (intervention) behaviour of rising powers, and then
moving further to also consider the influence of domestic politics and national interests on a
state’s foreign policy behaviour. As shall be discussed in Chapter 3, neo-classical realism
combines those two essential elements and provides a basis for explaining the intervention
behaviour of rising powers in foreign intrastate armed conflicts.

2.3 Do existing empirical studies account for intervention in foreign
conflicts by rising powers?
Systematic empirical studies on external intervention in foreign intrastate conflicts began in
earnest in 1996 when Patrick M. Regan published the insightful article: Conditions of Successful
Third Party Intervention in Intra-State Conflicts. 69 Before then, earlier research efforts
concentrated on developing a conceptual understanding of external intervention.70 James N.
Rosenau led those earlier conceptualisation efforts that became the foundation upon which
later research was built upon. A majority of the empirical research that followed concentrated
on external intervention in interstate conflicts and ethnic conflicts (Carment 1993; Carment and
Rosenau 1995a, 1995b; Khosla 1999). However, since 1996 research on intervention in foreign
intrastate armed conflicts has increased, and has basically covered three themes: (1) the effect
of intervention and intervening actors on civil wars, (2) conditions for successful intervention
and (3) decision-making by states on intervention. These three themes have often been
addressed in cross-national studies focusing on intervention in specific civil wars; while in some
cases “a more qualitative approach often using single cases to describe specific interventions”
was adopted (Regan 2010, p. 457). In a nutshell, the period from 1996 can be described as “a
decade of scholarship… [that] addressed issues of when interventions take place and how
interventions play out when they do take place” (Regan 2010, p. 457). However, despite such
significant advancement in scholarship on external intervention in foreign intrastate armed
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conflicts, three basic but fundamental questions have remained insufficiently addressed. Those
questions are: Who intervenes?71 Does a state’s intervention behaviour change when its
relative economic power increases? Is the nature and mode of intervention evolving?
Answering the above three questions has been inhibited by a major assumption that has
become a universal dogma in intervention literature. The assumption is that major powers are
the prime interveners in foreign intrastate conflicts outside of their regions; and that for the
rest of the countries, geographical proximity determines their intervention behaviour. In other
words, they only intervene in conflicts that are geographically close to them. As a result, the
intervention behaviour of global powers, particularly, the United States, Britain, and France,
have dominated empirical studies focused on interventions in foreign internal conflicts.72 Few
studies have analysed intervention in foreign civil wars by neighbouring countries as well as
third world countries.73 The main reason for that assumption is that there have only been a
handful of states that consistently and unilaterally intervene in foreign intrastate conflicts.
During the Cold War era, Soviet Union and the United States were the major interveners in
foreign conflicts, albeit using proxies. In the post-Cold War period, the United States became
the leading consistent unilateral intervener followed by France, which has maintained influence
as well as economic and political interests in most of its former African colonies. Subsequently,
the question of ‘who intervenes’ has not been popular among intervention scholars, because it
seemed obvious that only major powers intervene in other states’ internal conflicts.
Accordingly, research on who intervenes in civil wars has remained anchored on great powers
such that it has fallen short in articulating intervention by other states, particularly, nonwestern rising powers.
As noted above, empirical studies on unilateral intervention suggest that most interventions
have been conducted by major global powers. Patrick Regan analysed 196 cases of intervention
in 138 intrastate conflicts that occurred over a period of 50 years, from 1944 to 1994. Of those
conflicts, he observed that “nearly 40% (76 cases) of all interventions were carried out by major
powers, 5% (10 cases) of the interventions were under UN auspices, and the remainder were
attributed to minor powers” (1996, p. 345). China only intervened in 6 intrastate conflicts, an
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average of once every decade, and all the six interventions where in Asian conflicts. Although
he did not define major powers, Regan mentioned the United States, Russia, France and Britain
as being the major interveners – inferring that they are the major powers. Having made that
observation, he concluded that success of an intervention strategy is not entirely based on
features of the conflict but on characteristics of the intervention strategy and on the status of
the intervener. The deduction was that interventions by major powers are more successful and
common because they, the major powers possess “larger and projectable military forces… [And]
a wider range of economic resources that can be brought to bear in a foreign policy role”
(Regan 1996, p. 348).
Kathman (2010) concurs with Regan (1996) that the characteristic or status of an intervener is
critical to understanding third-party intervention behaviour in foreign intrastate armed
conflicts. Using the connection theory approach, he classified third-party state interveners by
their status into the following categories: major power intervener, democratic intervener,
African intervener and neighbour in order to determine which third-party states were more
likely to intervene in foreign intrastate conflicts. Rising powers were not included in that
analysis. Like Regan (1996) he concluded that “a slightly larger proportion [of third-party
intervention in civil wars] is accounted for by global powers… most of whom are geographically
distant from civil war hot spots” (Kathman 2010, p. 996). The finding, however, contradicts
claims by other scholars74 who suggest that states are more concerned with conflicts in
neighbouring countries than in far-off regions.
On the contrary, a study that focused on Brazil and Venezuela noted that for rising powers,
distance from the conflict may still be a factor. Referring to the role of Brazil and Venezuela in
the Israeli-Palestine conflict, Burton (2013) observed that although rising powers were taking
more action in resolving conflicts in other regions, “the distance and lack of contact between
emerging powers from the south like Brazil and Venezuela on one side, and Israel and Palestine
on the other”75 precluded them from effectively resolving the conflicts. All the same, there is an
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inferred consensus that the status of an intervener in the international system can either
constrain or expand the number of foreign conflicts that it can intervene in, and how effective
that intervention will be if it takes place; thus the status of a state in the global system is largely
considered important to understanding that particular state’s intervention behaviour. However,
despite the consensus there still is no significant research analysing how changes in a state’s
international status affects its intervention behaviour. The majority of existing research still
focuses on intervention by major powers like the United States (Yoon 1997; Findley and Teo
2006; Aubone 2013). As a result, research on the effects of a state’s rise in power on its
intervention behaviour in foreign conflicts is still limited.
One example, however, is a study by Amber Aubone which explained United States’ unilateral
military intervention in foreign civil wars. She observed that “the United States’ rise in power
resulted in increased intervention in the affairs of other states in the Western Hemisphere”
(2013, p. 284). In making that observation, she set a platform for impending research to test
whether an increase in the relative power of a rising state has any effect on its intervention
behaviour. Attempts to explore that question are beginning to develop, especially within policy
research think tanks. In May 2013, the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International
Affairs at the American University of Beirut published a Working Paper titled: Emerging Powers
and Israeli-Palestine Conflict: The Case of Brazil and Venezuela. The Working Paper examined
the role of Brazil and Venezuela as emerging powers in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Although
the Israeli-Palestine conflict is not entirely an intrastate conflict, the paper made useful findings
that can be tested in other empirical studies.
Similarly, Saferworld76 published a study on China’s economic and political engagements with
four conflict-affected countries - Sudan, South Sudan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Although targeted
at policymakers, the report reiterated the implications of rising powers on global peace and
stability, especially as they extend their influence to countries affected by intrastate armed
conflicts. The two reports by Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs and
Saferworld make two essential observations: First, they both note the increasing influence of
rising powers in the international system and the subsequent impact that the rise has had in
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the global order that privileged major powers. Second, they observe that the expansion of
economic and political engagement between rising powers and states in the Global South is
bringing new realities and changing the context for global governance. In themselves, the two
observations challenge western-centric assumptions of the pre-eminence of liberal global
powers in external intervention; thus setting a stage for those assumptions to be reconfigured
to the new realities of multiple rising powers whose global engagements seem to be reducing
the spheres of influence of traditional global powers such as the United States.77

2.4 China and Intervention in Intrastate Armed Conflicts in Africa
As discussed in the previous chapter, China is one of the most significant rising powers of the
21st century, which in many respects has had substantial implications on contemporary global
governance. In 2005, Robert Zoellick, the then United States Deputy Secretary of State sparked
a debate on what it would take to make China a ‘responsible stakeholder’, able to resolve
global challenges alongside other western global powers. In a speech titled, Whither China:
From Membership to Responsibility, he said:
China’s involvement with troublesome states indicates at best a blindness to
consequences and at worst something more ominous… On my early morning runs in
Khartoum, I saw Chinese doing tai chi exercises. I suspect they were in Sudan for the oil
business. But China should take more than oil from Sudan – it should take some
responsibility for resolving Sudan’s human crisis. It could work with the United States,
the UN, and others to support the African Union’s peacekeeping mission, to provide
humanitarian relief to Darfur, and to promote a solution to Sudan’s conflicts (Zoellick
2005).
In his view, China was acting as an irresponsible global stakeholder, concerned only with
economic and strategic gains, and failing to intervene where it was supposed to.
Zoellick’s speech acknowledged that of the current rising powers, China was the most
significantly able to impose challenges on the systemic order. Second, it gave an impression
that China should and has the capacity to take more responsibility in resolving internal conflicts
in countries it trades with78 alongside the United States, the United Nations and other actors
that presumably hold the same view of global governance as the United States; and thirdly,
that China should go beyond its own economic and strategic interests. Of more significance
however, is that Zoellick’s speech portrayed China as a power that needed to be tamed and
77
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socialised into a responsible stakeholder within the prevailing liberal world order. That thought
reflects the dominant opinion in International Relations – “why can China, as an illiberal,
authoritarian state, make rules for the world regarding humanitarian intervention? Why is it
not the other way around in which international institutions socialise China into accepting the
liberal humanitarian norms?” (Lee, Chan and Chan 2008, p. 437).
In terms of studies on Chinese foreign policy, Zoellick’s speech represents the prevailing view in
current literature that China is an irresponsible power that constitutes a threat to the presentday global governance order. It is therefore not surprising that literature on whether China is a
status quo or revisionist state and how the United States should respond to the ‘China threat’
flourished. But, nowhere has the impact of China’s rise in global power and influence been
seen more than in Africa. What is more interesting is that both China and Africa “relate to the
global system with a mutually reinforcing sense of historical grievances… they share a neoWestphalian commitment to state sovereignty and non-intervention”79 much to the chagrin of
Western global powers. On one hand, China’s official view of the global system provokes “a
flurry of criticisms aimed at Beijing’s perceived amoralism” (Taylor 2007, p. 139); and on the
other, it made China popular among African leaders (Pang 2009, p. 238). Against this backdrop,
research on China-Africa engagement has progressed from the human rights and good
governance discourse of the late 1990s to the specificities of bilateral trade relations between
China and individual African countries, particularly countries that possess strategic natural
resources such as oil. Be that as it may, research on China’s intervention behaviour in intrastate
armed conflicts, particularly in Africa is beginning to emerge80 although it is primarily focused
on China’s evolving foreign official policy principle of non-interference in other states’ internal
affairs; and China’s peacekeeping operations.
Research on the above two issues – China’s non-intervention principle, and peacekeeping
operations - often tends to be based on single case studies, and is overly descriptive without
systematically connecting theoretical thought with empirical analysis. For instance, much focus
has been on China’s engagement with Sudan, particularly in relation to the Darfur crisis.81 As
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observed by Ian Taylor, researchers focusing on China-Sudan relations were mainly concerned
with “Beijing’s weapons-exporting policy and its involvement in Sudan’s long running civil war”
(Taylor 2007, p. 143); and they sought to prove the transformation of China’s foreign policy
from non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states to conditional interference (Pang
2009). Although, they provide detailed empirical analyses, the analyses are based on diverse
explanatory variables that differ with each case study such that it is difficult to generalise the
findings and establish patterns and trends in China’s intervention behaviour. In the end, “most
of these studies seem to lack a ‘good theory’ that presents ‘the big picture’ of what is
happening in myriad realms of activity” (Regilme 2014, p. 1395).
Even in cases where comparative case studies on China’s intervention behaviour are conducted,
there is a general tendency to lump diverse explanatory variables together and select cases in a
random unscientific manner. For instance, a report conducted by Saferworld, titled, China and
conflict-affected states: Between principle and pragmatism compared China’s engagement in
four conflict-affected countries: Sudan, South Sudan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. With the exception
of Sudan and South Sudan, there are no significant comparative properties among the four
countries. As a result, rather than being comparative, the study was in essence a compilation of
single case studies. Although the report was made for the policymaking community, there has
been very little attempt in the academic community to disaggregate the empirical data in order
to develop specific causal hypothesis that can explain whether China’s increased intervention
behaviour is a result of its increasing relative economic power - a conclusion that is made in the
report and also in an article by Zhongying Pang.82 What this means is that although these
detailed empirical studies link China’s intervention behaviour with its increased economic
engagement in developing countries, the studies are unhelpful in the attempt to develop
comprehensive and generalizable causal hypothesis that seek to explain its rise in global power
and increased external intervention behaviour.
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2.5 Theoretical and empirical implications
Taking note of the above review, there are two major gaps in literature on external
intervention in foreign intrastate conflicts. The first gap is that there is a general lack of
systematic linkage between empirical studies and theoretical analysis of intervention in foreign
conflicts by non-Western rising powers in both International Relations and foreign policy
analysis. Literature on external intervention is still fixated on interventions by major powers.
Small powers are considered to be merely passive recipients of intervention and rising powers
are conspicuously absent. Although the focus on major powers strengthened various
intervention models and theoretical frameworks, it has become the major undoing for research
on intervention because it failed to consider that “the principal characteristic of the twentyfirst century international relations is turning out to be non-polarity: a world dominated not by
one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising
different kinds of power” (Haas 2008, p. 44). Therefore, it is not surprising that empirical
studies on intervention have remained stuck on global powers and have failed to adapt to the
new global order reality of several rising powers. Thus, existing empirical and theoretical
understandings of rising global powers as interveners is incapacitated.
The key reason, as discussed above, is that the main approaches of international relations focus
on “states that make the most difference” (Waltz 1979, p. 73), that is, the Western great
powers. The Global South, home to most of the rising powers (China, Brazil, India, Russia and
South Africa) is still largely disregarded in International Relations theory. Only in the past two
decades, because of the exponential increase in the relative economic powers of rising powers
such as China have International Relations scholars started to take notice; but even then, the
conduct of rising powers is still largely being considered from the perspective of great powers.
The overarching implication of this focus on global powers is that it has precluded the
scholarship on external intervention from exploring new intervention strategies peculiar to
rising powers that often lack the military capabilities of great powers but that do possess
economic capabilities that great powers no longer have a monopoly on. Notably, power is no
longer confined to military capabilities but, states “now understand prosperity to be a principal
means by which countries measure and exercise power” (Froman 2013). Because of their global
economic influence, rising powers now have interests and influence far beyond their regions.
Furthermore, these rising powers are challenging “the traditional modes of conducting foreign
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policy, privileging new kinds of soft power and rewarding new kinds of diplomacy. This is a
further point of differentiation from liberal modernist middle powers such as Canada and
Australia, whose foreign policies have been built around the promotion and exploitation of
these very changes” (Hurrell 2006, p. 4). Thus, narratives that confine their influence to their
neighbourhood are no longer tenable.
The second gap is that there is an apparent lack of explanatory variables that fully extrapolate
the link between a state’s rise in relative economic power and its intervention behaviour in
foreign intrastate armed conflicts. This cannot be explained from systemic factors only without
regard for domestic factors. So, the focus by realists and constructivists on material and
structural factors to explain the intervention behaviour of global powers is inadequate to the
extent that it disregards domestic factors such as domestic interest groups. As noted by
Goldstein, China’s “significance for international security depends upon a variable only loosely
connected to current patterns of economic and military growth – the country’s future political
coherence” (Goldstein 1997, p. 39). Domestic factors do matter. Therefore, for as long as the
analysis “ignores politics, particularly the relationship between foreign policy and domestic
politics”83 to that extent, it does not adequately explain the domestic dynamics faced by
emerging global powers, who are caught in-between international expansion and domestic
alignment with their new realities. The next chapter explores this issue in detail as it discusses
the neoclassical realist theory and how it can explain China’s intervention behaviour in African
intrastate armed conflicts.
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CHAPTER 3: Neoclassical realism: A foreign policy analysis
framework for rising powers
3.1 Introduction
States in the Global South are largely in “the limbo of the international system… passively
absorb[ing] the shock of having been made dependent on other parts of the world” (Bayart
2000, p. 217). Apart from reliance on other states, they also have no global import of their own,
their statehood is questioned, and they hardly constitute the focus of International Relations
studies.84 “Even when they are made the focal point of IR, they are not treated as the referent
object.”85 In fact, they are confined to the fringes of IR - frequently portrayed as inert
spectators in the gallery of global power politics. But, as alluded to in the preceding chapters,
“the transfer of global wealth and power now under way – roughly from West to East”86 is
turning the tide. China, once the “Sick Man of the East”87 is now the second largest global
economy, and it has achieved that in less than half a century. Together with other non-Western
rising powers such as Brazil and India88 these states seemed to be on an “upward trajectory of
power and influence;”89 a global phenomenon that Fareed Zakaria has described as the “the
birth of a truly global order”90 and the “third great power shift of the modern era.”91
This ‘modern era’ global shift in economic power is coinciding with a “shift in relative interstate
capabilities (power shifts) …, providing exceptional opportunities for rising powers to assert
themselves both geopolitically and in the global governance arena” (Armijo and Roberts 2014,
p. 503; Armijo and Katada 2014, p. 5). The entrance of these new rising powers into the
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international system has also notably eroded United States’ pre-eminence in global
governance.92 In addition, the shifts are happening in the context of widespread dissatisfaction
among countries in the Global South with the global governance strategies of the United States
and its allies.93 Hence, there are far-reaching transformations in the nature of the existing
‘posthegemonic’ global order, which, John G. Ikenberry define “as an evolving order marked by
increasingly far-reaching and complex forms of international cooperation that erode state
sovereignty and reallocate on a global scale the sites and sources of political authority”
(Ikenberry 2010, p. 18). The United States National Intelligence Council warned that the
diffusion of power referred to by Ikenberry can significantly reverse “the historic rise of the
West since 1750 and restore Asia’s weight in the global economy and world politics.”94 That
reversal, if successful could mean a return to the Westphalian order which was characterised
by state independence, state sovereignty and non-interference - values that have already
endeared China to leaders of developing countries, especially in Africa.
International Relations scholars generally agree that the 21st century has been so far
characterised by “the rise of the rest… [and by] the creation of an international system in which
countries in all parts of the world are no longer objects or observers but players in their own
right” (Zakaria 2008, p. 2, 3). As put by Christopher Layne, the U.S unipolar moment was just a
geopolitical interlude that carried within it seeds of its own demise, and ultimately gave way to
multipolarity.95 However, theoretical developments in IR have not kept abreast with this
unfolding empirical phenomenon. Practice has preceded theory, and the focus of IR theorists
has remained hinged on explaining the impact of rising powers on the Western-global order
from the perspective of the United States rather than on seeking ‘rising-power-focused-andcentred’ theoretical explanations. John Mearsheimer suggested a “theory of international
politics that explains how rising great powers are likely to act and how the other states in the
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system will react to them. That theory must be logically sound and it must account for the past
behaviour of rising great powers” (2006, p. 160). Others have argued that such a theory should
note that the relationships they “hypothesise about might not apply across all regions of the
world.”96 Steve Chan further argues that “theories based primarily on Europe’s or America’s
experiences cannot be automatically assumed to be generalizable to Asia or China but at the
same time, Asia’s or China’s experiences are also not necessarily unique” (2012, p. 3; Hui 2005).
What is therefore needed is a theory that explains how rising powers are likely to act within the
international system; and that can only be achieved by focusing on the rising powers
themselves as ‘referent objects’ rather than focusing on “perceptions and interests calculation
of the West” regarding them (Bilgin 2008, p. 11).

3.2 Neoclassical realism and rising powers
As highlighted in Chapter 2, realist theories of international politics explain the foreign
intervention tendencies of states by centring on systemic elements, and the interests and
capabilities of great powers.97 They assume great powers expand their interests abroad as their
relative material capabilities increase. For classical realists, this means that capabilities
determine interests,98 and that foreign policy ambition including external intervention in
foreign intrastate armed conflicts, follow the increase in hard power capabilities. Offensive
realists go further, advancing that “as great powers gain in relative power, they define their
interests more expansively,”99 forcing them to adopt interventionist strategies to protect their
interests abroad. This is a common realist explanation also held with minute variations by
defensive and neoclassical realists. Yet, by merely focusing on international outcomes
emanating from great power interactions in the international system, these realist theories,
with the exception of neoclassical realism, do not adequately acknowledge that “while the
international system may socialize states to respond properly to its constraints over time… it
cannot alone explain the shorter-term policy choices that states make, which can have
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dramatic consequences for both national security, and the structure of the international
system” (Toliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman 2009, p. 8). This is more so when it relates to foreign
policy choices of rising powers like China regarding threats in African countries – two regions
that to varying degrees occupied (in the case of China) or still occupy (in the case of the
majority of African countries) the peripheries of International Relations theory. How then can
the intervention policies and behaviour of China regarding intrastate armed conflicts in African
countries be theoretically explained?
Neoclassical realism seems to proffer a plausible explanatory framework. In general terms, it is
a theory of foreign policy rather than international outcomes, which explains variations in
foreign policies and external behaviour of states over time.100 It incorporates “the complex
model of state-society relations implicit in classical realism, while building upon neorealism’s
insights about constraints of anarchy and the relative distribution of material power”
(Taliaferro 2006, p. 470). Systemic and unit level variables are therefore combined to explain
the foreign policy and behaviour of individual states. As put by Gideon Rose, for those that
adhere to neoclassical realism,
The scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its
place in the international system and specifically by its relative material capabilities.
This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power
capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must
be translated through intervening variables at unit level. This is why they are
neoclassical (Rose 1998, p. 146).
Based on Gideon Rose’s explanation of neoclassical realism, there are three distinct
propositions that neoclassical realists make. These are: (1) an increase in relative material
power of a state will lead to a corresponding expansion of the scope and ambition of its foreign
policy activity; the reverse is also true, a decrease in a state’s relative material power will result
in a corresponding contraction of its foreign policy activity; (2) the process in proposition 1 is
not gradual or uniform because it does not solely depend “on objective material trends but also
on how political decision makers subjectively perceive them”; and (3) countries with weak
states take longer to translate the increase in their relative material power into expanded
foreign policy activity (Rose 1998, p. 167).
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Propositions 1 and 2 summarise the neoclassical realist causal logic which provide an
alternative explanation of states’ foreign policy based on interaction between systemic and
domestic level factors. This makes neoclassical realism distinct from structural realists who give
primacy to structural factors as the main determiners of international outcomes. The
neoclassical realist causal logic also places domestic level factors as intervening variables
between the relative distribution of power among states (independent variable) and foreign
policy behaviour (dependent variable). The focus is on how systemic and domestic factors
interact with one another to explain a state’s foreign policy. To do that, neoclassical realists
emphasise two domestic variables – decision-makers’ perceptions of the distribution of power,
and domestic state structure - suggesting that both individual decision-makers and domestic
politics matter in understanding the foreign policy of a state.101
Realism is generally viewed as a systemic theory that is uncongenial to domestic-level
theorising.102 And for the reason that neoclassical realism includes domestic-level variables, it
has been criticised as a reductionist theory. In line with that criticism, Kenneth Waltz warned
that the inclusion of unit-level variables reduces the theory to a descriptive narrative in which
variables "have to be added subjectively, according to the good or bad judgement of the author”
(Waltz 1979, p. 64-65). Although he made a valid argument, he “grossly misinterpreted the
relationship between the system and domestic-level variables in realist theory… realism
provides a deductively rigorous grounding for the inclusion of domestic causal variables… Both
the systemic environment and domestic process have causal impact because the former
determines the ends to which actors strive but the latter is the means by which actors obtain
those ends” (Sterling-Folker 1997, p. 3,4). Hence, as admitted by Kenneth Waltz himself: “each
state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its internal processes but its
decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interactions with them”
(Waltz 1979, p. 73). In view of that, by combining both international and domestic variables,
neoclassical realism “does not simply state that domestic politics matter in foreign policy, it
specifies the conditions under which they matter” (Christensen 1996, p. 252).
In deciding which domestic variables are apt, and under what conditions they matter, Gideon
Rose suggested that any foreign policy narrative should trace the different internal factors that
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“combine to yield particular foreign policies.” (Rose 1998, p. 153). Rose’s suggestion is
insightful. In order to avoid the subjective addition of variables based on an author’s judgement
as warned against by Kenneth Waltz, only domestic level variables that can explain the causal
chain connecting the increase in a state’s relative material power (systemic level variables) with
its foreign policy outputs (dependent variable) should be considered. Yet still, the fundamental
neoclassical realist assumption that an increase in a state’s relative material power will lead to
the expansion of its interests abroad as well as increase the latitude and ambition of its foreign
policy103 does not specify which material capabilities lead to the expansion of what interests
and where. While this may seem clear in theories of international politics, it is not the case with
a theory that seeks to explain variations in a state’s foreign policy, particularly foreign policies
of non-Western rising powers that in most cases lack the ‘hard power’ capabilities of great
powers.

3.2.1 Relative economic power, the independent variable
For neoclassical realists, the study of any country’s foreign policy should begin at the systemic
level. At that structural level, relative power distribution is the independent variable shaping
the broad pattern of a country’s foreign policy over time and across countries (Rose 1998, p.
150). Fareed Zakaria concurs. “A good theory of foreign policy should first ask what effect the
international system has on national behaviour, because the most generalizable characteristic
of a state in international relations is its relative position in the international system” (Zakaria
1992, p. 482). Aaron L. Friedberg also holds the same view, noting that “structural
considerations provide a useful point from which to begin analysis of international politics
rather than a place at which to end it” (Friedberg 1988, p. 8). Neoclassical realism thus claims
that the broad parameters of a state’s foreign policy are generally determined by the state’s
position in the international system and specifically by its relative material power (Rose 1998, p.
146; Toliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman 2009, p. 19; Toliaferro 2006, p. 466). Put differently,
neoclassical realism “stresses the causal primacy of structural variables, chiefly the relative
distribution of material power and anticipated trends in shaping states’ foreign policies.”104 This
mean that in order to explain the pattern of China’s intervention behaviour in foreign intrastate
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armed conflicts, the starting point is an analysis of its increasing relative material power vis-avis the rest of the international system – such that the preliminary hypothesis is that an
increase in China’s relative material power leads to a corresponding expansion of its interests
abroad as well as foreign policy activity, in this case, intervention in foreign intrastate armed
conflicts.
Before testing the above hypothesis, what needs to be clarified first is the nature of relative
material power that can lead to expansion of a country’s foreign activities. Hans Morgenthau
defined power in terms of interests. In general terms though, realists of all strands associate
power with a state’s military capabilities – “the tangible military assets that states possess”
(Mearsheimer 2006, p. 72). Military power was and still remains crucial to expansion of a
country’s foreign activity abroad because in previous times states expanded by plundering
“other countries’ resources and territory through invasion, colonisation, expansion, or even
large scale wars of aggression” (Zheng 2005, p. 20). However, unlike their historical
counterparts, 21st century non-Western rising powers are taking a different approach to
increasing their relative material power in the international system. Speaking of China – an
imposing example of how current rising global powers are increasing their relative power in the
international system, John Mearsheimer said: “China’s economy has been growing at an
impressive pace without foreign adventures, proving that conquest is unnecessary for
accumulating great wealth” (2006, p. 84). Indeed, China and other rising powers are increasing
their global power status through rapid domestic economic growth and increasing their share
of global wealth rather than through military strength - a phenomenon which led scholars like
Randall Schweller to conclude that “economic might has supplanted military strength as the
primary currency of national power and prestige” (Schweller 1999, p. 47). Janice Gross Stein
also concurs: “Rising powers no longer need military power to secure the resources they need”
(2010, p. 12). Also emphasizing the primacy of a state’s economic power over its military
capabilities, Steve Chan maintains that the former, ultimately determines the latter (2012, p.
170).
Notwithstanding, the material capabilities that a state controls, whether military or economic,
determine its relative power. But, there is a distinction between military and economic power.
Whereas military power is tangible, Mearsheimer describes economic power, of which a state’s
wealth is one of the major components as being latent power that the state can draw upon
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when competing with other rival powers (2006, p. 84). Since the bedrock of economic power,
and subsequent military power is a state’s domestic economic growth, relative economic
power is gained by growing a state’s wealth and increasing its global share of wealth. Implicit
within this understanding of economic power is that the rise and fall of states is often a result
of unit level dynamics, in particular, the level of a country’s domestic economic growth. As
noted by Paul Kennedy, “relative strengths of the leading nations in world affairs never remain
constant, principally because of the uneven rate of growth among different societies and of the
technological and organisational breakthroughs which bring a greater advantage to one society
than to another” (Kennedy 1987, p. xvi). As a result, “the economic power of states grows at
different rates, which means that some states are always gaining power and some are losing
power relative to others” (Layne 2008, p. 13).
The increase in a state’s economic power can be measured by its rate of domestic economic
growth in terms of annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and technological advances relative
to others. As an example, based on annual Gross Domestic Product growth in 2007, China’s
economy grew by approximately 14%, India by 10%, Russia 8%, Brazil 6% while South Africa
managed 5%, compared to the United States and Germany which expanded by an average 3%
and 4% respectively. With the global economic slowdown in 2014, India and China grew their
GDP by 7.4%; Brazil, 0.1%, South Africa, 1.5%; Russia, 0.6%; the United States, 2.4% and
Germany, 1.6%.105 Figure 3.1 illustrates the uneven rate of annual GDP growth among the
BRICS countries, and the United States and Germany.
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Figure 3.1: Annual GDP growth in percentage (%)

The effect of such uneven rates of GDP growth is that “economic power is shifting at a rapid
pace and the next half-century will see major changes in the relative size and rankings of the
world economies… [Notably] China will pass the USA in total gross domestic product (GDP)
measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) terms by 2016, and within a decade
thereafter in dollar terms at market rates” (Armijo and Roberts 2014, p. 503, 505). Accordingly,
there is a redistribution of economic power in the international system, which effectively can
undermine the current liberal international order.106
Unlike in other rising powers, the extraordinary economic growth in China has been
accompanied by an increase in high-technology exports,107 and a global expansion of China’s
economic interests and activities. As shown in Figure 3.2108, China overtook the United States
and Germany to become the major exporter of high-technology products since 2004.
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Figure 3.2: China’s high-technology exports, 2000-2012
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As a result, China dominates the global manufacturing sector, exporting its manufactured
products across the world and at the same time consuming roughly a third of global supply of
iron, steel and coal among other raw materials.109 “In just over a decade, China has risen from
relative insignificance to pole position in underwriting numerous resource-related transactions
across the globe” (Moyo 2012, p. 1). Apart from being the largest consumer of primary
commodities such as minerals, metal ore, fossil fuels and biomass, its domestic consumption
levels are now four times larger than that of the United States.110 Furthermore, in 2010, China
overtook the United States to become Africa’s largest trading partner; that is besides being the
largest trading partner of the majority of Asian and Latin America countries including India and
Brazil. China is now also the European Union’s second largest trading partner behind the United
States, with trade between Europe and China exceeding €1 billion a day.111
Based on annual GDP growth, high technology exports, and consumption of primary
commodities, it is projected that the “People’s Republic of China will overtake the USA as the
world’s largest economic power” (Dadush 2014, p. 13). Although it does not yet possess
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military capabilities comparable to that of the United States,112 the compounded effect of its
high domestic economic growth and technological advances gives it extensive global influence
in world politics, global trade and over other states, particularly in the Global South. As an
example, China is now one of the major sources of development finance to other developing
countries in the Global South, representing “a constellation of interests that are not only
reconfiguring power relations between the North-South but also reflecting a level of SouthSouth development engagements that are challenging the existing orthodoxy of the
‘Washington Consensus’” (Naidu, Corkin and Herman 2009, p. 1). Furthermore, as China
“accomplishes more in her domestic economic reform, the international community and many
Third World countries share a common expectation that China should assume more
international responsibilities for the world economy and security” (Yan 2006, p. 7). Indeed, the
rapid rise in the economic power of China and the other rising powers is “causing a ‘wind down’
of Pax-Americana – the period of unrivalled US primacy since 1945” (Armijo and Roberts 2014,
p. 503). Thus, “economic might has supplanted military strength as the primary currency of
national power and prestige” (Schweller 1999, p. 47).
The reason why economic might has gained traction over military power is that a state’s
economic capabilities can be translated into influence over other states, albeit not as an
“exemplar of military power” (Strange 1975, p. 211). States that have acquired a “dominance in
the distribution of international economic capabilities”113 can use their acquired economic
power “to coerce other states (aggressive economic power) or to defend the state against
coercion by others (defensive economic power)” (Strange 1975, p. 210). Beyond that, economic
power also extends to issues of international investment, trade and money regardless of
whether such power is deliberately exercised by the state to weaken or coerce other states or
simply to secure income gains for its multinational firms.114 As a result, “in recent decades,
leaders have come to see the economic clout that trade produces as more than merely a purse
for military prowess: they now understand prosperity to be a principal means by which
countries measure and exercise power” (Froman 2014, p. 1).
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The lateral pressure theory explains how states experiencing such rapid economic growth and
increases in relative economic power expand their interests and activities abroad. It attributes
their outward-expansion to a combined effect of internal economic growth and advances in
technology, and the inevitable inability of the state to meet its demand for resources needed to
sustain its internal economic growth from domestic sources. The resultant dilemma of rising
demands and insufficient domestic resources115 generates lateral pressure, which refers to the
tendency among rising powers and relatively high capability countries to engage in
expansionist activities abroad when their relative economic power increases. Examples abound.
“The external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the
United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development”
(Huntington 1991, p. 12). So also has been the expansion of China into other countries,
particularly in the Global South which have vast reserves of strategic raw materials and markets.
For that reason, when a state experiences rapid domestic economic growth, its relative
economic power increases, leading it to expand abroad in search of raw materials and markets
to sustain its domestic economic growth, and heighten its position in the international system.
For China and other rising powers in the 21st century, it can be argued that an increase in their
relative economic power, necessitated by high domestic economic growth, is as explained by
the lateral pressure theory responsible for the expansion of their foreign activity abroad. In
that sense, the preliminary hypothesis mentioned above can be sheared to parsimoniously
limit the focus of this study on the increase in a state’s relative economic power as leading to
expansion of its foreign intervention behavior - making the ‘increase in China’s relative
economic power’ the independent variable. The first hypothesis that will therefore be tested in
this study is whether the increase in a rising power’s relative economic power leads to
expansion of its intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts. This is an important starting
point because as put by Fareed Zakaria and other neoclassical realists, any good foreign policy
analysis should first begin by interrogating the impact of the distribution of power in the
international system on a state’s foreign behavior.
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3.2.2 Increases in perception of threat to interests abroad, the intervening
variable
Rising powers with increased relative economic power do not expand their interests and
activities in vacuity, since “other rival Powers are now economically expanding at a faster rate,
and wish in turn to extend their influence abroad” (Kennedy 1987, p. xxiii). Resultant
competition from that outward expansion is therefore motivated by a need to gain access to
scarce raw materials and “to attract investment, to strengthen the global competitiveness of
their national firms and workers in key high-tech sectors, and most noticeably, to assist (by any
means necessary) domestic firms competing for a share” in global markets (Schweller 1999, p.
47). The effect is that even status-quo states are increasingly “concerned about relative gains
and losses simply to preserve their current relative-power position and, by extension, their
level of security, prestige, and influence in the system” (Schweller 1999, p. 31). It therefore
follows that their principal domestic and foreign policy objective is to maintain comparatively
high internal economic growth116 because any variations to their respective growth rates, no
matter how modest, can significantly alter the nature of their economy and society,117 as well
as their position in the international system. That effectively makes their domestic and external
economic interests matters of national interest.
Due to strategic importance of positional goods such as global export and import market shares
and access to scarce resources in foreign countries, rising powers designate them as matters of
national interest that ought to be protected.118 This is why expansionist economic activities are
associated with states of high capabilities that can exert their influence on other states, and at
the same time engage in “intense competition among countries for resources and markets,
military power, political influence, and prestige” (Choucri and North 1975, p. 28). In order to
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protect those ‘national interests’ rising powers do not just extend their interests abroad
randomly. They ordinarily expand into states of comparatively weaker capabilities and mitigate
probabilities of confrontation with powerful states pursuing similar expansionist objectives. For
example, at first, “the United States did not expand against strong states that posed a great
threat to its security but largely against areas that were weak and in which expansion would
entail a small cost” (Zakaria 1998, p. 184). Yet, even in cases where a rising power adopts such
strategies, by merely expanding its activities and interests into foreign countries it collides
“with the spheres of interest of other states – and find itself embroiled in international conflicts,
crises, and wars that, at least initially, may not have been sought or even contemplated”
(Choucri and North 1975, p. 1). That collision of interests among expanding states, and the
uncertainties characteristic of international and intrastate armed conflicts, crises, and wars
trigger increases in the expanding rising power’s perceptions of threat to its interests in other
countries.
In cases of clashes among rival expanding powers over foreign interests or international
conflicts, the source and nature of the threat is obvious, but that is not the case with threats
emanating from intrastate armed conflicts in countries where rising powers have interests in.
Be that as it may, studies on threat perception in international politics principally focus on
interstate threats, where one state is perceived as a threat by another. Threats emanating from
intrastate armed conflicts in countries where rising powers expand into normally have
unintended impact on the rising power’s interests, and so, are at the fringes of international
relations literature. To put it in empirical terms, there is limited research on, for example, how
intrastate armed conflicts in South Sudan or Libya are perceived as threats by China in a way
that warranties its intervention, let alone change its foreign intervention behavior. The reason
for the limited research in this area is as alluded to in the preceding chapters a result of the
‘peripherialisation’ of small states, particularly African countries, in IR theory and international
politics discourse. Secondly, the threats are usually uncontemplated by the expanding rising
power, and thus they are considered as after-thoughts. Fareed Zakaria describes such threats
as “grays” and “ambiguous threats” because they are not “black and unmistakable”119 meaning
they are not as obvious as threats emanating from inter-state conflicts; and so are considered
to be inconsequential to international relations.
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In this study, threat is therefore applied “in the passive sense of an anticipation of impending
danger rather than in its active sense of an undertaking by one actor to impose sanction on
another” (Cohen 1978, p. 93). It means that the threat arises not as a result of warring parties
in the South Sudan armed conflict undertaking to cause harm on Chinese interests in South
Sudan; rather, it is based on China’s perception of threat to its interests defined as the ‘sense of
an impending danger’ to its foreign economic interests120 even though the warring parties
might not have directly threatened it. Thus suggesting that “threat may be perceived, and
countermeasures taken, even when the opponent possesses no malicious intent” (Cohen 1978,
p. 93). So, how does perception of a foreign intrastate armed conflict as a threat affect the
rising power’s foreign intervention behavior?
As put by Christopher Layne, when a state’s economic power increases, it expands its interests
abroad. It also defines its interests more expansively, and correspondingly its perception of
threat to interests abroad similarly expands121 -

suggesting that when a state’s relative

economic power increases, its perception of threat increases thereby influencing its foreign
intervention behavior as it seeks to allay the perceived threat. That claim seems plausibly
logical because as predicted by the latent pressure theory, when a state experiences massive
domestic economic growth, it expands outward in search of raw materials and markets to
sustain its domestic economic growth. Logically, expansion abroad exposes a state to new risks,
hence its perception of threat commensurately expands with the growth of its activities in
foreign countries. Thus, as put by Fareed Zakaria in reference to the United States, as its
“power grew, areas that were not earlier seen as crucial became vital interests, and crises that
the United States had blissfully ignored in the past were perceived as threatening. The
objective threats had not increased, but America’s desire to control its environment had” (1998,
p. 185).
The limitation, however, of explaining increases in a state’s threat perception based on
distribution of power in the international system is that it only gives a “general outline of the
state’s policy but not its specific responses” (Jervis 1976, p. 17). In other words, rising powers
with increasing relative material power and expanding foreign interests will have the same
increase in threat perception, and respond to those threats in a similar fashion. But, that is not
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the case, because, states behave differently, and the difference in threat perception among
states can be explained at the unit level, because, for example, structural factors will not
adequately explicate why China might have a high level of threat perception regarding the
intrastate armed conflict in South Sudan compared to the one in the Central African Republic or
Somalia.
Apart from the systemic level of analysis, threat perception can be analyzed from the level of
decision-making; bureaucracy; and domestic politics. According to Robert Jervis, “which level
one focuses on is not arbitrary and is not a matter of taste – it is the product of beliefs (or often
hunches) about the nature of variables that influence the phenomena that concern one” (1976,
p. 15). Generally, for neoclassical realists, as argued by Gideon Rose, foreign policy choices are
influenced by the perception of actual political leaders and foreign policy elites not just the
distribution of power in the international system.122 Friedberg takes the argument further:
“even if one acknowledges that structures exist and are important, there is still the question of
how statesmen grasp their contours from the inside, so to speak” (Friedberg 1988, p. 8). The
focus on ‘flesh and blood’ foreign policy makers is accentuated by the argument that foreign
policy elites and political leaders play a crucial role in the shaping of threat perceptions. But
individuals do not work in isolation, and are often not in full throttle of the foreign policy
making process - neither are they immune to domestic and international pressures. Reflecting
the influence of domestic and external constraints on individuals regardless of how powerful
they might seem, Robert Jervis points out that “in 1937 Clement Atlee said that ‘the foreign
policy of a government is the reflection of its internal policy,’ when his party took power the
foreign secretary declared that ‘Revolutions do not change geography, and revolutions do not
change geographical needs’ (1976, p. 23). The views of individual elites, while influential, are
apart from ‘geography’ influenced by interest groups, the media and bureaucracies they
represent, making what appear to be individual perceptions a complex concoction of varying
views and perspectives within the limits of domestic and international constraints – suggesting
that the shaping of a threat perception is a consequence of “social and political dynamics, as
well as events” (Meyer and Miskimmon 2009, p. 626). Thus, as put by Fareed Zakaria,
“statesmen encounter not only pressures from the international system but also constraints
that are the consequence of state structure.” (1998, p. 38).
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The starting point, however, is “to discover who is involved in the foreign policy decisional
process, what they say, and what they do” (Cottam 1977, p. 54). By asking ‘who’ this study
departs from the neoclassical realist leaning toward “decisions of flesh and blood” as the
intervening variable. It focuses on the state, defined as central decision-making institutions and
actors. The reason for focusing on the state rather than individual decision-makers is that it is
the state rather than an individual decision maker that not only makes but implements foreign
policy decisions. Also, it is states that “choose to highlight certain threats and downplay others
based on their conception of their interests” (Zakaria 1998, p. 184-185). Accordingly, risks
arising from intrastate armed conflicts in countries where China has interests do not constitute
a threat “even in the face of objective evidence.”123 They only become a threat when the state
perceives them to be such, otherwise, “when a threat is not perceived… there can be no
mobilization of defensive sources” (Cohen 1978, p. 93).
The implication is that despite its increase in relative economic power and endangerment of its
external interests by foreign intrastate armed conflicts, China may not intervene unless it
perceives the foreign intrastate armed conflict as a threat warranting its intervention. Thus, it
can be predicted that rising powers increase their intervention in foreign intrastate armed
conflicts when the state perceives the foreign intrastate armed conflict as a threat to its
economic interests abroad. In that view, this study is premised on the argument that an
increase in China’s relative economic power has the effect of widening the scope and
parameters of its foreign policy activities, that is, as its relative economic power increases, it is
able to expand its economic interests abroad more than it would have had with a lower relative
economic power. Because of an increase in relative economic power, it now has economic
interests in many African countries such that if an intrastate armed conflict occurs in any of
those countries, it will affect Chinese interests there. But, that would not have been the case
had it not have had interests there. Changes in perception of threat to its economic interests
abroad is therefore a key intervening variable between China’s rise in relative economic power
(independent variable) and its intervention behavior in African intrastate armed conflicts
(dependent variable).124 In other words, China’s perception of intrastate armed conflicts in
African countries as threats to its interests is the ‘transmission belt’ through which its
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increasing relative economic power affects its foreign intervention behavior. Yet without an
increase in its relative economic power and expansion of economic interests abroad, on its own
threat perception would have no significant effect on its intervention behaviour.

3.3 Tying it together
As highlighted above, because this study examines China’s intervention behavior in intrastate
armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan, the question that often arises is: Does China
intervene in foreign intrastate armed conflicts, especially in African countries? That question is
founded on the argument that China, as a non-western rising power has a non-intervention
foreign policy; but as shown in the following chapters, foreign intrastate armed conflicts are
putting its non-intervention policy to the test. Structural realists would explain China’s
intervention in foreign conflicts as an expression of its increasing relative material power,
because they suppose that when a state increases its relative material power, it expands
abroad. But, states do not intervene in foreign intrastate armed conflicts merely because of an
increase in their relative material power and subsequent expansion of their interests abroad.
They intervene in foreign intrastate armed conflicts when their perception of threat increases;
only when they perceive those foreign intrastate armed conflicts as threatening to their
interests can they intervene.
As discussed above, an explanation based on systemic factors only yields general explanations
that do not give a nuanced understanding of why there are differences in the level and mode of
intervention in the three countries. That can only be understood by applying the intervening
variable in-between the independent variable, which is the increase in China’s relative
economic power and the dependent variable, its intervention in foreign intrastate armed
conflicts. The resultant hypothesis that is tested in this study is that China increased its
intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts in Africa when it perceived the foreign
intrastate armed conflicts as a threat to its economic interests there. That means the trends
and patterns of China’s intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts are a combined result
of an increase in its relative economic power and changes in its threat perception regarding the
foreign intrastate armed conflicts.
Accordingly, the transmission belt through which increases in relative economic power
(independent variable) affects China’s intervention behavior (dependent variable) in Libya, Mali
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and South Sudan’s intrastate armed conflicts is its perception of threat to its interests in those
three countries (intervening variable). Hence, as suggested by neoclassical realists, the starting
point of any foreign policy analysis is to explore how the international structure affects the
state’s foreign policy. For that reason, in Chapter 4, this study examines the effect of China’s
increase in relative economic power on its intervention behaviour in foreign intrastate armed
conflicts from a historical perspective. The main objective is to find any generalizable
explanations that can assist in comparing its intervention in Libya, and Mali to its intervention
in South Sudan.
To understand China’s intervention behavior in the intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and
South Sudan, the context within which the foreign intervention policies are formulated and
implemented has to be closely examined. As noted by Gideon Rose, neoclassical realists
“favour beginning intellectually at the systemic level but then taking care to trace precisely how,
in actual cases, relative power is translated and operationalized into the behavior of state
actors” (1998, p. 166). In this case, context refers to both the systemic context and the unitlevel context, which explains why this study first analyses the effect of China’s increase in
relative economic power (systemic factor) and then assess the impact of changes in its threat
perception on its foreign intervention behavior. Theoretically informed narratives, and
historical analysis are therefore employed to understand patterns of China’s intervention in
intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan. To put that intervention in historical
context, the next chapter will trace the evolving nature of China’s intervention behavior from
imperial times to present day. The aim is to assess whether China’s intervention is historically
determined by increases in its relative economic power.
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CHAPTER 4: Exploring effects of the increase in China’s relative
economic power on its foreign intervention behavior: A
historical analysis
4.1 Introduction
Is China’s foreign intervention behavior evolving? Is it increasing its intervention in African
intrastate armed conflicts as its relative economic power increases? Implicit within these
questions is an assumption that the relative distribution of economic power in the international
system determine a state’s foreign intervention behavior. Of course, some would argue that
the nature of the state and its foreign policy orientation matters more than its position in the
international system. Their simple empirical argument is that states with a colonial and imperial
past such as Britain, France and Portugal are inclined to intervening in foreign intrastate armed
conflicts because of their colonial heritage. Indeed so, France has intervened in its former
African colonies’ intrastate armed conflicts on multiple occasions in the past fifty years,125 more
than China, which apart from control of nations such as Tibet and Xinjiang does not have an
elaborate colonial history. But, however plausible this argument may be, it does not explain
whether a state’s intervention behavior is determined by increases in its relative economic
power.
In exploring the argument that a state’s position in the international system determines its
foreign policy and external intervention behavior, this chapter begins by giving a critical
historical analysis of China’s evolving understanding of foreign intervention, its foreign
intervention policy and external intervention behavior from imperial times to the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and until 2015. The aim of the
historical analysis is to give a concrete background of the evolving nature of China’s foreign
policy regarding intervention in other states’ internal affairs vis-a-vis changes in its relative
economic power and position in the international system. As put by Suisheng Zhao, being an
ancient civilization, “history is inscribed in China’s mental terrain” and Chinese intellectuals and
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politicians have at times “reconstructed history to advance the current political agenda of the
Chinese government and justify their concept of justice and their view of China’s rightful place
in the world” (2015, p. 981). Appreciating China’s past understandings of intervention is
therefore critical to analyzing its current intervention policy and behavior in Africa. Based on
that background, the chapter then discusses the implication of China’s increasing economic
power and explores whether it has indeed resulted in an increase in its external intervention
behavior.

4.2 Imperial China – From Pax Sinica to the Western international system
of states
China’s foreign policy on intervention in the internal affairs of other states is an embodiment of
its historical trajectory as a nation that considered itself the Middle Kingdom, and the epicenter
of global civilization surrounded by barbaric nations.126 As put by Julia Ching, “through most of
its history, China saw itself as the global order, surrounded on its borders by subordinate
neighbors” (2004, p. 246). In John G. Ikenberry’s conception of what powers with a
preponderance of material capabilities do, imperial China transformed “its favorable power
position into a durable order that commands the allegiance of other states within the order”
(Ikenberry 2001, p. 4). It is therefore not surprising that the surrounding nations of Vietnam,
Burma, and Korea paid tribute to the Chinese emperors confirming the superiority of the
Chinese civilization. Yet, even as they paid tribute to China,
Relations between China and Korea or China and Vietnam were not analogous to
relations between sovereign nations in an anarchic international system or even
between the colonizing power and its colony; rather, the nations surrounding China
were considered inferior… Only through adoption of Chinese civilization, which the
neighboring elites would be exposed to during their voyages to pay tribute to the
Chinese emperor, would the nations of China’s borders be accepted as anything but
barbarians (Kornberg and Faust 2005, p. 10).
But, for as long as the surrounding ‘barbaric’ nations acknowledged the supremacy of its
emperors, paid tribute and did not threaten its territorial integrity, China left them to
determine their own internal affairs. Zhang Yongjin and Barry Buzan concur: “Participants and
aspiring participants in Pax Sinica…, remained sovereign entities, to the extent that they
retained their autonomy and independence in conducting their domestic and ‘foreign’ affairs’”
(Zhang and Buzan 2012, p. 15). As further put by Brantly Womack, “in contrast to the
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colonialism of Western imperialism, China acted as the passive guarantor of a matrix of
unequal but autonomous relationships rather than as an active metropolitan power” (2006, p.
135). Hence, even in the prime of its economic, technological and military power, imperial
China “apparently never plundered nor murdered – unlike the Portuguese, Dutch, and other
European invaders of the Indian Ocean” (Kennedy 1989, p. 7). It considered itself the center of
the global order, and a benevolent civilized superpower dominating its neighbors by cultural
and economic superiority rather than by military force (Perdue 2015, p. 1003; Suzuki 1968, p.
183).
Intervention into the internal affairs of its tributary nations was however not uncommon. Since
“it was normal for the Chinese to consider the barbarians subjects of the emperor, they
thought it legitimate to protect these barbarians and their ruler from rebellious elements” (Lam
1968, p. 169). In other words, as the ‘Son of Heaven’ there was an underlying theory that China
could “intervene whenever and wherever she judged it necessary because the Chinese
emperor was responsible for all the peoples under Heaven and because their rulers were
viewed as his appointed representatives.”127 Therefore, “China, as the paramount leader,
maintained order in the system and reserved the right to intervene in the internal affairs of its
vassals” (Wang 2011, p. 145). In Jerome Alan Cohen description, imperial China had the latent
right of intervention that Chinese emperors activated on occasional basis, especially in cases
where their direct interests were at risk (Cohen 1973, p. 475).
China’s intervention in the domestic affairs of vassal states like Korea began as early as the Sui
dynasty (581-618 CE), and the Liao dynasty, also known as the Khitan Empire (907-1125).128 But,
the most elaborate case of intervention by imperial China happened in October 1788, when the
Qing emperor sanctioned a military intervention in Vietnam to restore Lê Chiêu Thống to the
Vietnamese throne. Truong Buu Lam notes that Vietnamese kings “had to acknowledge China’s
suzerainty and become tributaries in order to avoid active intervention by China in their
internal affairs” (1968, p. 179). The threat of China’s intervention was not just peculiar to
Vietnam but also to other tributary states that bordered China. For most of those tributary
nations it was prudent for them to surrender part of their sovereignty to China in exchange for
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economic and trade benefits, military support in cases where their security was threatened by
other nations, and more importantly, to avoid interference in their internal affairs by Chinese
emperors (Lam 1968, p. 178; Cohen 1973, p. 476) – suggesting that the threat of China’s
intervention in their internal affairs was always imminent.
Notwithstanding, imperial China’s foreign and domestic policies were entwined and driven by
two fears: (a) barbarian attacks, and (b) internal revolts. The Chinese tended to think of “their
foreign relations as giving expression externally to the same principles within the Chinese state
and society…. [Hence] China’s external order was so closely related to its internal order such
that one could not survive without the other; when the barbarians were not submissive abroad,
rebels might more easily arise within” (Fairbank 1968, p. 2,3). It was therefore critical for
Chinese emperors to maintain order and stability within the surrounding ‘barbarian’ nations, as
well as within China itself, and that entailed certain measures of intervention in the ‘barbarian’
nations’ internal affairs. However, with the rise of Confucius thinking, China’s foreign and
domestic politics was further inspired by the Confucian Code, which considered warfare to be a
deplorable activity, and instead emphasized societal stability and order. Accordingly, “armed
forces were made necessary only by the fear of barbarian attacks or internal revolts” (Kennedy
1989, p. 7).
More than being concerned with intrastate armed conflicts in foreign nations, as long as their
interests were not at risk, Chinese emperors focused on containing internal revolts. As Liu
writes, the revolts against emperors did not happen very often, but they did happen enough
times to result in “cycles of order and disorder in the so-called twenty-four dynasties history”
(1995, p. 205). The fear of internal revolts was further exacerbated by Confucians who
according to Chan (1973, p. 62) sustained the doctrine of mass revolutions against inhumane
leaders, an excuse that China also used to intervene in the internal affairs of its tributary states
(Cohen 1973, p. 474). In concurrence, Yao wrote: “rulers could lose their throne if they lost
people’s hearts. In other words, if people are not happy with their emperors, they could
overturn them” (Yao 2011, p. 220; see also Ivanhoe 2004, p. 272). That fear of internal revolts is
to a greater extent what led to the imperial code enacted during the middle Ming dynasty
banning the construction and owning of seagoing ships and later any ships with more than two
masts; all efforts were concentrated on containing any signs of internal revolt and to protecting
the empire from outside aggressors rather than exploring unknown lands for profit, influence,
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and gain. This was because for as long as there was a threat of internal revolt, barbaric attacks
were considered imminent. It was not a misplaced concern of paranoid Chinese emperors
because as noted by John King Fairbank “most dynasties collapsed under the twin blows of
‘inside disorder and outside calamity’ (nei-luan wai-huan), that is, domestic rebellion and
foreign invasion” (Fairbank 1968, p. 3).
The banning of exploration ships and expeditions three years after the 1433 Zheng He
expedition to Africa, possibly China’s first engagement with the continent, which were financed
and sanctioned by Emperor Cheng Zu of the Ming Dynasty (in which Zheng He stopped at the
city states of Mogadishu and Brawa in Somalia and Malindi in Kenya) and the Middle East had
long term effects on China’s relative economic and political power. Due to the ban “China did
not seek information about the outside world. It neither fought external wars nor searched for
external markets, and foreigners who came to China were welcome so long as they accepted
the superiority of Chinese civilization” (Kornberg and Faust 2005, p. 8). Its decision to isolate
itself from the outside world coincided with a decline in its economic growth and technological
advancement. As put by Paul Kennedy, “the banning of overseas trade and fishing took away
another potential stimulus to sustained economic expansion; such foreign trade as did occur
with the Portuguese and Dutch in the following centuries was in luxury goods and (although
there were doubtless many evasions) controlled by officials.” Fast forwarding to the eighteenth
century, Paul Kennedy continues: “In 1776 – just as Abraham Darby’s ironworks at
Coalbrookdale were beginning to boom – the blast furnaces and coke ovens of Honan and
Hopei were abandoned entirely. They had been great before the Conqueror had landed at
Hastings. Now they would not resume production until the twentieth century” (1989, p. 8-9).
But to imperial China that did not matter, because as far as the emperors were concerned, they
were still the Middle Kingdom at the centre of their known global order.

4.3 Incorporation of imperial china into a truly international system of
states
Five centuries after the banning of exploration ships and two centuries since closure of the
blast furnaces of Honan and Hopei, Deng Xiaoping reflected on the implications of China’s selfisolation since imperial times in a speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory
Commission of the Communist Party of China in October 1984. As recounted:
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A closed-door policy prevents any country from developing. We suffered from isolation,
and so did our forefathers. You might say it was an open policy of a sort when Zheng
He was sent on voyages to the western oceans by Emperor Cheng Zu of the Ming
Dynasty. But the Ming Dynasty began to decline with the death of Emperor Cheng Zu.
In the Qing Dynasty, during the reigns of Kang Xi and Qian Long, there was no open
policy to speak of. China remained isolated for more than 300 years from the middle of
the Ming Dynasty to the Opium War, for nearly 200 years counting from the reign of
Kang Xi. As a consequence, the country declined into poverty and ignorance… the
lessons of the past tell us that if we don’t open to the outside we can’t make much
headway.129
Indeed, the decision to isolate itself and discourage private enterprises at the end of the Ming
Dynasty turned out to have far-reaching detrimental effects on China’s position in a truly
international system of states that emerged in the sixteenth century in Europe; and on its
foreign policy regarding intervention in the internal affairs of other states. The decline in
relative economic power caused by a lack of external trade, banning of explorations that would
have opened new markets and sources of raw materials, and an isolationist foreign policy
which was overly suspicious of foreigners and the foreign world, made imperial China relatively
weaker in terms of economic, military and technological advancement. Because as China
looked-inward, European powers such as Spain, Portugal, Netherlands and Britain that were
experiencing immense domestic economic growth were looking outward in search of markets,
new sources of raw materials and labor - and, in the process entangling themselves in other
states’ internal affairs.
As China’s relative economic power declined, European powers such as Britain were becoming
more dynamic and powerful, and aggressively expanding their interests and influence abroad,
including into China. Using their preponderance of economic and military, especially naval
capabilities, they progressively but forcibly incorporated China into the global system of states
that they dominated (Deng and Wang 1999, p. 11). Just as the African, Asian and Latin
American polities were compulsorily assimilated into the international system of states in the
eighteenth and nineteenth century, China found itself an engrafted weak member of that
international system. It was no longer the powerful nation at the center of its own global order,
but one of the many relatively weak states under European domination. Furthermore, contrary
to the Sinocentric approach of Chinese dynasties to a global order based on the Mandate of
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Heaven, the new international system of states based on the preponderance of material
capabilities meant that China was no longer the center of civilization, and no longer were its
emperors the ‘Sons of Heaven’ ruling with a ‘Heavenly mandate.’ They also lost their latent
right to intervene in the internal affairs of China’s tributary states, and even where it needed to
intervene, it simply no longer had the wherewithal.
The culmination of China’s incorporation into the modern international system of states
happened in earnest in the years infamously referred to as the ‘century of humiliation’
between 1839 and 1949. In that period, China came face-to-face with its two worst fears – fear
of barbaric attacks, and fear of internal revolts that had influenced its domestic and foreign
policy for centuries. Starting with the 1838 Yangtze River attack by Britain’s gunboats, and
subsequent attacks by the militarily and economically superior Japan, France and the Soviet
Union, China was forced to make major concessions that opened its ports to foreign powers
resulting in loss of tariff autonomy, territory and sovereignty. But more importantly, the
‘unequal concessions’ exposed the decline in China’s relative economic power. Beside foreign
invasion, China also had to contend with internal revolts that resulted in the fall of its last
emperor Henry Pu Yi, the twelfth and final ruler of the Qing dynasty. His fall led to the rise of
Nationalists in 1911, and subsequently the Communists in 1949. It therefore goes without
saying that from the beginning of the century of humiliation up to 1949 when the communists
took over, intervention in the internal affairs of its tributary states was a luxury China could
least afford as it was too busy fighting against foreign intervention in its own internal and
foreign affairs to bother with other nations.
The century of humiliation had several other far reaching effects on China’s perception of the
anarchic international system, and on its role in that global order. As observed by David Scott,
“that period of humiliation and unfulfilled potential cast a long shadow that continues to affect
Chinese foreign policy, strategic culture, and weltanschauung worldview” (2008, p. 3). The first
implication is that “China was no longer in accord with the Mandate of Heaven, nor was it a
sovereign state in an international system dominated by Western powers” (Kornberg and Faust
2005, p. 8). It now constituted part of Third World countries under the overbearing influence,
and in worst cases colonial dominance by European powers. The Mandate of Heaven that had
previously legitimated China’s hegemony over other nations and strengthened its claim as the
center of civilization around which other nations orbited was no longer tenable. The tables had
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turned. A new global order where cultural superiority did not matter as much as economic,
political and military superiority had emerged. So, as aptly put by Alison Adcock Kaufman,
“where Chinese rulers and intellectuals had before had little concept of an ‘international’ arena,
they now had to grapple with the notion that there existed a global system of power
relationships whose dynamics – though almost entirely out of China’s control – would
determine its fate” (2010, p. 5).
Second, the transformation of China from being a prime civilization at the center of the
tributary system in a global order whose parameters it largely defined, to being one of the
Third World countries in the lower tier of states in a Western dominated anarchic international
system also significantly impacted its foreign intervention policy. No longer did it have claim to
possessing the latent right to intervene in the internal affairs of its bordering nations. Finding
itself at the lower end of the international system of states, China had to adapt from being the
ruler to being the ruled in a systemic order where, as put by Thucydides, “the standard of
justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they
have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”130 China was therefore
“not only forced into the international system dominated by European powers where it lost its
tributary states, but also treated unequally and suffered in the hands of imperialist powers”
(Zhao 2015, p. 976). Thus, the century of humiliation “replaced and overturned the country’s
previous preeminence and prestige as the ‘Middle Kingdom’” 131 and the impact on its
perception of intervention and state sovereignty was immeasurable.

4.4 China, the international system, and intervention in Mao’s era
In imperial times, states that had formed part of China’s tributary system were not considered
sovereign and equal. They were regarded and treated as barbaric and inferior depending on
how close they were to Chinese civilization and culture. The concept of equality and state
sovereignty was therefore unknown in Pax Sinica because in “the traditional Chinese world
order… [they] did not use concepts corresponding to the Western ideas of nation, or
sovereignty, or equality of states each having equal sovereignty” (Fairbank 1968, p. 5). But, as
Mao declared the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Pax Sinica was long gone, in its stead
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was a Western-led global system of states premised on both equal sovereignty and relative
power distribution. Accordingly, the view of Mao and the Communist Party of China (CPC)
regarding foreign, particularly Western intervention was “one of national humiliation and
international inequalities, as the imposition on one part of the international system (China) by
another part of the international system (the West)” (Scott 2008, p. 8). The result was a
replacement by the Communist Party of China of the suzerainty of China with a new emphasis
on equality of states, respect of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of
other states.
In a speech made at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference on 21 September 1949, Mao Tse-tung delivered an opening address aptly titled,
The Chinese people have stood up. He said:
The Chinese have always been a great, courageous and industrious nation; it is only in
modern times that they have fallen behind. And that was due entirely to oppression
and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments… From
now on our nation will belong to the community of the peace-loving and freedomloving nations of the world and work courageously and industriously to foster its own
civilization and well-being and at the same time to promote world peace and freedom.
Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up.132
Less than a month later, on 1 October 1949, as he proclaimed the Central People’s Government
of the People’s Republic of China, Mao announced that the newly established government was
“willing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government that is willing to observe
the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect of territorial integrity and
sovereignty.”133 The basis of China’s relations and interaction with states in the international
system was no longer premised on pre-eminence of its civilization and ‘Mandate of Heaven’ as
in imperial times, but on the power dynamics of an anarchic international system in which
China occupied the peripheries rather than the core.
Realizing China’s inferior position within the prevailing Western-led global system, Mao
quickly embraced the concepts of territorial sovereignty and became a zealous
defender of its sovereign rights in what the Chinese perceived to be a social Darwinian
world, in which the status of a nation-state was determined by its economic and
132

Mao, Z 1949, ‘The Chinese people have stood up!’, Opening address at the First Plenary Session of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 21 September, viewed 12 May 2014,
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_01.htm
133
‘Proclamation of the Central People's Government of the PRC’ 1949, People’s Daily, 2 October, viewed
12 May 2014, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume7/mswv7_003.htm

77

military strength… they sought to maximize China’s security by expanding influence
and control over its neighborhoods, and in some cases, far beyond… [Believing] that
the world is unjust and unfair only in the sense that China was stagnant and weak
(Zhao 2015, p. 981; see also, Dreyer 2015, p. 1027).
In view of that, as China sought to increase its relative material power, it correspondingly
sought to expand its influence beyond its borders – bringing in a new dynamic to its
intervention behavior in foreign states.
By arguing that ‘China had stood up’, Mao and other Communist Party of China ruling elites
kick-started a process of re-defining China’s role in a global system that it found itself thrust in.
By all intends and purpose a weak and poor state, still fearful of imperialism and dominance by
Western powers such as the United States, Britain, the then Soviet Union, and its long-time
nemesis, Japan, China conceived of its role in international politics on the basis of the
distribution of relative economic power in the international system. To the Communist Party of
China, the dominant narrative was that for as long as China was weak relative to other states,
as it was at that time, it remained susceptible to foreign domination, imperialism and what
Deng Xiaoping referred to as ‘bullying’ by developed countries.134 Along the same lines as Deng
Xiaoping, but decades later, President Xi “urged all Party members to firmly keep in mind that
lagging behind leaves one vulnerable to attacks and only development makes a nation
strong.”135 To escape the predicament that befalls weak states, China, though relatively weak –
economically and militarily – began spreading its revolutionary ideology into Africa and other
Third World countries in order to counter United States’ hegemonism in global affairs.136 In that
respect, it envisioned itself playing a significant role in international politics, carving a niche for
itself in the Third World’s struggle for political independence, and in its struggle against the
Western hegemonism and power-ideological dominance.
During its formative years, the Communist Party of China ideologically aligned itself with the
Soviet Union. So when Mao was laying the foundation for the People’s Republic of China, he
pronounced in June 1949 that in terms of the guiding principles of China’s foreign policy they
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belonged to “the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union.” Having chosen the Soviet
side, he then added that “the Chinese people must either incline towards the side of
imperialism or that of socialism. There can be no exception to the rule. It is impossible to sit on
the fence. There is no third road.”137 The implication of aligning itself with the Soviet Union was
that in the early years of CPC rule, China was unable to articulate an independent foreign policy
regarding its engagement with developing countries, especially in Africa. However, the SinoSoviet co-operation on foreign policy principles did not last long. A combination of two
international factors - the rise of the anti-colonial movement in Africa in the 1950s, and the
Sino-Soviet fall-out in the 1960s138 gave China an opportunity to articulate the non-interference
principle abroad, as well as spread its own version of socialism in Africa. Prior to that, Africa
was to China a region for which “a positive African policy was non-existent… [because] apart
from the question of distance, the new [Mao] regime was not yet strong enough to adopt any
meaningful policy towards Africa, despite its ambition to universalize its revolutionary
experience” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 4).
Nonetheless, apart from seeing the non-intervention principle as an instrument for protecting
itself against Western and Soviet interference,139 China also considered it to be an effective soft
power strategy useful to securing a prominent place among Third World developing countries
also struggling against United States and Soviet Union’s political and ideological dominance.
The non-intervention principle therefore enabled China to be flexible and pragmatic in its
foreign policy while gaining the admiration of states repulsed by the strict ideological demands
of the United States and USSR. It also helped China to carve a niche for its own politicoideological influence in Africa through building bilateral relations with African states
independent of the Soviet Union.
The first momentous step toward engaging Africa was made at the Bandung Conference in
1955 where Premier Zhou Enlai pronounced the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’,140
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with emphasis on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. He
explained: “as the Chinese proverb says: ‘Do not onto others what you yourself do not desire.’
We are against outside interference; how could we want to interfere in the internal affairs of
others.”141 The principle resonated well with African countries that had either attained political
independence or were still fighting against colonial rule. Three years after the Bandung
Conference, the Bandung Principles as enunciated by Zhou Enlai were adopted by leaders of
newly independent African countries at the Accra Meeting of Independent African States which
was attended by Ghana, Liberia, Sudan, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic (short-lived political
union between Egypt and Syria), and Libya, Morocco and Tunisia and a delegation from
Cameroon.142 Among other factors, the emphasis on non-intervention guided China’s efforts to
gradually assume leadership of the Third World,143 particularly of the subsequent Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), which comprised of developing countries that refused to ideologically side
with either the United States or Soviet Union. As a result, China attained greater support and
diplomatic recognition from African countries most of which had previously recognised Taiwan
instead of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).144
Having established itself as leader of the Third World,145 China set to establish its own
ideological and geopolitical dominance in Africa on the basis that it did not interfere in African
countries’ internal affairs. However as noted by Alaba Ogunsanwo, China’s policy in Africa was
interlocked to its international strategic interests, and “was a function of her triangular
relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union” such that to a greater extent, African
states were “used merely as pawns on the international chessboard” (1974, p. 3; see also Thrall
2015, p. 4, 6). To draw Africa into its sphere of influence, Mao elaborated the ‘Dual
Intermediate Zones’ theory in 1963 which posited that “a spacious intermediate zone existed
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between the United States and the USSR.”146 That intermediate zone consisted of African and
Asian countries under colonial rule. Mao therefore argued to the satisfaction of several African
leaders that “the most effective way to oppose the two superpowers was for all nonsuperpower countries in between the two political extremes they represented to unite in their
struggle against imperialism;”147 and “form a new international order” (Yu 1977, p. 1036).
Satisfied with the reception of his Dual Intermediate Zones theory in Africa and the Global
South, he then declared, “we must give active support to the national independence liberation
movement in countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as to the peace movement and
to just struggles in all countries throughout the world.”148 In 1965, Defence Minister Lin Biao
reiterated Mao’s call to action, saying that China and other “socialist countries should regard it
as their internationalist duty to support the people’s revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and
Latin America.”149 But as shall be discussed below, China’s support to ‘freedom movements’
and ‘just struggles’ included significant intervention in the internal affairs of other states.
China’s military support for African liberation war movements began in the late 1950s with
assistance to Algeria’s Front de Libération Nationale which fought for independence from
France.150 But, “with the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations in the early 1960s, China reversed
its earlier policy of broad support for liberation organisations, and in general began to be more
circumscribed in aiding movements that had links with Moscow. This led to a process of
selecting suitable recipients for Chinese aid” (Taylor 2000, p. 93). The suitable ones where
those that subscribed to Maoism and were not aligned with or receiving any support from the
Soviet Union. As an illustration, in Angola, China supported the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) not only because its guerrilla strategies were similar to Mao’s
‘revolution from the countryside’, but also because UNITA’s rival liberation movement, the
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Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had strong Soviet links.151 China
therefore supported UNITA and the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) even
though the two groups were rivals of each other simply for the reason that they both fought
against the Soviet-backed MPLA. In 1963, the leader of FNLA, Holden Roberto, was promised
military support by the Chinese foreign minister, Chen Yi. Almost a decade later, in 1974 FNLA
“received a 450-ton shipment of arms and benefitted from the assistance of 112 Chinese
instructors based in former Zaire” (Campos and Vines 2008, p. 34). Meanwhile, in 1964, Jonas
Savimbi, leader of UNITA “met with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai in China,
where he received military training and became a disciple of Maoism” (Campos and Vines 2008,
p. 34). Influenced by its anti-Soviet stance, China ended up joining the United States and
apartheid South Africa in supporting UNITA, a decision that ended up tarnishing its image on
the continent,152 but more importantly, exposed China as just like the United States and the
Soviet Union in seeking to expand their influence over African countries.
As China’s relative economic power increased by leaps and bounds in the 1960s, albeit not to
levels comparable to the Soviet Union or United States, it became bolder in its geopolitical
competition for influence in Africa. Its strategy of choice was to expand its support for
liberation movements struggling for independence in Africa. In Zimbabwe, a country
strategically located at the centre of Southern Africa, China supported the Zimbabwe African
National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) because its rival, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), military wing of
the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) followed Soviet Marxist–Leninist ideology. Initially,
ZANU had sought military support from Moscow, but failing to get any, it turned to Beijing. The
People’s Republic of China took the opportunity to outdo the Soviets, seeing support for ZANU
as a vehicle by which it could pursue its anti-Soviet objectives in Southern Africa.153 It then
started providing military training and strategic assistance to ZANLA. “It was [also] under
Chinese tutorship that ZANLA’s military strategy underwent a fundamental transformation
from conventional military tactics to the Maoist model, which entailed the mass mobilisation of
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the population” (Zhang 2014, p. 6). The Maoist combination of guerrilla warfare and political
education for the masses contributed to ZANU’s triumph over ZAPU at independence in 1980.
To further strengthen its support for liberation movements in Africa, Chinese military
instructors were sent from Beijing to several training camps in independent African countries
such as Tanzania, Ghana, and Congo-Brazzaville. Their instructions were to train liberation war
fighters from other African countries still under colonial rule in Maoist ideology, guerrilla
warfare, and war strategies. In Tanzania, the Chinese military instructors set up training camps
for the rest of Southern Africa and also did the same for West Africa in Ghana.154 For example, a
group of ZANU liberation war fighters were mainly trained in Tanzania. Besides providing
training in African countries, some fighters were trained in China. Zimbabwe’s current vice
president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, went to China in September 1963 for six months’ training in
military science. In 1966, another group of 11 fighters led by the ZANLA commander Josiah
Magama Tongogara were trained in mass mobilisation, strategy, and tactics at the Nanjing
Academy in Beijing. 155 Similarly, as Mozambique’s Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
(FRELIMO) fought for independence from Portugal, its fighters received training from Chinese
instructors in Tanzania, and they received weapons from China. “China also coordinated its
military training for liberation groups with the Organisation of African Unity, providing the
organisation’s liberation committee with 75 percent of all the military aid that it received from
countries outside of Africa during 1971 and 1972” (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 165).
However, in its quest to outdo the Soviet Union and expand its influence across Africa, China
ended up intervening in the internal politics of independent African states. Ian Taylor notes
that “China adopted an anti-Soviet policy towards the liberation organisations in reaction to
Moscow and not to the local situation. Whenever a movement indicated a willingness to deal
with Moscow, China encouraged a rival organisation by switching aid to them, thus aiming to
thwart the Soviet Union. This became a competition for influence…” (2000, p. 93). Because of
its anti-Soviet fixation and desire to dominate the African continent, it supported anti-Soviet
radical dissidents in Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar, Senegal, Cameroon, Niger, and the Congo,156
much to the chagrin of newly independent African states. As a result, in 1966 Ghana expelled
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Chinese diplomats from Accra and suspended diplomatic ties with China on allegations that it
was “interfering in its internal affairs by helping train Africans in secret military camps and
supporting Nkrumah’s effort to return to power” (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 288). Other
independent African countries that also suspended diplomatic ties with China in protest to its
interference in their internal affairs, including Benin (1966), Burundi (1963),157 Democratic
Republic of Congo (1961), Kenya (1967), Tunisia (1967) and the Central African Republic
(1966).158 In the end, African countries were “worried about trading one foreign master for
another and regarded Beijing’s radical fervour as potentially subversive” (Raine 2009, p. 19; see
also Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 165).
Besides Beijing justifying the interventions as political support for movements fighting for selfdetermination, in international law, and to a sizeable number of African leaders, its support of
liberation movements in their countries amounted to intervention. To settle the issue of
whether support for rebels fighting for independence is intervention or not, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in a case involving U.S. support for rebels in Nicaragua. The court
decided that: “The United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing and
supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in
breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of
another State.”159
Even by China’s own interpretation “making direct contact with the opposition…”160 in this case,
liberation movements fighting against colonial governments, amounted to intervention. But,
justifiable as it seemed, China’s support for insurgent groups in countries such as Angola raised
further suspicion and discontent against its involvement in ideological proxy wars alongside
Moscow and Washington because it suggested that China’s support for liberation movements
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was propelled by the primary motive to counter Soviet influence in the Third World,161 and its
desire to create a third ideological pole. The suspicion was confirmed when Deng Xiaoping said
that China’s support for liberation movements in the Third World was meant to rally “the
world’s people to oppose hegemonism, changing the world political balance, frustrating the
Soviet hegemonists’ arrogant plan to isolate China internationally, improving China’s
international environment, and heightening its international prestige” 162 (underlined for
emphasis).

4.5 Domestic economic development first, international affairs later:
Deng’s China
Toward the beginning of the 1970s, a mélange of systemic and mostly domestic factors led to
waning of China’s support for liberation war movements in Africa. The most consequential
domestic factor was definitely the Cultural Revolution which gained momentum from the late
1960s. Focusing on containing internal revolts and purging ‘anti-revolutionary’ cadres within
CPC, support for African liberation movements drifted away from being a priority for Beijing.
Under the overbearing effects of the Cultural Revolution, China’s economy regressed hence its
ability to continue financing the ‘internationalisation’ project in Africa was further constrained.
But, as the Cultural Revolution drew to a close, and with the death of Mao on 9 September
1976 – a man who had singly defined the issues and determined the course of Chinese foreign
policy especially its support to liberation war movements in Africa,163 China’s domestic and
foreign policy took a shift. By 1975, Deng Xiaoping had already seized the opportunity and
declared that it was ‘utterly wrong’ for comrades in the Party to only make revolution without
promoting production. He therefore declared that the overall national interest was to “turn
China into a powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, industry, national defence, and
science and technology by the end of this century.” 164
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He also shifted China’s foreign policy from being driven by political and ideological
considerations to being influenced by economic interests; and from being geographically
focused on the poor and developing Africa, to concentrating on engaging the developed and
technologically advanced West. Part of his argument was:
We have gone on opposing imperialism, hegemonism, colonialism and racism, working
to safeguard world peace, and actively developing relations, including economic and
cultural exchanges with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence. After several years of effort, we have secured international conditions
that are far better than before; they enable us to make use of capital from foreign
countries and of their advanced technology and experience in business
management.165
Following on from his argument that China should reengage the West, he toured Europe and
while addressing a press delegation in the Federal Republic of Germany on 10 October 1978,
Deng Xiaoping urged China to open up to the outside world in order to advance itself.166 From
then on, China transfixed its efforts toward economic engagement with developed Western
countries in order to achieve relative economic development instead of continuing with the
isolationist and antagonistic policies of Mao.167 With his focus on economically developing
China, Deng Xiaoping also abandoned Mao’s international revolution agenda which had
focused on Third World countries in Africa and Asia.
China’s shift from ‘internationalisation’ of the revolution to domestic economic development
was not just a response to domestic imperatives but also to systemic pressures. In relative
terms, China was an economically and militarily poor country compared to the Soviet Union
and the United States. It was therefore no longer able to measure up to the financial and
military assistance given to most African countries by Moscow and Washington. In a talk with
an economic and trade delegation of the government of Madagascar, Deng Xiaoping hinted on
the withdrawal of Beijing from international engagements due to its weak relative economic
status in the international system. He said, “at present, we are still a relatively poor nation. It is
impossible for us to undertake many proletarian obligations, so our contributions remain small.
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However, once we have accomplished the four modernisations and the national economy has
expanded, our contributions to mankind, and especially the Third World, will be greater.”168
This statement by Deng Xiaoping marked one of the first clearest admissions by a Chinese
national leader that Beijing’s level of

engagement in international engagements was

determined by its relative economic power, suggesting that for as long as China remained
economically weaker than other global powers, its foreign policy remained limited until a time
when its ‘national economy has expanded.
Deng Xiaoping also reasoned that an economically poor China was vulnerable to bullying by
other states at the international front. To avoid that situation, it needed to achieve comparable
prosperity in order to restore “a position for China in international affairs.”169 Giving a speech
at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 16 January 1980,
Deng Xiaoping said, “the role we play in international affairs is determined by the extent of our
economic growth. If our country becomes more developed and prosperous, we will be in a
position to play a greater role in international affairs.”170 In 1984, he reiterated to the then
President of Brazil, Joao Baptista de Oliveira, that when China achieves a Gross National
Product (GNP), now known as the Gross National Income (GNI) of $1 trillion, it will be able to
contribute more to mankind.171 Furthermore, at the Third Plenary Session of the Central
Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China on 22 October 1984, Deng Xiaoping said,
“what will the political situation be like once we have quadrupled the GNP? I am confident that
there will be a genuine stability and unity. China will be truly powerful, exerting a much greater
influence in the world. That’s why we have to work hard. There are 16 more years until the
year 2000.”172
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True to the objective, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and open-door policy enabled China
to achieve an average annual GDP growth rate of 9.9% from 1978 to 2014, “one of the world’s
best” (Cheng 2014, p. vii). In 1984, when Deng Xiaoping told the President of Brazil that China
will be truly powerful and ready to play a significant role in international affairs when it
achieves a GNI of US$1 trillion, it still had a GNI of $257 billion. By 1998, two years before the
targeted deadline China quadrupled its GNI to slightly more than US$1 trillion. The table below
illustrates the extraordinary growth of China’s annual GNI from being a mere US$184.8 billion
in 1975 when Deng Xiaoping urged his fellow CPC comrades to consider production more than
revolution to becoming the world’s second largest economy with an annual GNI of US$10,097
trillion in 2014.
Table 4.1: Comparative Gross National Income (Formerly Gross National Product) Atlas Method
(Current US$ in Billions)
COUNTRY

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2014

CHINA

184.8

213.3

299.6

372.3

647.5

1175.8

2278.2

5752.3

10097

FRANCE

363.7

723.6

556.5

1208.8

1542.6

1532

2274.7

2847.7

2844.3

GERMANY

529.8

1020.1

765.4

1694.8

2414.4

2154.7

2959.4

3662.5

3853.6

RUSSIAN

..

..

..

..

392.1

250.3

638.5

1425.1

1930.6

255.5

500

480.4

988.3

1224.8

1613.4

2485.7

2541

2801.5

1842.2

3048.1

4164.9

6029.5

7760.9

10178.5

13694

15143.1

17611

566.3

1245.8

1371.5

3405.2

5177.2

4436.5

5001.6

5376.6

5339.1

FEDERATION
UNITED
KINGDOM
UNITED
STATES
JAPAN

Source: World Bank. 2015, World Development Indicators. Available at:
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=&series=NY.GNP.ATLS.CD&period
=#

In addition, China’s percentage share of world trade grew from less than one percent173 in 1978
to 12.1%, ahead of United States’ 11.5% and Germany’s 7.7% in 2013. In the same year, 2013, it
became the world’s biggest merchandise trader ahead of the United States, Germany and
Japan.174 In terms of trade with other regions, China-Africa trade surpassed the US$100 billion
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mark in 2008175 and reached $210.2 billion in 2013 making China Africa’s foremost trading
partner.176 As predicted by Deng Xiaoping this increase in China’s relative economic power
resulted in extension of its interests and influence Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle
East,177 thereby enabling it to exert a much greater influence in the world, and expand its
contributions in the Third World.

4.6 21st Century China, increased relative economic power and
intervention in Africa
In terms of relative economic power and global status, the China of the 21st century is miles
apart from the China of Mao and Deng Xiaoping in the 20th century. Its economy has grown
exponentially. In less than 60 years it has risen from being the ‘sick man of Asia’ to becoming
one of the world’s major economies. In fact, according to the World Bank’s 2014 development
indicators, its GDP based on purchasing power parity stood at US$18 trillion ahead of United
States’ US$17 trillion178 - eighteen times more than what Deng Xiaoping envisioned it to be by
the turn of the century. That growth in economic power has expectedly resulted in expansion
of its economic interests abroad as it searches for new markets and resources to keep the
engine of its economy running. From being an isolationist underdeveloped country in 1949, it
has also become the biggest trading partner of the United States, Asia and Africa, with
extensive trade relations with Europe and Latin America.
By all standards, the China of today has far exceeded Deng Xiaoping’s expectations, but what
impact has it had on its role in global affairs? As discussed above, in 1978 and 1984 Deng
Xiaoping respectively told a Madagascan delegation and the former president of Brazil, Joao
Baptista de Oliveira, that when China quadruples its economy’s size, it will be ‘truly powerful,
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175
Zhu, Z 2010, China's New Diplomacy: Rationale Strategies and Significance, Ashgate Publishing, Surrey,
p.22.
176
Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China 2014,’Chinese Premier Calls for Upgraded Version
of China-Africa Cooperation’, May 6, viewed 18 May 2014,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zt_africatour/news/201411/20141100802253.shtml
177
Ikenberry, GJ 2008, ‘The rise of China and the future of the West: Can the liberal system survive?’
Foreign affairs, vol. 87, no. 1, p.26.
178
The World Bank 2014, World Development Indicator – GDP ranking, PPP based’ viewed 7 April 2014,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP_PPP.pdf

89

exerting a much greater influence in the world’, and playing a significant role in international
affairs particularly in the Third World. The questions that arise, and what this chapter has
sought to do, is to explore from a historical perspective whether China’s role in international
affairs is determined by its relative economic power; and whether its understanding and
practice of intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts particularly in Africa evolve with
changes in its relative economic power? What is apparent is that China’s role in international
affairs, especially intervention in the internal affairs of other states, has historically been
influenced by its position in the international system, particularly its relative economic power.
The result of China’s rapid economic growth since 1978 has been a subsequent expansion of its
economic and political interests in Africa. Initially, the re-engagement with Africa was in
response to the dilemma of its rising demand for primary commodities and insufficient
domestic sources for those high-value commodities.179 Second, it needed alternative import
and export markets to sustain its growing economy.180 In short China was in “pursuit of
economic self-interest in the form of access to raw materials, markets and spheres of influence
through investment, trade and military assistance” (Marks 2006). As a result, by the end of
2013, it had surpassed the United States as Africa’s biggest trading partner, and its direct
investment in Africa amounted to US$25 billion, with at least 2 500 Chinese companies
operating across the African continent in sectors that include finance and banking,
telecommunications, infrastructure development, agriculture, manufacturing and commodity
broking. In addition to economic interests, it also considered Africa to be “an important
component in shaping its influence and prestige as a major power”181 and in expanding its
global influence.
The expansion into Africa was, however, not without significant geopolitical challenges. Despite
most African countries having been independent for several decades, European “political
influence, economic preponderance, and cultural conditioning remain[ed]. Britain and France,
and with them the rest of the European Community, maintain[ed] a relatively high level of aid

179

Choucri, N & North, RC 1975, Nations in conflict: National growth and international violence, WH
Freeman: San Francisco, p.15; Adem, S 2010, ‘The Paradox of Chinas Policy in Africa’, African and Asian
Studies, vol. 9, no. 3, p.336.
180
Gill, B, Huang, C, & Morrison, JS 2007, ‘Assessing China’s Growing Influence in Africa’, China Security,
vol.3, no. 3, p.9.
181
Jakobson, L 2009, ‘China's diplomacy toward Africa: Drivers and constraints’, International Relations
of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 9, no. 3, p.405.

90

and investment, trade dominance, and a sizeable flow of teachers, businessmen, statesmen,
tourists and technical assistants” on the continent.182 In addition to the European powers, the
United States, Russia, Japan and other rising powers such as India and Brazil also have
significant stakes in the politics and economies of African countries. That means as a latereturnee to Africa, China lacked “the economic and political ties that Western Europe has with
Africa as a legacy of colonialism, and the economic power that the United States wields
because of its wealth and influence in international financial institutions” (French 2004). With
options for economic and trading partners in Africa somewhat limited,183 it was compelled to
offer resource-rich African countries better terms than those offered by rival global powers.184
For China, one of those better terms came in the form of promises not to interfere in the
African countries’ internal affairs, and unlike the West, it did not attach political conditions to
its development assistance to African countries.185 Just as in the 1950s, Beijing’s emphasis on
non-interference resonated well with African ruling elites,186 some of whom were bogged down
by Western demands for political and economic reforms in exchange for aid and development
assistance.
Riding on its official foreign policy of non-intervention in other states’ internal affairs, China
first gained ‘political, economic and military space’ in countries described as ‘outposts of
tyranny’187 where Western presence and influence was weak. 188 These were countries either
ostracised by the West for gross human rights violations, terrorism, bad governance and
authoritarianism, or simply for being riddled with perennial political instability and intrastate
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armed conflicts. 189 Seeing countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan,
Zimbabwe and Angola as opportunities, Beijing was quick to step into the vacuum left by
Western powers. 190 Also taking advantage of the minimal competition from Western
companies, whose activities in those countries were inhibited by their governments,
multilateral sanctions, or domestic pressure,191 Chinese companies flourished as Beijing took
“up political, economic and military space that was [once] occupied by Britain, France or the
United States”192 in resource-rich countries like Sudan and Angola.
Mutually invoking the historical Sino-Africa cooperation in their fight against colonialism, the
CPC strengthened its economic and political ties with ruling political elites in Africa. As China
gained access to strategic natural resources, political leaders in countries such as Zimbabwe,
Libya, Sudan and Angola viewed China’s enthusiasm to trade with them in spite of Western
sanctions as a source of alternative development assistance, and legitimisation of their
regimes.193 By accentuating the principle of non-intervention in their internal affairs, “China
offered [them] not just an alternative path to development, but also an alternative to the
Western-authored, liberal international order – rejecting, for example, the concept of universal
human rights.”194 As it gained in economic power and influence in global governance, China
expanded its tentacles beyond ‘pariah and authoritarian states’ to include African countries
such as Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, South Africa, and Botswana that still are strongly aligned to
the West.
As China expanded its economic interests in Africa, more and more it found both its
investments and nationals under threat from intrastate armed conflicts in some of its African
trading partners. Examples of Chinese nationals being kidnapped for ransom, and investments
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being caught in the crossfire of armed conflicts abound. For instance, when an intrastate armed
conflict broke out in Libya in 2011, Zhong Manying, Director of the Department of West Asia
and Africa under the Ministry of Commerce reported that Chinese enterprises with businesses
in property, railway, crude oil service, and telecommunication valuing more than $20 billion
were lost (MOFCOM, 2011). Among those Chinese enterprises were three state oil firms, China
National Petroleum Company (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group) and
China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) (Martina and Buckley 2011). In Sudan, China
invested US$20 billion mostly in the oil industry before a secessionist conflict resulted in split of
the Sudan into two. Two-thirds of its investments ended up in the new state of South Sudan. A
further intrastate armed conflict outbreak in South Sudan affected the operations of the stateowned CNPC, which is a major shareholder in two oil consortia – the Greater Nile Petroleum
Operating Company (GNPOC) and the Petrodar Operating Company (PDOC). 195 Not only have
the intrastate armed conflicts affected China’s economic interests, its citizens working in Africa
have also been targeted. For example, Chinese workers were kidnapped and others killed by
rebels in Sudan.196 In the Central African Republic, two Chinese workers were kidnapped in
2012197 and more recently, Chinese companies have had to evacuate their nationals and scale
down operations due to the ensuing civil war in South Sudan.198 More and more, as shall be
discussed in the next three empirical chapters, China’s adherence to its non-interference
principle is being put to the test, as it intervenes to protect national interests in Africa.
What is apparent, however, is that the general trajectory of China’s actual intervention in the
internal affairs of other states can be explained by its position in the international system and
increases in its relative economic power. As promised by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and reiterated
by President Xi in 2015, as China’s economic power increases, it is expanding its interests into
Africa. In the process, its non-intervention policy is being put to the test, compelling it to
intervene in some African conflicts, and forcing it to play a bigger role in international affairs.
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This means that the trend from imperial China is still relevant today, “When Chinese power
prevailed, the empire was able to force its tribute system and its language of diplomatic
discourse on surrounding peoples. When the empire was weak, the Chinese perception of the
world had little effect on the course of events. The ultimate fact is the fact of power” (Schwartz
1968, p. 278). With “the continued growth of the Chinese economy and with China’s deeper
integration into the international system, the tendency to keep a low profile in various
international situations changed… the old strategy of ‘hiding one’s brilliance and improving
one’s internal strength’ (tao guang yang hui) is no longer viable” (Wang and Rosenau 2009:23).
Already, “Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping appears to have moved beyond Deng’s
cautious and cautionary approach and is much in line with what one would expect from a
reemerging power that accepts its status as a major global power on the rise” (Cook 2015, p.
113).
Writing in 2008, John G Ikenberry noted that as China had quadrupled the size of its economy,
with trillions of US dollars in reserves, its diplomacy was extending its reach to Asia, Africa,
Latin America and the Middle East. The implication of that extraordinary economic growth is
that China is now both a military and economic rival to the US, a factor that is heralding a shift
in the distribution of global power and putting China on its way to becoming a formidable
global power. President Xi noted that China was now supposed to protect its nationals and
interests abroad, which in reality entails intervening in the internal affairs of other states.
Correspondingly, it is taking a more liberal interpretation of the official non-intervention
principle. In concurrence, Jian Yang notes that “China’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold
War has experienced major changes in a liberal direction” (2009, p. 31). Other authors also
note that since the turn of the beginning of the 1990s, “Chinese foreign policy has become far
nimbler and engaging than at any other time in the history of the People’s Republic” (Medeiros
and Fravel 2003). Structurally different levels of relative economic power point to divergent
patterns in China’s interpretation of its principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of
other states. With a rise in its relative economic power in the 21st century, there should be an
increase in its intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts in Africa.
What is clear from this historical pattern is that in times of expansive rise in economic power,
Chinese intervention in other states’ affairs is more frequent, whereas in times of decline there
is less significant intervention abroad. It can be argued that the periods of high economic
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growth in China are matched with higher activity abroad, making them extroversion times
whereas the decline periods are matched with less or no activity abroad, making them
introversion times.

“The extroversion times are matched with greater activity, including

interventions abroad” (Feste 2003, p. 188). Frank Klingberg (1996) describes this phenomenon
as being foreign policy mood alternations from introversion to extroversion. From the analysis
above, toward the end of the Ming dynasty, the Century of Humiliation, and the period from
Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in 1978 to until the coming in of Hu Jintao can be described as
withdrawn periods in China’s foreign policy. These periods were “typified by the concern to
prevent development or expansion of… political and military concerns beyond its own
borders,”199 whereas the latter years of Hu Jintao and currently President Xi Jinping’s reign
constitute the extrovert periods of its foreign policy.
On the other hand, Mao Zedong’s interventionist foreign policy in Africa reflects that even
though the increase in relative economic power may be minute, a state can still intervene in
the internal affairs of other states in order to protect its interests abroad. This does not mean
that political ideology and/or state interest may be autonomous push factors separate from
relative economic growth and a state’s position in the international system because unlike Xi
Jinping who sees China as a global power able to compete with the United States in global
governance, Mao narrowly defined China as the leader of the Third World with interests to
protect there. In the Third World, China had a significantly superior ‘global’ position, able to
influence and intervene in their internal affairs on behalf of its geostrategic and ideological
interests. As put by Gideon Rose, the increase in its relative economic power, however small,
was the basis upon which it was able to expand its interests abroad. Mao’s ‘withdrawal’ from
Africa during the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward when China’s economic power
was significantly under strain suggests that economic power was the bedrock upon which
China’s interventionist foreign policy lay.
This cyclical pattern in China’s foreign policy behaviour, in particular intervention in foreign
conflicts, reflects the lateral pressure hypothesis and the neoclassical realist arguments that
States expand when they think they can, when they perceive relative increases in
national power, and when changes in the relative costs and benefits of expansion make
it profitable for them to do so… [because] as states grow wealthier and more powerful,
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they do not only seek greater worldwide political influence (control over territory, the
behaviour of other states, and the world economy) commensurate with their new
capabilities, but they will also be more capable of expanding their interests and, if
necessary, of waging large-scale wars for this purpose (Feste 2003, p. 189).
With its new economic power, China has international interests, and the capacity to project
both military and non-military power to protect and advance those interests. Thus the “Chinese
foreign policy establishment has come to see the country as an emerging global power with
varied interest and responsibilities – and not as the victimised developing nation of the Mao
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping era” (Medeiros and Fravel 2003). Hence, “as China’s economy
continues to grow and as its political ambition continues to develop, so will its influence around
the world” (Wang and Rosenau 2009, p. 7). Thus, as put by Li Cheng, director of the John L.
Thornton China Center of the Brookings Institute, “as a major power, China’s voice should be
heard, and views should be delivered… [Since] along with its rising international status, China
also shoulders more responsibilities and obligations in narrowing the rich-poor gap, promoting
South-South cooperation and other global affairs.”200 This is because “the way Chinese policy
changes and how it responds to the challenges of the twenty-first century will be critical not
only to the future of conflict-affected and fragile states, but to global security and stability and,
consequently, to China’s own sustained economic growth and modernization” (Mariani 2015, p.
267).
Nevertheless, still the position of China in the international system and its relative economic
power is only sufficient in explaining in the abstract the changing nature of China’s intervention
policy and behavior. It does not explain China’s specific intervention behavior in individual
African countries because the “foreign policy of any country is, after all, designed to promote
as far as possible the interests of that country as perceived at each particular moment by the
country’s leaders. Changes in some aspects of foreign policy may not necessarily reflect
changes in the concrete situation but rather a change in the perception of the policy-makers or
a calculation that such change would have desirable results” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 20).
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CHAPTER 5: China and the Libyan civil war: Case of ambivalent
interventionism?
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter traced the historical evolution of China’s intervention behaviour vis-a-vis
the trajectory of its transition from being the ‘Middle Kingdom’ to being a state within the
modern international system. What became apparent is that as its relative economic power
vacillated due to changes in its domestic economy, so did its intervention in African states’
internal affairs. With Deng Xiaoping pursuing the ‘Socialist Modernisation’ programme, Africa
no longer fit into the grand scheme of China’s domestic and foreign policy – simply put what
followed was a “decade of neglect by China”201 because it “not only viewed Africa as largely
immaterial in its quest for modernisation, but also saw that the rationale behind its support for
anti-Soviet elements in the continent was no longer valid” (Taylor 1998, p. 444). It was only
after the Tiananmen Square incident that China revived its political and diplomatic engagement
with Africa, but still its role in the continent’s internal affairs remained minimal. Its focus on
Africa was reinforced when, due to lateral pressure caused by high domestic economic growth,
it aggressively sought new markets and sources of energy and other strategic primary
commodities. Only then did it vigorously renew its re-engagement with resource-rich countries
in Africa. With its gigantic oil and gas reserves and lucrative opportunities for Chinese
multinational companies in the construction and telecommunications sector, Libya was a
natural target for China’s ‘going out’ strategy.
Building on that broad history of Sino-Africa relations, and particularly on the thesis that China
expands its interests abroad when its relative economic power increases, this chapter discusses
China’s intervention in Libya’s 2011 intrastate armed conflict. It begins by exploring Sino-Libya
diplomatic, political, and economic relations from a historical perspective, and then focuses on
China’s economic interests in Libya and how the outbreak of the intrastate armed conflict in
2011 affected those interests in a manner and scale never before experienced by China in
Africa. The latter part of the chapter examines China’s unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral
intervention in the conflict. Overall, the main argument advanced in this chapter is that China’s
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response to the Libyan intrastate armed conflict reflects an indecisive foreign policy on
intervention in foreign conflicts that gravitated from non-interventionism to ambivalent
interventionism.

5.2 Background of China-Libya relations
Relations between China and Libya began in the 1950s through what began as indirect
interactions at conferences such as the 1955 Bandung Conference202 and the Afro-Asian
People’s Solidarity Conference held in late December 1957. China’s drive to directly engage
Libya, however, gained momentum as part of Beijing’s wider “diplomatic offensive in North
Africa… the region of Africa that had the largest number of independent states; Beijing believed
it could persuade several to recognise the PRC” (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 228). As a result
of that concerted diplomatic offensive, China established its first African embassy in Cairo,
Egypt in 1956. A year later, a Commercial Officer at the Chinese embassy in Cairo, Chan HiangKang, established China’s first official trade relations with Libya, alongside other North African
countries. The relations got a further boost when the International Liaison and Organisation
Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council’s
Commission for Cultural Relations with foreign countries jointly organised visits to China for
delegates from twenty-seven African countries including Libya in 1958-9. The visits by the
African delegates “were naturally expected to support diplomatic recognition and the opening
of trade relations after independence” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 35; see also Larkin 1973, p. 29).
However, the outcome was not outright successful for China, because in 1959 the Kingdom of
Libya under King Idris established and maintained full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.203
When Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi (popularly known as Muammar Gaddafi)
came into power after the 1969 coup d'état against King Idris, he was “a 27-year old signals
officer driven by grand ambitions, fierce hatreds and a pathological penchant for meddling in
the affairs of other countries, made possible by the huge flow of oil revenues at his disposal.”204
Partly because he was an anti-Communist and pro-Arab Unity nationalist – ideologies that were
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inimical to China, he was at first not keen on establishing diplomatic relations with China. He
therefore maintained Libya’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan until 1978. However, possibly due to a
combination of acknowledgements by Zhou Enlai of Gaddafi’s support for the anti-imperialist
movement, and “China’s support for the Arab states and the Palestinians against Israel,” 205
Muammar Gaddafi acquiesced to recognising the People’s Republic of China in 1971. In fact, it
was a unilateral decision that he made “while there was still an ambassador in Tripoli
representing Taiwan.”206 Libya-Taiwan diplomatic relations still remained until August 1978
when the People’s Republic of China and Libya officially established diplomatic ties.
On consummation of their diplomatic relations, China and Libya immediately entered into their
first trade agreement, the agreement for cooperation on the economy, science and technology
in August 1978, which came into force four years later.207 In 1982, the countries signed the
Agreement on Establishment of the Sino-Libyan Joint Committee on Economic, Trade, Scientific
and Technological Cooperation, and the Sino-Libyan Mutual Cooperation Program. Further
agreements were signed concerning the sending of Chinese medical teams to Libya between
1983 and 1994208and follow-on agreements on cultural cooperation (1985); scientific and
technological cooperation (1990), and cultural and information cooperation (2001). In addition,
although there were several exchange visits between the two countries in the course of
Gaddafi’s rule over Libya, official visits by heads of state of both Libya and China were rare. The
only time Gaddafi made a state visit to China was in 1982, “during which the two countries
signed an accord to set up a mixed committee for trade, economic, science and technological
cooperation.”209 Two decades later, China’s President Jiang Zemin and Vice-Premier Qian
Qichen made a two-day state visit to Libya – the first visit by a Chinese President to the North
African country.210 In between, China’s Vice-Premier Li Peng visited Libya in May 1984; in
January 1996, Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited Libya. In
September of the same year, a delegation led by Zinati Mohammed Al Zinati, Speaker of the
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General People’s Congress of Libya, paid a goodwill visit to China. Libya’s Secretary of Foreign
Communication and International Cooperation, Abdul-Rahman Mohammad Shalgam, then
visited China in May 2000; and the following year, in January 2001 China’s foreign minister
Tang Jiaxuan visited Libya.211 The last visit by a high ranking Chinese official before Gaddafi’s fall
in 2011 was by foreign minister Li Zhaoxing in January 2006. The fact that five years passed
without high level official visits between the two countries somewhat reflects the uneasy
relations between China and Libya.

5.3 Troubled diplomatic relations
By the time a mass revolution against Muammar Gaddafi started in February 2011, Libya-China
diplomatic relations had gone through turbulent times – causing China “occasional
indignity.”212 For example, at the same time that Muammar Gaddafi was hosting China’s
foreign affairs minister Li Zhaoxing in Libya and confirming his country’s commitment to the
one-China principle, his son Sayf al-Islam Gaddafi, President of the Gaddafi International
Foundation for Charity Associations and acting as his father’s envoy met President Chen Shuibian in Taiwan. On behalf of his father, he went on to invite President Chen to visit Libya “in
order to facilitate bilateral economic, science, technology, tourism, education and military
exchanges, and exchange representative offices.”213 Much to the vexation of Beijing, President
Chen made a transit stop in Tripoli four months later in May 2006.214 Regarding that visit, Liu
Jianchao, the PRC’s foreign ministry spokesman vented Beijing’s anger in the following terms:
Regardless of China’s persuasion and strong opposition, Libya insisted on allowing Chen
Shui-bian to stop over and discussed with him setting up representative offices on each
other’s territory… This is a serious violation of Libya's long-term commitment to the
one-China policy and will exert a negative impact on China-Libya relations… We
demand that Libya live up to its commitment and immediately cease all official
exchanges with Taiwan in whatever form so as to maintain the overall China-Libya
relations.215
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Further infuriating China and causing it to lose face was that four months before President
Chen’s stopover in Libya, the spokesman of China’s foreign ministry, Kong Quan, had
confidently declared China’s appreciation for the Libyan government’s adherence to the oneChina policy.216 Nonetheless, despite China’s stern rebuke over President Chen Shui-bian’s visit
to Tripoli, Libya did not cease relations with Taiwan. Instead, the Taiwan Commercial Office
began operating in Libya just two years after President Chen’s visit to Tripoli.217
Libya’s foreign policy and relations with China, as it has with other countries, was generally
unpredictable because of the prominent and direct role that Muammar Gaddafi played, which
ensured that foreign relations were personality-driven and depended on his personal relations
with leaders of the respective foreign countries.218 For instance, when Gaddafi was incensed by
China’s lack of support for his ‘integrated Africa’ initiative, under what he termed the United
States of Africa, Gaddafi publicly criticised China for attempting to ‘colonise’ Africa for its own
benefit and for its lack of support for integration and cooperation of African countries. Two
years later, at the 2009 Fourth Ministerial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which
was held in Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, Libya’s foreign minister Moussa Koussa also complained
about China’s ‘divide and rule’ of African countries. He remonstrated that Beijing does “not
want the African Union, or African unity, but rather China wants to cooperate with Africa as
separate nations, rather than as a union…”219
Apart from accusing China of being divisive to Africa, Gaddafi and his foreign minister
continued to accuse China of colonising the continent. In an address to Oxford University
students via satellite, Gaddafi contended that there was a geopolitical conflict between China
and the United States over Africa and that the two countries were using different strategies
and approaches to colonize the continent and benefit from its resources. He said:
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There is a colonialism that imposes itself by force [United States] and another that uses
gentler methods [China]. There is a soft and a harsh colonialism. But in the final
analysis, colonialism is one and the same. As I said, there are those who welcome China.
We all seek a deterrent against the harsh approach of American penetration. This
makes us take China's side. However, China must know that we are aware that it could
turn into an imperialist power. If it wishes to settle in Africa or to plunder Africa's
resources at a low price and sell its manufactured products at an exorbitant one, it will
turn into a colonial power.220
His foreign minister, Moussa Koussa, put it in even more crude terms, arguing that reality on
the ground suggested “something akin to a Chinese invasion of the African continent.” 221 He
then concluded his criticism by advising China not to resettle its citizens in Africa under the
pretext of employment and investment.
Both accusations touched a nerve in China because it had carefully cultivated an image and
identity as Africa’s all-weather benevolent equal partner interested in mutually beneficial
engagements unlike the ‘exploitative’ West. Although there is no evidence of China’s specific
response to Gaddafi and Moussa Koussa’s allegations that it was driving toward colonising
Africa, China has consistently negated those accusations, arguing that it is Africa’s development
partner. Regardless, Libya’s accusations against Beijing reflected the problematic nature of the
two countries’ relations. In fact, Maximilian Terhalle puts it that “Gaddafi’s outspoken
sympathies for and close ties with Taiwan and his well-known policy to raise resentments
among African states against China’s economic engagement on the continent made it
somewhat easier for Beijing to vote in favour of the resolution [UNSC Resolution 1970]” (2015,
p. 170). That United Nations Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) imposed sanctions, asset
freezes, and an arms embargo on Libya, and as well as on selected individuals that included
Gaddafi, his sons, and close associates. However, as put by David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman
in their book, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement, despite their awkward relations,
China was still “willing to suffer an occasional indignity because of Libya’s significant oil
resources in which China has shown increasing interest” (2012, p. 228). But exactly how much
of those oil resources did China get from Libya?
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5.4 China-Libya economic and trade engagements
Libya’s proven oil reserves are estimated at 43.7 billion barrels, the ninth largest reserves in the
world.222 According to the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), the country
“holds the largest amount of proven crude oil reserves in Africa, the fifth-largest amount of
proved natural gas reserves on the continent, and in the past years was an important
contributor to the global supply of light, sweet (low sulfur) crude oil, which Libya mostly
imports to European markets” (2015, p. 2). Before the intrastate armed conflict in 2011, as
shown in the diagram below, Libya produced an estimated 1.65 million barrels per day of high
quality sweet crude oil, up from the 1.4 million barrels per day produced in 2000, and slightly
lower than the 2008 average of 1.74 million barrels per day.223 In mid-2011, oil production in
Libya was reduced to its lowest level as mass demonstrations against the Gaddafi regime
escalated to an intrastate armed conflict.
Figure 5.1: Crude oil production in Libya, January 2010 to October 2015 (million barrels per
day)

Before the intrastate armed conflict, approximately 85% of Libya’s oil exports were destined for
Europe, especially the West European countries of Italy, Germany, France and Spain.224 Italy
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was the top destination. This dominance by West European countries of Libya’s oil and gas
exports was driven by two major factors: (1) Western Europe’s need to diversify energy sources
and reduce its dependence on expensive gas and oil from Norway and Russia; and (2) the
opening up of the Libyan oil industry after lifting of international sanctions against the Gaddafi
regime in 2003. Also, building on already existing economic relations between Libya and
Europe, as well as a shift toward the West by the Gaddafi regime in the 2000s, European
companies, especially Italian ENI, Spanish Repsol, and Total from France took the opportunity
to dominate the Libyan energy sector. But in order to diversify its export oil market, the Libyan
National Oil Corporation (NOC) maintained “a balance in its relationships between North
American, European, Brazilian, Chinese, Russian, Turkish, Indian and other corporate entities
that were investing in Libyan energy markets” (Campbell 2013, p. 6). This situation provided
China with an opportunity to enter into the Libyan oil industry, albeit on a smaller scale than
the Europeans. Although it was a late entrant in Libya’s energy sector, China still managed to
increase its share of Libyan oil exports from 4.2% in 2008 to a peak of 13% in 2011. Western
Europe, in particular Italy, however, remained the highest importers of Libyan oil.
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The table below shows the major destinations of Libyan oil in percentage of its total oil exports
from 2008-2013.
Figure 5.2: Libya's petroleum crude exports by destination (%), 2008 – 2013
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To Libya, China was one of its major oil buyers, but to China, Libyan oil only constituted a
fraction of its total oil imports. As shown in the diagram below, in 2010, Libyan oil only
represented 3% of China’s total crude oil imports. By the end of Libya’s intrastate armed
conflict in September 2011, Libyan oil exports to China had been drastically reduced to
approximately 1% of China’s imports. In 2013 it was further reduced to about 0.8% of total
Chinese oil imports.225
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Figure 5.3: China’s petroleum crude imports from selected African countries (%), 2008-2013
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Among China’s African sources of oil, Libya fell far behind Angola, which has consistently
remained the largest source of China’s oil imports from Africa. At its peak, Angolan oil
constituted 17% of China’s total oil imports in 2010 and 14% in 2013. In contrast, to date Libya
remains a small exporter of oil to China, and still is outside the league of China’s largest African
suppliers of oil – Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan
(Alessi and Xu 2015).
Before the conflict in 2011, China made several unsuccessful attempts to increase its stake in
the Libyan oil industry. For example, China National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) “offered
to assist Libyan counterparts in offshore exploration and the building of new pipeline system”
(Engelbrekt and Wagnsson 2014, p. 3). It then “partnered with Libya’s NOC to build pipelines
and carry out exploration projects, and was seen to have a strong relationship and business ties
with the Gaddafi regime” (Jiang and Ding 2014, p. 28). Perhaps confident of its relations with
the ruling elite in Libya, and seeking to further increase its stake, in 2008 CNPC attempted to
acquire a controlling stake in the Verenex Energy Inc. of Canada, including its Libyan assets, but
was blocked by Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC). Later into the deal, NOC chose to
exercise its right of pre-emption, effectively blocking CNPC’s bid to acquire Verenex Energy
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Inc.226 “Verenex had been working on gas and oil exploration in the Ghadames Basin since 2006
and had reported several discoveries” (Taib 2010, p. 25.1). What bothered CNPC and the
Chinese government is that Libya ended up paying far less than the $499 million that CNPC had
offered, raising suspicion that the blockage was a political move by the Gaddafi regime to
maintain ownership of oil reserves within the hands of the Libyan government as a matter of
national interest. With attempts to increase its stake in the Libyan energy sector, China
remained a comparatively small player, exploiting only a fraction of the Libyan oil exports.

5.5 China’s involvement in Libya’s industry
Beyond the oil industry, Chinese firms were major players in the construction and
telecommunications sector of the Libyan economy. At the time of the conflict in February 2011
at least 75 Chinese private and state-owned firms were operating in Libya227 - “mainly in the
fields of telecommunications, irrigation and rail construction” (Engelbrekt and Wagnsson 2014,
p. 3). Although Libya was not among the top 20 African destinations for China’s Outward
Foreign Investment (ODI),228 it still provided a huge market for manufactured Chinese products
and was a lucrative source of infrastructure development contracts for private and state owned
Chinese firms. This was “partly because the energy sector in Libya [had] already attracted
scores of foreign companies, including giants such as BP, Shell, ExxonMobil, with the Chinese
companies arriving too late to enter the market” (Zhang and Wei 2012, p. 44). Yin Gang, a
senior researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, concurred
with Zhang and Wei’s observation. He stated in an interview in 2011 that the most important
relationship between Libya and China was not oil but the export of Chinese technology to
Libya,229 as well as infrastructural development – especially in the railway construction and
telecommunications sector.
Unlike their Chinese counterparts in the energy sector, China’s private and state-owned
construction and telecommunication companies found Libya to be profitable. Contracted
infrastructure development projects funded by the Libyan government attracted large Chinese
226
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private and state-owned enterprises, such as the Changshu Construction Group, a Jiangsu
based enterprise which was contracted to construct a university town in Libya. Other major
Chinese state-owned enterprises with investments and construction projects in Libya included
China Water Resources and Hydropower Construction Group, China Communications
Construction Group, China Railway Construction Engineering Corporation, China State
Construction Engineering Corporation, China Gezhouba Group Corporation, China Building
Materials Group Import and Export Corporation, China National Petroleum Corporation, China
Metallurgical Group Corporation, the Workers International Engineering Co., Ltd., China
Communications construction Group, China metallurgical construction Co., China Civil
Engineering construction Corporation Limited; and two major private firms in the
telecommunications sector – ZTE and Huawei. Of the major Chinese companies operating in
Libya, thirteen, which included Metallurgical Corporation of China, China State Construction
Engineering Corporation, and China Railway Construction Corporation, are directly under the
central government.230 The table below gives a summary of the most significant projects and
investments by Chinese firms in Libya.
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Table 5.1: Investments by Chinese firms in Libya
Company Name

Ownership

Investment Project

China Railway
Construction

Central
enterprises

There are three general
contracting project

Chinese
Architecture

Central
enterprises

Gezhouba Group

Central
enterprises

2007 to enter Libya engaged in
engineering contracting projects,
duration 40 months, nearly half of
the project amount
Construction of 7300 housing units
in Libya

China
Metallurgical

Central
enterprises

China Oil and Gas
Group

Central
enterprises

China
Hydropower
CCCC
Construction
In Engineering
Group
Beijing Hongfu

Central
enterprises
Central
enterprises
Central
enterprises
Private
Enterprise

Ningbo Century
Huafeng

Private
Enterprise

In Libya build 5,000 units of
residential projects and
subcontracted cement plants, two
unfinished projects
2002 to enter Libya, before civil
unrest there has five subsidiary
companies
Projects under construction 6
Libya Misurata 5,000 units of
housing project
Housing Construction
Libya in 2009 to 5,000 units of
housing and turnkey facilities
project
In Libya, the construction of a
large housing project

ZTE

Investment Amount
Total $ 4.237 billion,
currently unfinished
contract amount
$ 3,551,000,000
The cumulative
contract amount of
about 17.6 billion yuan
Contract amount 5.54
billion yuan, a total
project amount of
16.8%
Contract amount of
about 5.131 billion
yuan
unknown

The total investment of
1.788 billion US dollars
$ 4.8 billion investment
Investment Amount
$ 4,000,000,000
Equivalent to about 3.4
billion yuan
Contract amount of
about 3.354 billion
yuan
$ 092.7 million

Private
Mobile communication network
Enterprise
construction
Huawei
Private
FTTH (fibre to the home) and other $ 040 million
Enterprise
projects
Source: Sohu, Inc. 2011, A List of Chinese Enterprises’ Investments in Libya. Available at:
http://business.sohu.com/20110823/n317112596.shtml

The China-Africa Trade and Economic Relationship Annual Report of 2010 reported that China’s
imports from Libya increased by 22.6% to reach US$3.17 billion in 2009. It also reported that by
2009, Libya had the third largest project signed with a Chinese company in Africa – the SurtTripoli section, valued at US$24.2 billion; the other two major projects were the Central and
western sections of the East-West expressway project in Algeria (US$62.5 billion) and the social
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housing project in Angola valued at US$35.4 billion.231 By 2010, trade volumes between the two
countries reached US$6.58 billion.232 The boom in trade between Libya and China was such that
the Afriqiyah Airline launched a twice-per-week direct flight from Tripoli to Beijing in order to
cater to rising travel demand by Chinese business people and workers.233 However, according
to the Annual Report on the Development of Africa, jointly published by the Social Sciences
Academic Press, the Institute of West Asian and African Studies of the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, and the External Relations Bureau of the Ministry of Culture released in Beijing
on 4 July 2012 “there was a sharp trade decline between China and Libya in 2011, a 58 percent
year-on-year decrease.”234 Mei Xinyu, a researcher at the Ministry of Commerce affiliated
Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation confirmed that in the first
eight months of 2011, trade between Libya and China fell by 51.4 percent year-on-year,
amounting only to US$2.16 billion.235

5.6 Implications of the Libyan armed conflict on China’s economic and
trade interests
Apart from drastic reductions in trade volumes between Libya and China there were several
other direct and indirect implications of the Libyan armed conflict on China’s economic
interests there. Foremost, as the Libyan government struggled to contain the rebels, let alone
maintain law and order, construction sites and commercial enterprises were indiscriminately
looted and destroyed. In the first week of the conflict alone, a report in the Global Times
suggested that 27 Chinese construction sites were pillaged and wrecked. The wanton
destruction increased as the conflict intensified. A number of other Chinese companies started
reporting not just destruction of their properties but also an increase in threat to their
personnel – leading some to suspend or totally abandon project sites.
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Some, especially the large Chinese firms, took several unorthodox measures, including hiring
local militias as security details in a bid to protect their assets and at the very least mitigate
losses. The China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), a state-owned enterprise
that operated in Libya, recorded its on-site equipment, and signed material devolution
agreements with local management commissions, the military, and customers before
evacuation. The China National Machinery Industry Corporation (SINOMACH) also made
arrangements with local staff and residents to guard their assets as Chinese nationals were
evacuated. But as the fighting intensified, those measures also proved to be ineffective. The
situation was rather different for most small- and medium-sized enterprises that could neither
afford private security nor had local political and military connections to have their assets
protected in their absence.236 For example, Century Huafeng, a medium-sized enterprise from
the Zheijang province reported extensive attacks, armed robbery and loss of all their
documents to a fire. It ended up closing the site. This was the same with other small and
medium enterprises that continued to suffer major losses due to lack of resources and
inexperience in risk mitigation strategies in armed conflict situations such as was obtaining in
Libya.
For some Chinese firms it was not destruction of property but just the threat of destruction
that forced them to suspend operations. Large state-owned corporations such as the China
State Construction Engineering Corporation announced suspension of operations because its
20 000 residential construction project worth 17.6 billion Yuan (US$2.68 billion) was under
threat. The China Railway Construction Corporation left behind US$4.24 billion worth of
unfinished projects in Libya. State-run Metallurgical Corporation of China suspended two
projects worth 5.13 billion Yuan,
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while Sinohydro Corporation and the China

Communications Construction Corporation also suspended their multi-billion dollar projects.
Since most of these large firms worked on contracted projects financed by the Gaddafi
government which also guaranteed their security, they found it fairly easy to suspend
operations without fear of incurring as large losses as the small and medium enterprises.
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In addition, UN sanctions against Libya’s National Oil Corporation, and other Libyan oil
companies decreased income from oil and gas upon which the Libyan economy was overly
dependent. Further sanctions and asset freezes against major Libyan financial investment
vehicles controlled by the Gaddafi regime as well as the central bank of Libya translated the
intrastate armed conflict into an economic crisis. As a result, Libya’s real GDP shrunk by 27.8%
in 2011, and oil production plummeted to almost zero. The consequential reduction of the
Libyan government’s revenue was particularly detrimental to Chinese firms because most of
their Libyan projects were contracted projects commissioned and financed by the Libyan
government. With sources of revenue drastically reduced and fiscal focus flatly placed on
containing the rebellion, the Libyan government’s capacity to meet its financial and contractual
obligations to Chinese firms was further reduced. Because “overseas contracted projects are
characterised as long-lasting and requiring input in the prophase”238 Chinese companies had
already expended large amounts of their money ahead of time setting-up fixed assets such as
offices and purchasing equipment and materials such as construction equipment and raw
materials. Most Chinese companies ended up losing those initial investments, and despite
assistance from the Chinese government, they are still struggling to get compensation for their
losses from the Libyan government.
Loss of revenue due to UN sanctions and the combined effect of suspension and abandonment
of projects due to intensified fighting between rebels and Gaddafi’s forces meant further losses
of revenue by Chinese firms. In particular, revenue in the form of “performance bonds,
advance payment bonds, to maintain the normal operation of projects”239 was lost due to force
majeure, a common clause in business contracts that relieves both parties of their contractual
obligations when events such as war that are beyond the control of both parties prevent them
from fulfilling their contractual obligations. The loss of revenue meant that Chinese firms could
not pay their suppliers and other contractors, giving the Chinese firms poor global credit ratings.
To pacify reports that Chinese investments in Libya had gone to waste, Zhu Weidong, deputydirector of the African Law and Society Research Centre at the Xiangtan University in Hunan
Province, wrote in Global Times that the losses were not as severe because most Chinese
companies had received 15% of their payments in advance from Libyan outsourcers in order to
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purchase necessary materials and equipment before construction projects began. He explained
that apart from three companies that had completed over 30% of their projects, such as Beijing
Hongfu Group, Beijing Construction Engineering Group, and China State Construction
Engineering Group, which had completed 50% of its contracted project, the rest of the
enterprises did not incur major loses. However, data published by the Ministry of Commerce
showed that 50 projects undertaken by 75 Chinese companies worth approximately US$18.8
billion had been severely affected by the Libyan conflict.240
Further exacerbating the loss for Chinese companies operating in Libya is that domestic banks
made compensation claims against some Chinese companies. Media in China reported that
Sahara Bank, which is part of the French bank BNP Paribas, had already made compensation
claims for advance payment guaranteed by the bank against several Chinese companies.
Affected companies included the state-owned engineering and construction company, China
Gezhouba Group Corporation, as well as Sinohydro Corporation, and the Beijing Hongfu
Construction and Engineering Group. Hu Jiangu, director of the Chinese Academy of
International Trade and Economic Cooperation under the Ministry of Commerce, explained
that it was improper for Sahara Bank to make such claims because there still was half a year
before the guarantee expired. He also argued that advance payment guarantees are for use by
local Libyan developers who would have made advance payments to Chinese enterprises
engaged in construction projects, and get bank guarantees to hedge risks against that payment.
Nonetheless, Sahara Bank made a claim of about 400 million Yuan (US$61 million) against
Beijing Hongfu Construction and Engineering Group. Other sources suggested that the biggest
claim of an undisclosed amount was against China Gezhouba Group. Overall, the net effect of
such claims is that credit ratings of Chinese companies were negatively affected.241
In addition to losses of revenue, assets and equipment, Chinese companies also incurred
evacuation and resettlement expenses for their Chinese workers in Libya. Although Chinese
nationals were not specifically targeted, the intensity of the fighting and destruction of some
Chinese projects made it impossible for their safety and security to be guaranteed. Also there
was a growing anti-foreigner sentiment across Libya, particularly against nationals of countries
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that were perceived as supporting the Gaddafi regime. As highlighted above, major Chinese
firms were somewhat aligned to the Gaddafi regime because they were contracted and paid by
his government. All these factors increased threats against Chinese nationals. Chinese firms
were therefore compelled to arrange for the evacuation and resettlement of their workers to
secure areas within Libya, and if they had the means, back to China. Although the Chinese
government ended up assisting with the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya, most
companies had already started the evacuation process before. In the end, approximately 36
000 Chinese nationals who had been working on various projects in both private and stateowned companies were evacuated from Libya.

5.7 China’s intervention in Libyan armed conflict
The monumental impact of the Libyan intrastate armed conflict on Chinese businesses and
economic interests was largely undisputed; but in a bid to avoid public discontent, China’s
Ministry of Commerce attempted to play down the nature of companies affected and the
extent of their losses. Zhong Man-ying, Director of the Department of West Asia and Africa
under the Ministry of Commerce, put the figure of affected Chinese firms at a modest 26, and
disputed that China had direct investments in Libya or that state-owned companies had been
affected. However, reports soon emerged suggesting that as many as 75 Chinese firms,
including at least 13 state-owned enterprises, had approximately US$18-20 billion worth of
investments at the time of the conflict in Libya. Those media reports, as well as the fact that
over 35,000 Chinese nationals were marooned in Libya, increased pressure on Beijing to show
effort toward protecting and guaranteeing the security of Chinese nationals and interests
abroad.
That it was the first time China had been confronted by an intrastate armed conflict in Africa
which had such a direct, visible, and grand scale effect on its interests and nationals abroad
became obvious as the conflict intensified. Besides exposing China’s unpreparedness, lack of
contingency planning, and inability to take concrete and decisive action regarding foreign
intrastate armed conflicts, the Libyan conflict put China in an embarrassing Catch-22 situation.
On the one hand, its foreign policy principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other
states proscribed it from taking any direct action in Libya, but on the other hand, there was
increasing domestic pressure for the PRC to protect Chinese nationals and interests abroad,
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and also incessant calls internationally for Beijing to act like a responsible global power able to
actively participate in global efforts toward resolving conflicts. Both the international and
domestic demands for China to take action entailed some level of intervention in the internal
affairs of Libya, putting Beijing in a quandary – whether to take action and risk flouting its own
foreign policy principle of non-intervention, or not take any action to protect its nationals and
interests abroad and risk losing credibility among the Chinese. Balancing the different interests
proved to be tricky for Beijing and as discussed below, it reflected itself in its ambivalent
interventionist strategies as it got to grips with a changing perception of foreign intrastate
armed conflicts as threatening to its interests abroad.

5.7.1 Non-intervention
China’s relations with African countries is predicated on the principle of non-intervention in
their internal affairs, and that includes intrastate armed conflicts. There were some exceptions
though, as discussed in Chapter 4 during Africa’s struggle for independence and when China
was engaged in competition against the Soviet Union over geopolitical influence in Africa, it
supported anti-Soviet liberation war groups and rebels across the continent. That was in the
1950s, 60s and 70s, since then, there have been rare cases of significant Chinese intervention in
Africa’s intrastate armed conflicts. Part of the reason is that unlike armed conflicts in its
immediate Asian region, intrastate armed conflicts in Africa posed no particular direct threats
to China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic and political interests, or even to its
nationals working there. Before outbreak of Libya’s intrastate armed conflict, threats to China’s
national interests and nationals working and living in African countries were minor and limited
to isolated cases of kidnappings, robberies and in rare cases murder, which normally was of a
civilian nature. In such cases, the responsibility to protect Chinese nationals and its overseas
investments fell on the Chinese firms operating abroad and mostly on the hosting African state.
So, since there had never been an intrastate armed conflict that threatened its interests and
nationals at a scale as that of Libya, Beijing generally viewed intrastate armed conflicts in Africa
as non-threatening to its nationals and national interests there. Thus, Beijing and most Chinese
firms in Africa emphasised commercial risk rather than political and security risk management.
The focus on commercial risk rather than political and security risk made sense because in most
cases major Chinese investments were a result of bilateral consultations between the Chinese
government and the respective African government in which the investments would be based.
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Libya was not an exception. Huge energy and infrastructure development projects, especially
by Chinese state-owned enterprises, were often a result of state-to-state consultations
between Beijing and Tripoli. In addition, because it was the Libyan government that contracted
Chinese firms to undertake infrastructure development projects, such as building of university
towns and rail construction, it guaranteed their security. It was therefore a forgone conclusion
that the security of the Chinese firms and nationals working on those projects was the
responsibility of the Libyan government. So when the Libyan intrastate armed conflict began,
the Chinese government made frantic demands on Gaddafi’s regime to guarantee the security
of Chinese investments in that country as well as to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals
working there.
In cases where intrastate armed conflicts and political instability threatened Chinese
investments and nationals in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan or
Nigeria, Beijing’s strategy was to prop up regimes in those countries through financial,
diplomatic and sometimes military assistance, as well as through formal and informal networks
with ruling elites in those countries. For as long as those ruling elites remained in power,
Chinese interests, nationals, and investments in those countries were secure. The existence of
such an inter-reliant relationship between the security of China’s foreign investments and the
security of regimes in some African countries was, however, problematic. A major challenge for
China is still that if the regime that guaranteed security of its interests, firms, and nationals is
overthrown, then its interests, investments and nationals operating in that country would be
exposed, or in some cases targeted by the new regime for their (perceived) support of the
fallen regime. It is therefore not surprising that at the beginning of Libya’s intrastate armed
conflict, Chinese foreign policymakers perceived it to be another internal conflict that the
Gaddafi regime was able to quash without much ado; hence they were convinced that for as
long as the Gaddafi regime remained in power, its nationals and investments were secure,
meaning there was no need for Beijing to take any intervention action until it was clear that the
Gaddafi regime was losing power.
As in all cases where China evoked non-interventionism, it was notably silent regarding the
Libyan conflict, something that reflected its initial confidence in the ability of the Gaddafi
regime to restore order. The media in China also largely ignored the conflict until foreigners
working in Libya were targeted in xenophobic attacks. With over 35,000 Chinese nationals
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under threat who were working on various projects worth approximately US$20 billion, it
seemed only natural that the media turned its attention to their plight.

In addition to

heightened media attention to threats of losing major investments and Chinese nationals,
domestic public opinion242 and growing popularity of the issue on Weibo forced the Chinese
government to at least acknowledge the Libyan conflict and consider taking some level of
action to avoid domestic public discontent. Being careful to avoid picking any sides in the
conflict or issuing statements perceivable as interference in the Libyan intrastate armed
conflict, Beijing issued several statements urging parties in the conflict to resolve their
differences amicably and guarantee the security of civilians, particularly Chinese nationals.
However, with intensification of the conflict, Beijing’s calls for dialogue and protection of
foreigners rang hollow because they were devoid of action.
Three other reasons explain China’s silence at the beginning of the conflict and then the tepid
statements urging parties in the Libyan conflict to resolve their differences peacefully that
followed. First, it considered the Libyan state to be more centralised, and capable of reigning in
the protestors than had been the case for the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak
regimes in Tunisia and Egypt respectively. Indeed, in the initial stages of the protests, the
Gaddafi regime appeared in control and able to restrict the protests within particular areas
such as Benghazi. Also, Gaddafi’s defiance and violent crackdown on protestors gave an
impression that he was determined to quash the demonstrations before they spread across
Libya. Focusing on Gaddafi’s ruthlessness and determination, Chinese foreign policy makers
saw no need to intervene or take a decisive position regarding the conflict. They reasoned that
the protests and demonstrations against the Gaddafi regime were a passing phase, and based
on previous effects of other Arab Spring protests in countries neighbouring Libya, it was
Beijing’s view that the Libyan conflict was not worthy of meddling into the murky waters of
Arab conflicts, hence it adopted political passivity and avoided taking any concrete position or
action regarding the protests as it had done in the case of Tunisia and Egypt. Also, China
regarded the Gaddafi regime to be more powerful and stable and incapable of being
overthrown by a group of protestors.
The second reason is that China separated business from politics. Its deputy foreign minister,
Zhou Wenzhong, had said, “business is business. We try to separate politics from business”
242

Sun, Y 2014, Africa in China’s foreign policy, Brookings Institute, Washington D.C., p.10

117

(Whalley 2011, p. 235). The underlying philosophy of that principle was that for as long as
internal conflicts did not affect its business interests there was no need to intervene. Since
previous conflicts of a similar nature in Tunisia and Egypt had not significantly affected Chinese
investments or threatened Chinese nationals living in those countries, there was no need for
Beijing to take action. Not taking action meant that China would let the Gaddafi regime deal
with the conflict on its own. Moussa Koussa, the former Libyan foreign affairs minister,
criticised China for taking that position in African matters. He argued that “genuine cooperation
must include politics… and should not be limited to building roads and schools. It is true that
this is required, but international cooperation is not based on constructing buildings and giving
aid, but rather through political positions" (Shichor 2014, p. 128).
The third reason is that “there was no love lost between Beijing and the Gaddafi regime”
(Calabrese 2013, p. 10). As discussed above, Gaddafi had only visited Beijing once in 1982, and
the last high-ranking officials from Beijing had last visited Libya in 2006. Besides, diplomatic
relations were tense due to continued semi-official relations between Libya and Taiwan. To
China, Muammar Gaddafi was nothing to get concerned about except when he (Gaddafi)
justified his government’s crackdown on protestors by saying “the unity of China was more
important than those people on Tiananmen Square.” To that, Beijing responded by censuring
all media reference to the crackdown on protestors in Libya, and in particular, Gaddafi’s
reference to Tiananmen Square. Apart from that censorship, China did not make any significant
changes to its stance of non-intervention in the initial phases of the Libyan conflict.

5.7.2 Transition from non-intervention to pragmatic intervention
Mass revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt left Beijing’s foreign policy of non-intervention in the
internal affairs of other states unscathed – the majority of protests in the Arab world had not
turned into full scale intrastate armed conflicts. But Libya turned out to be different. As the
Gaddafi regime began using heavy military equipment and live ammunition to disperse
protestors243 in order to reassert its authority, the mass protests escalated into an armed
conflict that attracted global attention. Also, in protest against Gaddafi’s harsh military tactics,
professional army personnel defected with their weapons and joined civilian protestors, adding
a new military dynamic to the mass protests. To replace the defectors and strengthen his forces,
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Gaddafi used the country’s oil wealth to recruit a private army of mercenaries from subSaharan African countries such as Niger, Chad and Mali. In retaliation, protestors organised
themselves into armed rebel armies, which in turn escalated the protests into a fully-fledged
armed conflict. This had not been the case in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt or Algeria, but as put by
Jack A. Goldstone, when protestors started using violent action, the Gaddafi regime was
emboldened in its use of more violent force even against unarmed civilians, as it depicted them
“as a threat to social order, and justified using repressive tactics against them” (Goldstone 2012,
p. 115). Using mercenaries244 and special guard units loyal to him, Gaddafi vowed to track down
and kill the protestors ‘house by house’ like rats,245 which resulted in indiscriminate violence
against civilians perceived to be anti-Gaddafi. Faced with such a formidable and determined
Gaddafi force, the armed protestors then sought international support to militarily fight against
the Gaddafi regime leading to international involvement in the conflict.
A combination of internationalisation of the Libyan conflict, and increasing inability of the
Gaddafi regime to guarantee security of foreign investments and foreign nationals, all drew
Beijing’s attention. In addition, the threat to Chinese nationals raised domestic demands for
Beijing to protect its nationals abroad, effectively bringing to question China’s perception of
and response to threats emanating from African intrastate armed conflicts. What also drew the
ire of Chinese officials is that as soon as rebels organised themselves into the National
Transitional Council, they issued veiled warnings to China because of its passive resistance to
their struggle against the Gaddafi regime. Because some of Chinese investments and projects in
Libya were a result of its bilateral arrangements with the Gaddafi regime rather than being
pure business contracts, they were vulnerable to changes of government. 246 With several of its
state-owned enterprises such as CNPC and the China Railway Construction Company having
won large contracts, and over 75 other Chinese companies operating in the country, in addition
to over 35 000 Chinese nationals in Libya, China’s strict adherence to its foreign policy principle
of non-intervention in Libya’s armed conflict was put to the test. Also put to the test was its
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long-held perception that foreign intrastate armed conflicts, or more generally political issues
in African countries, were non-threatening to its interests in those countries.
The above factors combined to put pressure on Beijing to take action in order to protect both
its foreign investments and nationals in Libya.247 The factors also compelled China to consider
political instability in Africa to be threatening to its interests there, thus its perception of the
intrastate armed conflicts in Libya metamorphosed from being regarded as a non-threatening
internal issue to being regarded as threatening. The effect was a re-consideration of its
absolute non-intervention approach to the Libyan conflict. But what proved to be a challenge
for Beijing, and what influenced the rest of its responsive action to the Libyan conflict, was the
need to strike a balance between protecting its interests in Libya and maintaining its foreign
policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. It is here that pragmatism
proved to be an asset for China. From passive and tepid statements urging parties to the Libyan
conflict to resolve their disputes through dialogue, Beijing experimented with both multilateral
and bilateral actions aimed at protecting its interests in Libya. In particular, it found multilateral
interventions to be a discreet intervention option which struck a delicate balance between its
identity as a non-interventionist power, and intervening to protect its nationals and
investments under threat in Libya.

5.7.3 China’s complicity in multilateral intervention in the Libyan intrastate
armed conflict
To strike a balance between non-intervention and protecting its interests and nationals in Libya,
Beijing chose United Nations-led multilateral intervention. The first UN multilateral action that
China supported was imposition of sanctions against members of Gaddafi’s family and inner
circle. On 26 February 2011, a few weeks after the Libyan mass demonstrations escalated,
China opted not to veto UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) when it was tabled for
adoption at the 6 491st meeting of the Security Council. Among other things, the resolution
condemned “the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of
peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting
unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made
from the highest level of the Libyan government.” Have placed responsibility for the ‘hostility
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and violence’ against the civilian population on political leaders in Gaddafi’s government, the
Security Council referred the situation to the International Criminal Court for investigation and
imposed an arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban on Gaddafi, his family and close officials.
Beijing’s support for imposition of sanctions and referral of the Libyan situation to the
International Criminal Court was in stark contrast to its principle of non-intervention in Libya’s
internal conflict, since as previously put by its Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou Wenzhong, China
is “also against embargoes” (Whalley 2011, p. 253). This is because, previously China had
vetoed UNSC resolutions that imposed sanctions on countries such as Zimbabwe, Burma, North
Korea, and Sri Lanka for gross human rights violations and violence against civilians. Its
argument in those several cases was that imposition of sanctions against a sitting head of state
amounted to interference in his/her country’s internal affairs. It further reasoned that such like
resolutions did not assist in resolving conflicts, but instead tend to escalate the situation.
Speaking after vetoing a resolution that sought to impose sanctions against Mugabe and his
government in Zimbabwe, China’s foreign ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao argued that
“passing a sanctions resolution against Zimbabwe would not help to encourage the various
factions there to engage in political dialogue and negotiations and achieve results.” 248
Considering that initially China advocated political dialogue amongst warring parties in Libya,
and that the Libyan government was not agreeable to sanctions being imposed against its
leaders or that the situation be referred to the ICC “it was impossible for China to support UN
intervention” (Shih and Huang 2014, p. 147) but it did.
Against its tradition of non-intervention and opposition to sanctions, China still voted in favour
of sanctions against Gaddafi’s regime.249 Its ambassador to the United Nations justified his
country’s deviance by arguing that regional organisations such as the Arab League, the African
Union, and the Secretary General of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference were in favour
of the resolution as a way of compelling Gaddafi to the mediation table. In proffering that
argument China absolved itself of the responsibility to explain why it had deviated from its non248
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intervention principle. Furthermore, based on its UNSC voting history, China is not known to be
influenced by pressure from regional or non-international organisations, but by its own
interests. So even though it explained its support of the resolution on the basis that it was in
the interest of cooperation with the international community, and stability of Libya, the
overarching reason is that the Resolution enabled protection of its investments and nationals in
Libya.

It also allayed concerns from the international community that it was passively

condoning the massacre of civilians by the Gaddafi regime.
With domestic pressure increasing over China’s seeming inability to protect it nationals and
interests abroad, Resolution 1970 was critical to disproving its critics.

The resolution

“expressed concern for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya…. [Urging] the Libyan authorities to ensure the safety of all foreign nationals and
their assets and facilitate the departure of those wishing to leave the country.”250 In fact
Ambassador Li Baodong’s statement after voting for Resolution 1970 confirmed that the
immediate cessation of violence through peaceful means such as dialogue were important
insofar as they guaranteed that the safety and interests of foreign nationals in Libya was
assured throughout the process.251 Thus China’s voting in favour of the resolution was also
meant to prove to its citizens concerned about the welfare of their compatriots in Libya that it
was taking serious efforts to protect them and secure national interests abroad.
Despite Beijing’s justification, Resolution 1970 was a collective intervention into the internal
affairs of Libya, to which Beijing took part by voting in favour of the resolution. From a
functional perspective, the UNSC Resolution tilted the balance of power in the Libyan conflict in
favour of the rebels rather that the Gaddafi regime because the arms embargo, asset freeze
and travel ban was imposed on officials in Gaddafi’s regime only. By cutting off the supply of
weapons, and financial resources, the UNSC Resolution set up Gaddafi to fail in the ensuing
intrastate armed conflict. China’s complicity in the collective intervention in Libya’s intrastate
armed conflict is confirmed by attempts by Beijing to exonerate itself for the subsequent
military intervention by NATO. Ambassador Li Baodong justified China’s support of the UNSC
intervention in Libya by saying that China had voted in favour of the Resolution after taking into
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account the special situation in Libya, and regard for concerns and views of Arab and African
countries. Still that did not change the fact that according to China, imposition of sanctions on
the government of another state is interference in that country’s domestic affairs. In fact, that
was the basis China had vetoed other UN resolutions that sought to impose sanctions on
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, the military junta in Burma, and the leaders of North Korea.
According to Joel Wuthnow, China acted to protect its investments and nationals because “on
Libya, China observed a leader acting erratically and endangering not only oil producing
facilities in rebel-held eastern part of the country, but also the lives of some 40,000 of Chinese
citizens, who would later have to be evacuated” (2013, p. 131).
The second UN mandated multilateral intervention was declaration of a no-fly zone in Libya.
Instead of voting in favour, this time China abstained, resulting in adoption of UNSC Resolution
1973 (2011) on 17 March 2011. The resolution was compelled by failure of the Gaddafi regime
to comply with Resolution 1970(2011); as well as continued escalation of state-sponsored
violence against civilians, and systematic human rights violations such as arbitrary detentions,
enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions. Circumstances leading to adoption
of the resolution are important to understanding why China’s abstention signified its intent to
use multilateral institutions to resolve the Libyan conflict. First, building on its argument that
on Libya it was guided by wishes of regional organisations, China claimed to have abstained
because the Council of the League of Arab States had resolved at an extraordinary session held
in Cairo, Egypt on 12 March 2011 to “call on the Security Council to bear its responsibility
towards the deteriorating situation in Libya, and to take the necessary measures to impose
immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places
exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people
and foreign nationals residing in Libya.”252
However more importantly, China and the rest of UNSC members were aware that Mustafa
Abdel-Jalil, leader of the National Transitional Council, had lobbied regional organisations, the
European Union, and for United States to impose a no-fly zone on Libya. For example, on
March 10, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil met Nicholas Sarkozy, the then president of France; subsequent
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to their meeting, Sarkozy announced France’s recognition of NTC as the legitimate government
of Libya. Nicholas Sarkozy then lobbied other EU members at the EU summit in Brussels on 11
March 2011 to support the no-fly zone proposal, arguing that “the strikes would be solely of a
defensive nature if Mr. Gaddafi makes use of chemical weapons or air strikes against nonviolent protesters.”253 True to NTC’s wishes, Resolution 1973 (2011) authorised member states
“acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation
with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian
populated areas under attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”254 It then
imposed a no-fly zone in the airspace of Libya in order to help protect civilians and authorised
Member States to strictly enforce the arms embargo and an asset freeze on Libyan government
institutions such as the Libyan Investment Authority, the Libyan Foreign Bank, the Libyan
National Oil Corporation, and Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio, as well as the assets of
officials within the Gaddafi inner circle. Of the fifteen countries in the UN Security Council, ten
voted in favour of the Resolution with five (China, Brazil, Germany, India and Russia) abstaining.
With knowledge of NTC’s lobbying of both regional organisations as well as European powers
and the United States, it was insincere for China to argue that in abstaining it was merely
following the wishes of regional organisations, when it was clear that the no-fly zone was
intended to incapacitate the Gaddafi regime for the benefit of the NTC.
By decapitating Gaddafi’s air force, Resolution 1973 skewed the armed conflict in favour of the
National Transitional Council, which by that time was already engaged in a full armed combat
against the Gaddafi regime. China’s withholding of its veto on Resolution 1973 was in more
ways than one a passive consent to a multilateral military intervention in the Libyan conflict. As
put by US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, “a no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to
destroy the air defenses. That’s the way you do a no-fly zone. And then you can fly planes
around the country and not worry about our guys being shot down. But that’s the way it
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starts.”255 Chinese diplomats at the United Nations and foreign policy makers in Beijing were
aware of these dynamics, and its abstention was calculated to give the impression that it was
opposed to the intervention but only gave in in order not to spoil international efforts toward
resolving the conflict. This was a convenient excuse for China because it helped it maintain the
façade and re-assure African countries opposed to the Resolution that it still adhered to
principles of non-intervention.
China’s insincerity soon emerged when NATO began bombing Gaddafi’s air force installations
just as Robert Gates had warned. As soon as African countries started complaining against what
they termed Western military intervention in Libya, China quickly joined them, arguing that it
had supported the resolution out of the impression that it was meant to protect civilians rather
than institute regime change. If indeed China believed that, which is highly unlikely, it was
naive of its foreign policy makers to think that by abstaining it was not participating in military
intervention in the Libyan intrastate armed conflict because China’s abstention from UNSC
resolution 1973 paved way for NATO’s military intervention in Libya. China’s “abstention over
Resolution 1973 allowed it to walk a tight rope between supporting intervention and adhering
to its non-interference principle” (Kassim 2014, p. 35). As a result of that abstention, Yun Sun
argues, that “China sees its acquiescence as directly contributing to the fall of Muammar
Qaddafi” (2012, p. 1). For that is what China had done: it had together with other Western
powers militarily intervened in the Libyan intrastate armed conflict and effectively assisted the
NTC to topple the Gaddafi regime.

5.7.4 Engagement with the NTC and mediation attempts
At the height of the Libyan intrastate armed conflict, China made unprecedented steps toward
reaching out to both parties in the conflict. Xinhua described the reaching out to warring
parties in Libya as “taking a practical and constructive approach to the Libya issue by mediating
between the two conflicting sides.”256 By any stretch of the practice of mediation, China’s
reaching out to both the Gaddafi regime and the NTC, was in no way a mediation effort. In
many respects it turned out to be more of a public relations exercise meant to curry favour
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with the NTC which Beijing had snubbed since its formation. Part of the reason for its action is
that as the conflict intensified, it became clear that the NTC was gaining international
recognition as the legitimate representative of Libya from countries such as France, Britain, the
United States, and some Arab countries. Beijing therefore reasoned that continued snubbing of
the NTC was not going to be in its best interest, especially after the NTC announced that in the
reconstruction phase it was going to give preference to businesses from countries that had
supported its struggle against the Gaddafi regime. Up to that point China had not made any
direct contact with the NTC or openly supported its struggle against Gaddafi; it therefore made
the unprecedented step to make contact with them even though Gaddafi’s regime was still in
power. This was contrary to Beijing’s own non-intervention principle which inhibits contact
with opposition groups in another country because it constitutes intervention in that country’s
internal affairs.
The first confirmed contact between China and the National Transitional Council happened on
2 June 2011 when China’s Ambassador to Qatar, Zhang Zhiliang, met NTC Chairman Mustafa
Abdel Jalil in Doha, Qatar.257 A statement by China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei
confirmed the meeting but did not provide intricate details except that “the two sides
exchanged views on the Libyan situation” and that “the Libyan crisis can be resolved through
political means and that the future of Libya is decided by the Libyan people.”258 Following the
first meeting in Doha, Li Lianhe, a Chinese diplomat in Egypt, met with Mustafa Abdel Jalil when
he visited the headquarters of NTC in Benghazi on 6 June 2011. As part of his visit he inspected
the humanitarian situation and property of Chinese businesses in Benghazi.259 Subsequently, on
22 June 2011, Mustafa Abdel Jalil visited Beijing on a two-day visit, during which he met Yang
Jiechi, China’s foreign minister. In the meeting, Foreign Minister Yang said, “since its creation,
the NTC has increased its representativeness and gradually become a major political force.
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China sees it as an important dialogue partner.”260 In addition, a statement by China’s foreign
ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, confirmed that to China, the National Transitional Council was
indispensable to resolving the conflict in Libya for the benefit of its businesses, hence its
readiness “to stay in contact with all parties including the Libyan National Transitional Council
to push for an early political settlement of the Libyan crisis.”261
In honour of its pledge to stay in contact with the NTC, on 6 July 2011 Chen Xuedong, DirectorGeneral of the Department of West Asian and North African Affairs in China’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs met members of the NTC including deputy head of the NTC Executive Office, Ali
al-Isawi, and head of the Executive Board’s foreign affairs office. The meeting had two main
objectives: the first was to implore the NTC to support African Union’s mediation efforts. To
that effect, Chen reiterated China’s recognition of the NTC as an ‘important dialogue partner’
critical to resolving the conflict in Libya through political dialogue and settlement. The second
and more important reason for the meeting came to light when Chen sought assurances from
the NTC that it would guarantee the safety of Chinese nationals and assets in areas that it
controlled.262 The NTC officials undertook to protect Chinese nationals working in Libya and
their property and expressed appreciation for China’s efforts to strengthen relations and
promote a peaceful settlement of the Libyan crisis.263
Although the Chinese foreign minister had met with Libya’s foreign minister (General People's
Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of Libya) Abdul Ati Al-Obeidi, a
special envoy of the Gaddafi regime in Beijing on 8 June 2011,264 it is Beijing’s contact with the
NTC that is an exception to its non-interference policy. By China’s own definition of
interference in the internal affairs of another state, establishing ties and maintaining relations
with the NTC while the Gaddafi regime was still in power was a direct bilateral intervention in
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the Libyan intrastate armed conflict. Global Times, a media outlet that “often reflects
conservative, and even nationalistic, opinions that do not represent the official line”265 justified
China’s engagement with both the NTC and the Libyan regime in the following terms: “closer
contact with Libya’s two camps shows China is dedicated to helping seek peaceful and quicker
solution to the protracted civil strife in the North African country.” Nonetheless, the most
significant motivating factor in meeting both sides was revealed in China’s official media, which
suggested that maintaining close contact with both sides to the Libyan conflict enabled China
to comprehensively keep abreast with the current condition of its investments and assets.
The coinciding of China’s ‘mediation’ efforts with international recognition of the NTC at the
expense of the Gaddafi regime implied a pragmatic intervention by China meant to mend
fences with the NTC before it assumed total control of Libya. That way, whichever side won,
Chinese investments would have been secured. Articles jointly published in Global Times and
Xinhua concurred: “It is only natural that China is keeping a close eye on its investments there”
266

by keeping “closer contact with both sides… China assess the latest development in Libya

more comprehensively, know the current condition of its investments and assets there more
clearly, including uncompleted infrastructure projects and equipment, and better protects its
lawful and justifiable investment interests there.”267 Another article published in Xinhua also
argued that the ‘mediation’ was pragmatic because “Libya’s prolonged civil war… posed serious
threats to foreign investments, including those of China, in the country.”268 The ‘mediation’ was
therefore meant to protect Chinese interests and nationals in Libya rather than seriously
mediate between the warring parties. The main motivation was to gather information on the
state of its investments as well as ensure their security.
Furthermore, three years later, Zhong Jianhua, China’s Special Envoy for African Affairs,
confirmed that China had indeed violated its own non-intervention principle when he said: “I
think for the last two or three decades we were quite rigid about non-interference in the
internal affairs of other countries… we try to avoid making direct contact with the opposition…
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when you talk to a rebel force that means stepping into internal affairs.”269 Yin Gang, an African
affairs expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of West Asian and African
Studies interpreted Beijing’s meeting with opposition leaders in foreign countries which have
intrastate armed conflicts as part of its mediation efforts.270 But, as put by Zhong Jianhua,
meeting rebels or opposition forces amounts to intervention in another country’s internal
affairs. However, He Wenping, Director of African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, in justification of the PRC’s reaching out to the NTC while Gaddafi was still in power,
said: “once things became clear, and we knew that even the people in Tripoli supported the
NTC (National Transitional Council), there was no reason for China not to support the NTC, and
then we recognised the NTC and give them support.”271 He Wenping “often reflects China’s
position on Africa issues” (Shinn 2013), thus her statement confirms arguments that China only
recognised the NTC in order to protect its investments and guarantee its businesses’ return to
Libya.
Also suggesting China’s mediation efforts were insincere are allegations published in a Final
Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011)
concerning Libya. Media reports suggested that the Gaddafi regime had tried to secure arms
from China in violation of the arms embargo. Although The Guardian newspaper noted that
further research was required to determine whether or not the violation occurred, other media
reports insisted that the state-owned China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO), China
Precision Machinery Import-Export Company, and China Xinxing Import and Export Company
negotiated with Libyan officials in Beijing to buy arms worth approximately US$200 million in
July 2011 in breach of the UNSC arms embargo.272 According to Denny Roy, documents
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implicating the state-owned Chinese companies were discovered by anti-Gaddafi forces in
Tripoli. He argues that “the Chinese companies proposed delivering the weapons through
intermediary countries such as South Africa or Algeria to shield China from criticism” (Roy 2013,
p. 244). Jiang Yu, spokeswoman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, admitted that “the Gaddafi
regime sent representatives to China in July to meet individuals from relevant Chinese
companies without the knowledge of Chinese government departments.”273 She, however,
refuted claims by Omar Hariri, head of the transitional government’s military council and the
Libyan military spokesman, Abdulrahman Busin, that the guns had been delivered to Libya and
that they had “hard evidence of deals going on between China and Qaddafi,”274 arguing that no
contracts were signed and no weapons were delivered,275 she maintained that “China exercises
strict management over all military exports.”276 It is, however, questionable whether Libyan
officials would visit Beijing and have meetings with state-owned arms companies without the
knowledge of the Chinese government.

5.7.5 Evacuation and protection of Chinese nationals
The magnitude of threat to Chinese nationals in Libya was greater than at any point in the
history of China-Africa engagement. As it became clear that the intrastate armed conflict in
Libya was intensifying and that foreigners were in danger, domestic pressure on the Chinese
government to secure the lives of Chinese nationals increased. In fact, one of the major reasons
China had supported UN intervention in Libya and engaged in low-key mediation efforts was to
secure its nationals in Libya. As put by Maximilian Terhalle, “another key driver behind’s China’s
support of UN intervention in Libya was to protect its citizens” (2015, p. 170). In February 2011
China chartered planes from Air China and buses and ocean liners from Greece and Malta in
order to evacuate Chinese citizens in Libya. Most of the Chinese nationals stranded in Libya
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were employees of Chinese companies operating there.277 In total China evacuated 35,860
nationals from Libya with assistance from countries such as Greece, Malta, Egypt, Tunisia,
Turkey, and Jordan that provided transportation and temporary shelter to the evacuated
Chinese nationals. The PLA as well as Chinese companies operating in Libya such as China
Communications Construction Group and the China Railway Construction Corporation,
contributed to the evacuation of the Chinese nationals.278
Some media reports suggested that the Chinese Defence Ministry had authorised the Chinese
navy to conduct escort missions in the Aden Gulf in order to provide support and protection to
ships evacuating Chinese nationals in waters surrounding Libya.279 The 4 000 ton missile frigate,
Xuzhou was diverted from the coast of Somalia on 24 February 2011 “in the Asian power’s first
naval operation in the Mediterranean Sea and its first deployment of military hardware in a
civilian evacuation mission.” 280 The Xuzhou is armed with weapons that include HHQ-16
surface-to-air missiles and carries a Z-9 helicopter. According to Jeremy Page the evacuation
reflected the mounting domestic pressure on Beijing to protect its growing foreign interests
and increasing numbers of Chinese citizens working abroad. More importantly, it illustrated the
Chinese Navy’s ability to operate far beyond China’s in order to protect the country’s perceived
foreign interests.281 President Hu Jintao was quoted saying: “spare no efforts to ensure the
safety of life and properties of Chinese citizens in Libya.”282 In order to coordinate evacuation
efforts, “the State Council of China set up the emergency command headquarters to the Libyan
crisis to lead all relevant organisations to create solutions and negotiate with the Libyan
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government to protect Chinese expatriates and overseas assets” (Zhang and Wei 2012, p. 48).
The implication is that while evacuation might not be considered as intervention in the strict
sense of armed interventions such as the NATO-led military intervention, it involved a violation
of Libyan sovereignty, and was done without the consent of the Libyan government. But the
most significant implication is that it transformed China’s perception of threats emanating from
African intrastate armed conflicts from considering them as inconsequential to its interests in
Africa, to regarding them as detrimental to both its economic interests and citizens there thus,
compelling it to modify its non-intervention policy.

5.8 The ambivalence of China’s intervention in Libya
China’s ambivalent multilateral and unilateral intervention in the Libyan intrastate armed
conflict reflected a state struggling to reconcile “the nexus of intervention, state sovereignty
and the use of force” (Richardson 2012, p. 45). In effect, the Libyan conflict
Set its own precedent for international dilemmas in implementing UN Security Council
resolutions in support of the doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ on the one
hand, and the involvement of Western military intervention to implement it, on the
other. The former present[ed] moral pressure, and the latter creat[ed] discomfort. It is
almost as if the solution is more problematic than the problem (Aybet 2011).
China was largely unprepared, and to a greater extent was inexperienced to deal with that
paradox, because before the Libyan conflict, concerning Africa China had successfully portrayed
an imagery of being able to strike a balance between safeguarding its expanding economic
interests in Africa, and respecting the host African countries’ sovereignty through nonintervention in their internal affairs. But as highlighted above, the intrastate armed conflict in
Libya and its accompanying threats to China’s economic interests scuttled that delicate balance,
exposing Beijing’s unpreparedness, lack of concrete foreign policy strategy, and inability to
decisively deal with threats emanating from foreign intrastate armed conflicts.
As discussed above, the Libyan conflict also tested China’s overriding perception that intrastate
armed conflicts in Africa were not a threat to its economic interests or nationals there. The
shock of realising that they actually were a threat to its interests seem to have had a
transformational effect on how Beijing considered and responded to the threat, and on how it
reacted to subsequent intrastate armed conflicts in Mali and South Sudan. Part of the
transformational effect was an incipient change to its overall perception of foreign intrastate
armed conflicts in Africa as threats to its national interests. Because in most cases the change
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in threat perception is not usually distinct but gradual, in the case of China, the process of that
threat perception transformation was characterised by a distinct sense of lack of clarity and
consistency between rhetoric and action on how to intervene and safeguard its interests in a
way that balances “its traditional commitment to ‘non-interference’ with its responsibilities as
a great power” with interests abroad (Pang 2009, p. 237).
The effect of the recalibration and rethinking process is usually characterised by lack of clarity
on foreign policy. Thus, as China was compelled to respond spontaneously to the threatening
effect of the Libyan intrastate armed conflict, it did not “know when, where and how to use its
power” (Wang 2013). The result was ambivalence in its intervention behaviour, which reflected
itself in the difference between China’s rhetoric and actions in Libya. On the one hand it
condemned intervention in Libya’s domestic affairs, but on the other, it supported multilateral
intervention that affected the direction, duration, and outcome of the intrastate armed conflict
in a direct way. On the one hand it condemned Western manoeuvres toward ousting the
Gaddafi regime, but on the other, it engaged and recognised the Libyan opposition when
Gaddafi was still the leader of Libya in blatant violation of its own non-intervention principle. It
can therefore be argued that based on how it responded to the Libyan conflict, China’s foreign
policy was ambivalent, “did not reflect a clear and well developed policy… [and] strong rhetoric
[was] often used to compensate for weak or incoherent policies.”283 Thus, “China should be
counted in the group of ambivalent interventionists” (Engelbrekt 2014, p. 51).
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CHAPTER 6: China and Malian intrastate armed conflicts: A
responsible, benevolent major power?
6.1 Introduction
As the intrastate armed conflict in Libya ended with the death of Muammar Gaddafi, another
conflict emerged in Mali. Although different in nature, the Mali and Libya conflicts were
interlinked in that weapons and Tuaregs who had fought as mercenaries for the Gaddafi regime
returned to aid the struggle for independence of Northern Mali. While the government of Mali
struggled to contain the Tuareg rebellion, a group of disgruntled Malian soldiers mutinied and
overthrew the government in Bamako. The internationalisation of the conflict, and the fact
that it had emerged hardly six months after the Libyan intrastate armed conflict, made it
impossible for China to ignore it as it had done previous Tuareg rebellions and coup d’états in
Mali. Besides, China had had unbroken diplomatic relations with Mali since 1960. Furthermore,
there were Chinese nationals and investments in Mali, with the possibility of the conflict
spiralling into neighbouring countries such as Niger where China has uranium mining
concessions (Shaw 2013). Again, the question of how China responds to threats posed by
intrastate armed conflicts on its interests, both direct and indirect, emerged.
Based on this background, this chapter examines China’s intervention in the Malian intrastate
armed conflict. Like the previous chapter, it begins by giving a historical analysis of Sino-Mali
diplomatic, political, and economic relations since diplomatic relations were established in
1960. In giving the historical analysis of Sino-Mali relations, the focus is on China’s response to
previous Tuareg rebellions and coup d’états in Mali. The aim is to draw comparisons with its
intervention in the 2012 coup d’état and the Tuareg rebellion. The argument pursued in this
chapter is that with hindsight concerning the effect of the Libyan crisis on its interest there,
China was more alert to the threats the Malian armed conflict potentially had to its interests in
Mali and the Sahel region.

6.2 China-Mali political and diplomatic relations
Since establishing diplomatic relations on 27 October 1960, China and Mali maintained
uninterrupted ties despite adverse internal and external political dynamics in Mali. To start
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with, in its external relations, even at the peak of Sino-Soviet wrangling in the 1960s, Mali
maintained ties with both China and the Soviet Union. It was, however, not just Mali that
played both sides; other independent African states did the same - maintaining political,
economic and military relations with both China and the Soviet Union, and at times playing the
two against each other. During the Cold War era, African leaders, according to Lucy Corkin
were “experts in appearing to emulate the ideologies of their patrons in order to coax out
further material support,”284 and Mali’s first president, Modibo Keita played that game well. He
received extensive aid, political support285 and military equipment from the Soviets as well as
China despite warnings of the Soviet Union’s imperialist tendencies from Beijing. But unlike
other independent African countries, and to its advantage, Mali pragmatically and consistently
avoided taking sides in the 1960s Sino-Soviet squabbling – something that Alaba Ogunsanwo
refers to as “a practical application of the non-alignment principle developed in the period of
the cold war” (1974, p. 217). Nonetheless, a common anti-imperialist ideology 286 in the
formative years of Malian independence and President Modibo Keita’s “socialist ideology and
mode of production, with heavy emphasis on the role of the public sector in the economy” 287
inclined Mali toward Mao’s China rather than toward the Soviet Union or France, its former
colonial master.
To show the depth of their political and diplomatic relations, Sino-Mali high level official visits
were common. Official visits between the two countries started off with Premier Zhou En-lai’s
official tour of ten African countries (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea,
Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia) between 14 December 1963 and 4 February 1964. As part of the
maiden official trip by a Chinese national leader to Africa, Premier Zhou visited Mali from 16 to
21 January 1964. At the time of his visit, several agricultural projects such as rice and sugar
cane growing, as well as infrastructure development projects were already underway, all
funded by Chinese money and overseen by Chinese technicians. To show its appreciation for
the assistance rendered by China, the Malian government went all-out to show its
indebtedness to Premier Zhou, Vice-Premier Chen Yi, and their entourage. Mali declared “a
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holiday for all government offices and public and private enterprises in Bamako and its
outskirts…, [in order] to accord a welcome deserving the great Chinese-Malian friendship.”288 In
the Malian town of Koulikoro, the Mayor, Mamadou Diarrah made Premier Zhou an honorary
citizen of Koulikoro. But amidst that pomp and fanfare, in his meetings with President Keita,
Premier Zhou “enunciated the eight principles observed by the Chinese Government in
providing economic and technical assistance to other countries.”289 He also “shared with Keita
China's experiences on governance and economic development, which covered the capacity
building of the governing party, the elimination of the residues of colonialism and the
importance of safeguarding economic independence” (Zeng 2014). The thoughts were then
encapsulated in a joint communique that the two parties published on 21 January 1964.
Impressed by President Keita’s anti-imperialist and anti-colonial rhetoric and appreciation for
China’s assistance by Malians, Premier Zhou and Chairman Liu Shao-chi invited President Keita
to visit China. Within months of Premier Zhou’s departure from Bamako, President Modibo
Keita led a delegation of fifty-one on a tour of Asia, with Beijing being the main destination. It
was during his visit in Beijing that the Sino-Mali Treaty of Friendship was signed in November
1964. With this agreement, several trade and economic agreements were reached. In the same
mould as the TAZARA railway, China agreed to fund construction of the Guinea-Mali railway.
The agreement for its financing and construction was signed in May 1968 by China’s finance
minister Li Hsien-nien and by the Guinean and Malian foreign ministers in the presence of
Premier Zhou Enlai. Three months after the signing ceremony, Chinese technicians conducted
the preliminary surveys of the rail project in Mali and Guinea. But four days after they left
Bamako, President Modibo Keita was overthrown on 19 November 1968 in a coup d’état led by
Captain Yoro Diakité.290 All in all, from 1960 until 1968, when President Keita’s rule was ended,
fifty-five Chinese delegates had visited Mali; excluding the fifty-one delegates that visited China
with President Keita in September 1964, fifty-six Malian delegates visited China (Ogunsanwo
1974, p. 269,270).
On taking over power from President Modibo Keita on 19 November 1968, Captain Yoro Diakité
suspended the constitution and handed over power to a 14-member Comité Militaire de
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Libération Nationale (CMLN - Military Committee of National Liberation). Under the leadership
of Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, the CMLN governed Mali from 1969 to 1979. In June 1974,
Malians approved a new constitution that paved the way for a transition to a civilian
government. However, in a bid to maintain political power, Traoré’s government sponsored the
Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM - Malian People’s Democratic Union) which
Moussa Traoré led. Unsurprisingly he won the 1979 elections, as well as, the successive
elections until he was deposed in 1992. In all this turmoil, China maintained relations with the
ruling regime of the day, without any sense of obligation to the deposed governments.
Unlike his predecessor, Modibo Keita, Moussa Traoré had a pragmatic foreign policy approach.
He rejuvenated relations with France and opened ties with the United States and other
Western powers while maintaining close connections with both the Soviet Union and China. In
comparison, Sino-Mali relations measured by official visits between the two countries
increased more during Moussa Traoré’s leadership than in Modibo Keita’s. For example, in June
1973, Moussa Traoré visited China and met with Chairman Mao; he also visited China in August
1981, June 1986 and January 1989. China seemed to positively reciprocate Traoré’s visits
because Chinese government, military, and CCP officials, including “Zhang Dazhi, commander
of the Chinese artillery (May 1971), Geng Biao, Vice-premier (October 1978), Huang Hua, Vicepremier and concurrently minister of foreign affairs (November 1981), Liu Kai, assistant to
minister of national defence (March 1982), Tian Jiyun, Vice-premier (December 1984), Wang
Hanbin, Vice-chairman of the National People's Congress (September 1989, Qian Qichen,
Member of the State Council and concurrently minister of foreign affairs (January 1992)” 291
visited Mali on official state and party business.
Despite the seemingly cordial relations between Moussa Traoré’s regime and Beijing, there was
silence from Beijing when he was deposed by junior officers led by Amadou Touré in 1992.
Having overseen reform of the constitution and a democratic election, Amadou Touré handed
over power to the democratically elected government of Alpha Oumar Konaré. President
Konaré made two state visits to China, in December 1992 and September 1996. Other Malian
high level officials that visited China during the Konaré regime include Prime Minister Ibrahim
Boubacar Keita (August 1994 and October 1999), Ali Nouhoum Diallo, Speaker of the National
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Assembly (July 1995), Moussa Balla Coulibaly, Chairman of Economic, Social and Cultural
Council (March 2000), 292 Moctar Ouane, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation (August 2009). Also, “in 2009, Minister of Territorial Administration and Local
Communities General Kafougouna Kone, Minister of Communications and New Technologies
Diarra Mariam Flantié Diallo and Minister of Health Oumar Ibrahima Toure visited China.”293
From China, “General Liu Jingson, commander of Lanzhou Military Zone (July 1995), Major
General Chen Youqing, Political Commissar of Communications Department of the
Headquarters of the General Staff (December 1995), General Zhou Kunren, Political Commissar
of the General Logistics Department (July 2000) and General Chen Bingde, Commander of Jinan
Military Zone (June 2002) paid visits to the Republic of Mali one after the other.”294 The
highlight of Sino-Mali political relations during President Amadou Toumani Touré’s time in
power occurred in February 2009 when President Hu Jintao arrived in Bamako for a one day
state visit.295

6.3 Sino-Mali economic and trade relations
Beyond politics, Sino-Mali relations came to be more economically defined soon after Mali’s
independence. In February 1961, just a year after Mali’s independence, the two countries
signed a goods and exchange payment agreement, which “called for the export to Mali of
machinery, farm machines and tools, scientific instruments and electrical appliances, chemicals,
drugs and medical apparatus, metalware, and steel products, etc., but this could better be
described as aid, as Mali had at that time relatively little to export to China in return”
(Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 86). The 1961 agreement was consummated in November 1964 when
the two countries signed a treaty of friendship during President Keita’s visit to China at the
invitation of Premier Zhou Enlai. Following the treaty of friendship, a host of other economic
and trade agreements, including Chinese technical and financial assistance for construction of a
radio transmitter, a cinema, and a hotel in Mali were agreed upon. The Chinese government
bore three-quarters of the projects’ costs, and it also agreed to send technicians to work on the
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projects. The rest of subsequent projects were funded partly through a US$3 million credit
facility requested by President Keita’s government, and was advanced to the Central Bank of
Mali. The credit facility was one of the first cases of an African country requesting loans and
development assistance from China, and it set the tone for subsequent Sino-Mali engagements.
China was also quick to bring to fruition the economic and trade undertakings it made to Mali
soon after establishing diplomatic relations. By January 1962, three months after signing the
Sino-Mali economic and technical cooperation agreement in September 1961, Chinese
agricultural experts arrived in Bamako to start working on irrigation projects that included rice
and sugar plantations. Following a resounding success of the sugar plantation project, China
provided further economic and technical assistance for the building of Mali’s first sugar refinery
in the Segou region. At its completion in 1964, Mali was able to process 400 tonnes of sugar
cane daily, enabling it to export sugar in the region and beyond. Other notable Chinese
supported projects included a match factory completed in Bamako in 1967, a textile mill built in
Segou in 1968, a tea plantation, and cement works. But since Mali lacked strategic mineral
resources, China concentrated on infrastructure development and agricultural projects such
that “the presence of Chinese agricultural and technical personnel remained the symbol of
Chinese commitment” to its relationship with Mali (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 216).
As Mali was landlocked, semi-desert and poor country lacking in both financing and skilled
personnel, President Modibo Keita was impressed by the Chinese development assistance
model. Instead of merely providing funds and expecting Mali to complete the projects on its
own, as Western governments did, China provided both financing and personnel to implement
their aid and infrastructure projects. Chinese aid and technical assistance in the agricultural,
infrastructure and rail construction sector thrived. And from its early days of independence
“when most external actors limited their activity to supplying the equipment with which Mali
was supposed to embark on economic development, China went further to build factories
which they only handed over after completion” (Anda 2000, p. 218). These actions endeared
China to both civilian and military leaders in Mali. In fact, President Modibo Keita was highly
appreciative of that Chinese model of development assistance, and he made it known to
Premier Zhou Enlai when he visited Mali in January 1964. At a function held in Premier Zhou’s
honour, President Keita paid “warm homage to the P.R.C. for the low cost of its technical
assistance, for the readiness of its technicians to adapt themselves to the life of our people, for
the speed and competence with which the projects undertaken by the People’s China are
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carried out one by one, and all these things are done without the slightest intention of
interfering in our internal affairs” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 159-160).
To Mali, then and to date, China epitomised a benevolent development partner, uninterested
in seeking hegemony or intervention in its internal affairs, unlike France and other Western
countries. The main reason is because, unlike its neighbour Niger which has rich uranium
reserves, Mali had “relatively little to export to China,”296 because its “mineral sector [was]
dominated by the production of gold. No other mineral commodities [were] produced in
significant quantities in the country” (Soto-Viruet 2012, p. 28.1). Accordingly, China’s economic
and trade relations with Mali were better described as aid and assistance. By the time the
crises of 2012 began, China and Mali had had fifty years of unbroken diplomatic and economic
relations – making China one of Mali’s four biggest trading partners. In the course of those five
decades, Mali benefitted from three debt reliefs provided by China in 2001, 2006 and 2008.
The indebtedness of Mali and debt reliefs given by China does not me China only suffered
losses, it still derived benefits from the bilateral relationship. According to Beijing’s Eight
Principles of China’s Assistance to African Countries espoused by Premier Zhou Enlai during his
visit to Africa in 1964, China did not consider “its financial aid as a unilateral grant, but rather a
mutual and reciprocal process from which China also benefits” (Zeng 2014).
By the turn of the 21st century, trade and economic relations between the two countries had
significantly developed from just being aid and assistance to joint ventures in Mali’s agricultural
sector and the construction industry created huge opportunities for Chinese state and private
owned enterprises. The sector that recorded the largest boom in Sino-Mali relations is the
construction industry. In 2002, Mali was advanced a loan by the Chinese government to
construct five football stadiums that were used when Mali hosted the 2002 Africa Cup of
Nations, Africa’s biggest football tournament. Major Chinese investments were in rail
construction. Interestingly, major construction deals were reached even after the 2012
intrastate armed conflicts in Mali, suggesting that China’s intervention in Africa is not just
driven by perception of threat to current economic interests but also to anticipated interests.
In December 2015, the state-owned China Railway Construction Limited (CRC) announced that
Mali and Senegal had signed a US$2.7 billion contract for CRC to rehabilitate the Bamako-Dakar
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railway line.297 Also, Chinese investments in Malian agricultural sector flourished, making
cotton China’s biggest import from Mali. From a trade value of US$23.35 million in 2002, SinoMali trade grew to approximately US$130 million in 2010.

6.4 Insurrections and coup d’états: A test to China’s non-intervention
principle
Since 1960, Mali has had persistent internal insurrections298 including three successful coup
d’états, and multiple Tuareg rebellions in Northern Mali. Throughout all these events China
maintained its non-intervention posture, continuing diplomatic and political relations with each
successive government. However, it was not long before attempts were made to forcibly China
in the internal politics of Mali. The first case happened when President Keita, who was facing
popular dissent due to his government’s widespread corruption, declining economy, and his
own version of a ‘cultural revolution’, persuaded China to support his people’s militia project,
as he feared a looming popular uprising. Military overthrow of governments in the West
African region, particularly the coup d’état against President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, made
a military rebellion in Mali imminent. To counter that possibility, President Keita established a
‘people’s militia’ twice the size of the country’s army. Turning to China for support of the
‘people’s militia’, three military delegations from Mali visited Beijing between October 1966
and July 1968. By the third visit in 1968, China agreed to provide Mali with uniforms and
weapons, but before the militia was consolidated, President Keita was overthrown in a military
coup by junior army officers led by Lieutenant Moussa Traoré in November 1968. Considering
that Modibo Keita’s socialist policies were rhetorically moulded along Chairman Mao’s
economic and political ideology, one would have expected China to come to his rescue; instead
China issued no public statement and maintained diplomatic ties with the new Traoré regime
as if power had been transferred to Lieutenant Moussa Traoré procedurally.
When he announced his takeover of power from President Modibo Keita to cheering Malians,
Moussa Traoré promised rapid development, revival of the economy, and an end to corruption.
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However, ten years into his rule, a failing economy, stagnant development, widespread
corruption, and abuse of power resulted in internal resistance and an attempted coup against
his own government. When the 1978 attempt by the military to overthrow him failed, Moussa
Traoré became even more heavy-handed, ruthlessly purging political and military opponents
and banning opposition political parties. In the process of wanting to maintain political power,
he triggered a string of protests and widespread riots between 1991 and 1992 that eventually
resulted in his ouster by the military in 1992. Again, China, which had maintained good
diplomatic ties with Moussa Traoré as discussed above, simply moved on with the new regime
without even a public statement being issued concerning the coup d’état.
On taking over power from Moussa Traoré, Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, the coup leader,
immediately instituted a transitional committee that oversaw adoption of a new constitution,
facilitated the holding of democratic elections, and then oversaw transition of power to a
civilian government in that same year. 299 Alpha Omar Konaré won those elections and
established Mali’s first democratically-elected government since independence. His election
ushered in a period of political stability, and successive democratic transitions of power from
one civilian government to the other until 2012.300
In 2002, Amadou Toumani Touré returned to power after winning a landslide in an election
marred by political fraud and irregularities. But his government’s failure to contain the Tuareg
rebellion in northern Mali, “as well as the lack of resources at the disposal of the army to deal
with the brewing insurgence”301 led to his ouster in 2012. He was toppled in a military rebellion
led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who declared himself leader of a transitional authority
called the Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l’État
(CNRDR - National Committee for the Return of Democracy and the Restoration of the State).302
However, due to regional and international pressure, the CNRDR agreed to hand power over to
a civilian transitional government led by President Dioncounda Traoré, the country’s former
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speaker of parliament, following an agreement brokered by the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) between Sanogo and Touré in which they both agreed to resign.
Nonetheless, soldiers loyal to Amadou Toumani Traoré attempted to wrestle back political
power, leading to a violent backlash from the military junta that had installed President
Dioncounda Traoré. International and regional pressure again resulted in presidential elections
that Ibrahim Boubacar Keita won in August 2013.303
Amidst the above seriate of coup d’états and insurrections, the Tuareg in northern Mali were
engaged in a persistent and prolonged armed struggle for self-determination against the
successive Malian governments since Modibo Keita’s reign. Between 1962 and 1964, the first
Tuareg rebellion started but was ruthlessly crushed by the better equipped Malian military.
Since then, there were intermittent but largely unsuccessful Tuareg insurrections until 2013
when they briefly declared unilateral independence. The Tuareg, a nomadic people inhabiting
northern Mali and adjacent parts of the Sahara Desert in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Algeria, were
politically and culturally excluded by Malian governments. Also, being “nomads of the white
race, [they could] neither conceive nor accept to be commanded by blacks whom [they] always
had as servants and slaves” (Lecocq 2005, p. 54). Determined to achieve independence from
southern Mali, their struggle for self-determination was led by the following major groups:
Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad – Popular Movement of Azawad - (MPA); Tuareg Front
Populaire pour la Libération de l'Azaoud - Tuareg Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FPLA);
Alliance Touareg Niger-Mali - the Niger-Mali Tuareg Alliance (ATNM); and the National
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).
A combination of regional and domestic factors produced a favourable environment for a
major Tuareg offensive against Bamako. Domestically, they took “advantage of the power
vacuum caused by the coup and the incertitude surrounding Bamako… [to carry] forward their
task for an independent State” (Roberto, Closs and Ronconi 2013, p. 76). Regionally, the fall of
the Gaddafi regime propelled the Tuareg rebellion in two ways. First, there was an overflow of
small arms and heavy weaponry such as NR-160 rockets, BM-21 multiple-launch rocket systems,
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9M22M rockets, and UB-32 rocket launchers from Libya. 304 Militants who raided Libyan
government’s armouries sold the weapons to Islamic groups and the Tuareg. Second, the
Tuareg who had been working in Libya’s oil and construction industry returned to Mali due to
increased xenophobic attacks as the Gaddafi regime crumbled. Returning to Mali also were
Tuareg mercenaries who had fought in the Libyan war on behalf of the Gaddafi regime.305
These diverse Tuareg groups returned with military weapons, and equipped with modern
fighting and insurgent experiences.306 Joining forces with the MNLA, which was formed in 2010,
along with Islamic armed groups including Ansar Dine (formed in 2012), Al-Qaida in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO)
they seized control of northern regional capitals of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu before taking total
control of the rest of northern Mali. By 6 April 2013, they had declared independence of
northern Mali, renaming it Azawad with Gao as its capital. It was only through the military
intervention of France that Malian government’s authority was re-established in northern Mali
(Francis 2013, p. 3).

6.5 From indifference to ‘concern’
From the military overthrows of Modibo Keita to the present government of President Ibrahim
Boubacar Keita; and from the first Tuareg rebellion in independent Mali in 1962 to the Tuareg
declaration of independence in April 2013, China was careful not to entangle itself in the murky
terrain of Malian politics. Professing strict adherence to its foreign policy principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states, it avoided siding with any regimes in Mali. In
fact, in the first two coup d’états China did not issue any public response, either in favour of or
condemning the military takeovers of governments in Mali. Diplomatic relations remained, and
so did its development projects. Only in one incident did the overthrow of a president result in
disruptions of Chinese projects in Mali. When President Keita was overthrown in November
1968 the joint Guinea-Mali rail project funded and constructed by the Chinese was suspended.
The suspension was, however, not a Chinese initiative but a result of Guinea’s unwillingness to
work with the new military government of Moussa Traoré. As a result of the rail project’s
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suspension, a few Chinese technicians working on the project left Bamako – but the majority of
their Chinese colleagues working on other projects remained.
China approached the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali with the same attitude as it did the
SPLM’s struggle for independence of South Sudan - it regarded the Tuareg’s struggle for
independence as Mali’s internal affair. Because of its friendly relations with successive Malian
governments – military and civilian, it simply ignored, or at best was indifferent to the Tuareg
struggle for greater autonomy and self-determination. As in the case of its reaction to southern
Sudan’s own struggle for independence from the Sudan, China maintained its rhetoric on
respect for national and territorial integrity of its partners, as well as its non-intervention
principle in the internal affairs of other states. On those bases, China contended that it could
not support secessionist groups. But as will be argued in the next chapter on South Sudan,
Beijing’s policy regarding support to opposition groups in Africa was not consistently
implemented. In Mali, Beijing was consistent in its indifference to the Tuareg rebellion,
concentrating instead on managing its relations with successive Malian regimes to which it
generally “developed vested interests in the stability of a friendly African state… [Such that] for
the African state concerned, friendship with China removed a potentially dangerous and
powerful external source of inspiration for rebellious and discontented elements” (Ogunsanwo
1974, p. 174).
Overall, Beijing’s indifference to military overthrows of governments and the Tuareg rebellion
in Mali was strategic and pragmatic, leading to unintended benefits. For example, at the time
Modibo Keita was overthrown, his government had approved the Soviet Union’s 1968 invasion
of Czechoslovakia despite China’s advice not to. The new regime of Moussa Traoré immediately
reversed the approval and castigated the Soviet Union for being imperialist, much to the glee of
Beijing. Similarly, by ignoring the Tuareg rebellion, China continued to foster and maintain
cordial relations with successive Malian governments – shrewdly preventing the Tuareg
rebellion from tainting its relations with Bamako. By and large, the volatility and instability of
the Malian political landscape caused China to be careful of its engagement with the different
regimes, choosing not to take any sides for as long as they took no action to strain relations
with Beijing.307
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The biggest test of China’s indifferent approach to the Malian coup d’états and Tuareg
insurrections came in 2012 when Mali plunged into chaos under the pressure of “three distinct
but interrelated types of conflicts that coalesced to produce the 2012-3 crises” (Francis 2013, p.
2). The three crises included: (1) the Tuareg takeover of northern Mali, (2) a coup d’état that
overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré’s government, and (3) an attempt by Islamist
jihadists to establish an Islamic, Sharia-law based state. Occurring just a few months after the
Libyan intrastate armed conflict, there was overwhelming evidence that the Tuareg had
advanced more aggressively than before due to the fall of Gaddafi. Accordingly, there was
significant international focus on Mali as well as fear that the conflict could engulf the whole
Sahel region (Shaw 2013). In addition, fears that Mali could become an Islamic terrorist hub
were amplified when it emerged that al-Qaeda-linked Islamist groups captured Northern Mali,
and were advancing toward Bamako.
Initially China was indifferent to the triple crises in Mali, but when it became apparent that the
Tuareg rebellion had been successful as it declared the independent state of Azawad, at the
backdrop of the military overthrow of Amadou Toumani Touré’s government, China’s position
changed to what can be described as a tepid expression of concern. What proved the tepidness
of its concern is that unlike France, Britain and the United States that issued statements
condemning the coup d’état in Mali, China’s reaction was solicited by a journalist in the regular
Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference on 22 March 2012. In a brief statement, Hong Lei,
China’s foreign ministry spokesperson said: “China is concerned about the soldier’s riot in Mali
and hopes the situation will subside and return to normal as soon as possible. We maintain that
relevant issues should be resolved through dialogue and consultation.”308 China’s statement,
although it was in response to a journalist’s question, marked a departure from its practice in
the previous two coup d’états and multiple Tuareg rebellions. Hitherto, it had avoided issuing
public statements against Tuareg rebellions or coup d’états in Mali.
A day after China expressed its concern about the army riots in Bamako, General Amadou
Sanogo announced on Malian state television and radio that the CNRDR had taken over control
of the government from Amadou Toumani Touré. The third successful coup d’état in Malian
history had been completed. General Amadou Sanogo’s takeover of government was met with
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widespread condemnation from several African countries, the African Union, ECOWAS, the
United Nations, France, and the United States. The U.S. Department of State straightaway
issued a statement announcing that it stood “with the legitimately elected government of
President Amadou Toumani Touré.”309 An immediate suspension of financial aid to Bamako,
and suspension of the military assistance programme which provided the Malian army with
counter-terrorism training and intelligence operations in the Sahel followed the Department of
State’s statement.310 France, the most influential power in Mali, mobilised the European Union
and together they imposed strict restrictions on the military junta and cut-off all non-essential
aid. In Africa, the response was even swifter. ECOWAS representatives from Cote d’Ivoire,
Burkina Faso, Benin, and Niger convened an emergency meeting in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire on 29
March 2012; on the following day they “threatened to close Mali’s borders and cut off its
access to the regional central bank, on which Mali relied for currency” (Chivvis 2015, p. 69). The
threat of sanctions was acted upon on 3 April 2012, which effectively cut Mali’s fuel supply, and
access to cash from the regional central bank. In protest, South Africa closed its Bamako
embassy on 22 March 2012.311 In addition, two of the most important organisations to Mali,
ECOWAS and the AU suspended Mali’s membership and began making plans for military
intervention to restore democracy.
Compared to other states’ responses and action against the military junta in Mali, China’s own
response was a far cry away. Departing from its ‘tepid concern’, Beijing issued its strongest
statement against the military junta in Mali: “We are opposed to the unconstitutional takeover
of power”312 the foreign ministry spokesperson said. But instead of being backed by punitive
action against the military government of General Sanogo, China added the traditional and
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official plea in such events,313 it called upon “relevant parties in Mali to restore normal order as
soon as possible and safeguard national unity and stability for the sake of the fundamental
interests of the country and the people.”314 Compared with responses from other international
capitals such as Washington, London and Paris, Beijing’s response exuded apparent
indifference to the implications of its rhetorical opposition to the military takeover of the
Malian government.
In addition, despite major powers and the United Nations Security Council imposing measures
against the military junta, China remained unperturbed. In fact, when a counter-coup was
attempted by military guards loyal to the deposed Amadou Touré, the PRC foreign ministry
through its spokesperson Liu Weimin again called on parties in the Malian conflict to “exercise
restraint, properly handle their disputes by peaceful means including dialogue and consultation,
and jointly safeguard constitutional order, so as to ensure a smooth political transition.”315 The
continued failure by China to take concrete measures against the military government in Mali
raised concerns that it was a free-rider, 316 trying to “maximize its interests through minimal
involvement… while staking a claim to the moral high ground”317 by “making hollow calls for a
political resolution”318, but not acting as a responsible global power, and being “highly reluctant
to take on more burdens – whether economic, political, or military – preferring to free-ride”
(Kleine-Ahlbrandt 2009).
Beijing’s position regarding the intrastate armed conflict in Mali only shifted when its nationals
and interests in Mali appeared to be under threat – suggesting that China’s response was
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primarily motivated by concerns over protection of its own interests. To address those threats
and mitigate losses, possibly to avoid the Libyan debacle, the Foreign Ministry of the People’s
Republic of China issued a security alert on its website. It urged “Mali to take effective
measures to ensure the safety and lawful rights and interests of Chinese institutions and
nationals there”319 Beyond issuing a security alert, the foreign ministry’s spokesperson Hong Lei
announced several steps taken by the Chinese government in Beijing, the embassy of China in
Bamako, and Chinese enterprises operating in Mali. The Chinese embassy in Bamako
proactively engaged Chinese firms and nationals in Mali to assess their needs and security
status. But as the security situation deteriorated in weeks that followed, the Ministry of
Commerce warned Chinese firms of the escalating security risks in Mali, and urged them to
exercise vigilance. It also cautioned against non-essential travel to Mali, advising Chinese
nationals to temporarily leave the country and consider returning when the security situation
improves. The proactivity in taking measures to protect Chinese nationals and interests in Mali
before extensive losses had occurred suggests the change in China’s perception of threats
posed by intrastate armed conflicts in Africa to its nationals and interests there. On the other
hand, it also reflected that China was largely self-focused in its response to international
security issues.

6.6 From concern to rhetorical support for mediation
The onward advance toward Bamako by the MNLA and its Islamist allies after they captured
strategic towns in Northern Mali compelled China to urge ECOWAS to lead mediation efforts.
To that effect it issued a statement through its foreign ministry spokesperson expressing
appreciation and support for “efforts made by the African Union, ECOWAS and regional
countries to mediate the Mali issue.”320 What China did not publicly acknowledge was that the
mediation efforts by ECOWAS combined dialogue with the threat of political, diplomatic and
economic sanctions as well as military intervention. One could argue that this was deliberate
because China considers both the imposition of sanctions and military action as intervention in
the internal affairs of another state. When the Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson was
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asked to comment on ECOWAS’s demand that the military hand over power or else face
sanctions such as closure of borders and freeze on central bank accounts and military action,
Hong Lei avoided commenting on the sanctions and military action; instead he said: “China
supports the ECOWAS-led peaceful mediation for the Malian crisis. We hope parties concerned
in Mali will establish a dialogue channel with the ECOWAS as soon as possible to seek an end to
the crisis through negotiation, and avoid confrontation as well as serious impact on people's
life.” 321 Reading between the lines, the ECOWAS sanctions were in every respect
‘confrontational’, with potential to cause ‘serious impact on people’s lives.’ Yet it was only
through imposition of sanctions that Captain Sanogo was willing to negotiate reinstatement of
the constitution and hand over power to a transitional government.322
The rationale behind China’s support for ECOWAS mediation while deliberately avoiding
express support for imposition of sanctions or taking any punitive action against the military
regime as other states had done was to preserve its bilateral relations with Mali. The basis for
exercising caution against giving full and express consent or even implied consent as it had
done in the case of the NATO-led intervention in Libya is that it wanted to avoid sharing the
blame in case Mali descended into chaos; at the same time it also wanted to be in support of
regional and international initiatives toward restoring democracy in Mali. It also wanted to
portray and maintain its image as a neutral power that does not interfere in the internal affairs
of other states. But as put by Paul Haenle director of Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global
Policy, rhetorical support for mediation efforts being taken by others was not commensurate
with China’s global status.
Indeed, China’s support for ECOWAS mediation efforts turned out to be mostly rhetorical. The
European Union, France and the United States provided financial, diplomatic or logistical
support to ECOWAS, but the Chinese government offered nothing. It simply played no
significant role in facilitating mediation efforts by ECOWAS. David Shinn maintains that China’s
support of mediation efforts rather than punitive measures against the military regime was in
accordance with its non-interference policy. Understandably, China was concerned that
sanctions or military intervention would escalate the conflict, effectively destabilising the
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region, as had been the case in Libya. The interconnectedness of the Malian conflict with the
downfall of Gaddafi as a result of sanctions and military intervention by NATO and other
Western powers also seemed to cement China’s concerns against confrontational measures
against Captain Sanogo. So, as noted by a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and
Security Studies in Addis Ababa, to avoid the controversy of a failed military intervention,
Beijing simply settled on giving rhetorical support to ECOWAS, while hoping that the situation
did not escalate in a manner that would cause extreme damage to its interests in Mali and the
Sahel region.
Nonetheless, ECOWAS countries had a strong preference for military intervention. As Captain
Sanogo announced plans to hold a national meeting to decide the country’s democratic
transition schedule, ECOWAS began plans for a military intervention of Mali. However, within
the ruling and political elites in Mali, there was no consensus on the proposed ECOWAS-led
military intervention. In particular, Captain Sanogo and other military leaders controlling key
ministerial portfolios, including Defence, Home Security and Territorial Administration 323
opposed ECOWAS intervention, arguing that it was an affront to Mali’s state sovereignty. At
best Captain Sanogo wanted ECOWAS’ role in Mali to be limited to training and logistical
support for Malian troops. The transitional government also opposed the ECOWAS-led military
intervention in Mali because even though power had been handed over to them as demanded
by the AU and ECOWAS, Captain Sanogo and his military junta had “remained influential in the
background” (Souaré 2014:89). In protest against pressure from Captain Sanogo and the
military junta to oppose military intervention by ECOWAS, the transitional government’s prime
minister resigned in November 2012, and a new one, Django Sissoko, was immediately
appointed in his stead (Francis 2013:3).

6.7 Multilateral action
In spite of pressure from the military junta, the leader of the transitional government,
President Dioncounda Traoré, defiantly supported military intervention by ECOWAS. On 1
September 2012, he sent an official invitation to ECOWAS and France to militarily intervene in
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Mali in order to quell the Tuareg rebellion.324 In what turned out to be a replay of the Libyan
case, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2071 on 12 October
2012. It authorised ECOWAS and the AU to make an actionable plan for military intervention in
Mali. China voted in favour of that Resolution. But before the AU and the ECOWAS African-led
International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) became operational, Tuareg separatists and
their Islamic allies advanced toward Bamako, capturing strategic towns of Konna and Diabaly
on the way. They took advantage of divisions and political bickering among political and
military leaders in Mali over military intervention by ECOWAS. 325 In response, the United
Nations Security Council issued a press statement expressing the determination of members of
the Security Council “to pursue the full implementation of its resolutions on Mali, in particular
resolution 2085 (2012) in all its dimensions.” Resolution 2085 (2012) authorised the African-led
International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to assist the armed forces of Mali in regaining
of control over its northern territory.326 Taking note of the changed context, they then called
“for a rapid deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).”327
However, the continued inability of the Malian military to stop the Tuareg and their Islamist
allies from advancing toward Bamako, “coupled with failure of the deployment of troops from
African countries… forced France to act unilaterally, but with the approval of the international
community, including Russia, China and African regional actors” (Francis 2013, p. 5; see also,
Okemuo 2013, p. 219). China had also voted in favour of both Resolution 2071 (2012) and
Resolution 2085 (2012), all of which authorised military intervention in Mali.
Regarding France’s military intervention in Mali there appeared to be confusion in Beijing.
Although they supported it at the UN Security Council, they remained adamant that military
intervention without consent of the target state is illegitimate. “You cannot imagine China
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would support any bombing. It’s against our principles,”328 is how He Wenping, Director of
African Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences had put it in a discussion on China’s role
in international peace and security. She then warned that unless opposed, “French forces’
involvement in Mali will provide the case for legalization of a new interventionism in Africa.”329
Along similar lines, researchers at China’s Naval Military Research Institute, Li Jian and Jin Jing,
retorted that France was behaving like the African gendarmerie, and that its military
intervention in Mali was a ploy to consolidate its control over Malian gold mines and oil
reserves. Further drawing comparisons with the military intervention in Libya, they made an
argument that France’s eagerness to militarily intervene in African countries constituted an
attempt to recolonise and secure its strategic interests in Africa. What also exacerbated these
concerns is that “France did not give any explanation why it was going it cavalier seul rather
than within the EU framework” (Okemuo 2013, p. 219).
In its defence, France argued that its military intervention in Mali was at the invitation of Mali’s
interim government led by President Dioncounda Traoré,330 thus it was not a violation of Mali’s
sovereignty. “France had answered to the request for military assistance issued by the Malian
authorities by providing, within the bounds of international law, the support of its armed forces
to the Malian units engaged in the fight against terrorist groups” (Okemuo 2013, p. 236). The
intervention met the traditional requirement of consent of the country concerned.
Furthermore, there was near-consensus in ECOWAS and the AU that French forces intervene
alongside troops from Mali, Niger, Chad and other predominantly West African countries. In
fact, ECOWAS adopted Resolution A/Res.Msc.1/01/13 expressed gratitude to France for
militarily intervening in Mali.331 In further defence, the Permanent Representative of France at
the UN, Gérard Araud, argued that his country’s intervention in Mali was a bridging operation

328

Martin, P & Cohen, D 2011, ‘Through Chinese eyes: He Wenping (part 3)’, The Interpreter, 2 December,
viewed 12 June 2015, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/12/02/Through-Chinese-eyes-HeWenping-%28Part-3%29.aspx
329
He, W 2013, ‘Hollande has set alarming precedent for intervention’, Global Times, 22 January, viewed
12 June 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/757501.shtml
330
‘Mali’s PM calls for foreign intervention’ 2012, Al Jazeera, 27 September, viewed 16 June 2015,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/09/201292755022310928.html
331
ECOWAS 2013, Resolution A/RES.MSC.1/01/13 Expressing gratitude to the Republic of France and
other ECOWAS partners for their interventions towards the Resolution of the crisis in Mali, 19 January,
viewed 9 June 2015,
http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/reports/communiques/extraordinary_summit_of_ecow
as_heads_of_state_and_government/Gratitude%20to%20France%20on%20Mali.pdf

153

required in Mali before deployment of AFISMA. Thus, France’s “Serval operation mark[ed] a
clear contrast with the nation’s modus operandi in the Libyan conflict” (Ping 2014, p. 24).
The incongruence between China’s rhetoric of anti-military intervention in Mali and its actual
behaviour, such as voting in favour of a post facto authorisation of the intervention332 exposed
the lack of an elaborate foreign policy position on intervention in foreign conflicts in Beijing.
Realising that an outright support of France’s intervention in Mali was detrimental to its image
in Africa, Beijing continued to emphasise concerns of “a potential abuse of the UN mandate,
like what happened in Libya.” 333 He Wenping said, “we have some concerns about the
intervention… These concerns are based on problems that have arisen as a result of foreign
intervention in other countries such as Libya and Côte d’Ivoire. The whole African continent
now has a heavy foreign military presence, with increasing numbers of military bases and
drones.”334 Arguably, considering what had happened in Libya, if China was serious about
raising these concerns it would have vetoed the French military intervention in Mali. However,
as it became clear that the French were effective in pushing MNLA and the Islamists back into
the Northern Mali hinterland, thus restoring peace and order which was necessary to safeguard
the security of Chinese nationals, institutions and investments there, there was an about-turn
in China’s position. He Wenping retorted that none of Chinese officials had opposed France’s
intervention in Mali because “the French military intervention was necessary… [since] the
situation was urgent.”335 This sudden change in opinion implied that China had improvised or
tailored the non-intervention principle in African intrastate armed conflicts in order to protect
its immediate interests there.
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6.8 Conclusion: Striking a balance between intervention and nonintervention
Struggling to articulate its role in the Malian intrastate armed conflict in order to secure its
interests there vis-à-vis its non-intervention principle, Guo Xueli, charge d’affaires at the
Chinese embassy in Bamako, announced that China was considering providing military support
to the Malian army. In an interview broadcast on television in Bamako, Guo Xueli said: “we are
going to bring our assistance to the extent possible, specifically in the military, where we
already have a very old cooperation.” 336 Researchers at China’s Naval Military Research
Institute disagreed –causing another embarrassing discord among foreign policy elites in China.
In a commentary published in the Global Times soon after, Li Jian and Jin Jing retorted that
appeals for China to contribute troops were Western ploys to manipulate China, and were
against China’s principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. In
summation they wrote, “the West will not allow us to get involved in its traditional spheres of
influence, and deploying troops would also conflict with the guiding principle of our foreign
affairs.”
Conceding that safeguarding Chinese interests in Mali and the Sahel region could not be
entrusted to France and the West, Li Jian and Jin Jing urged Beijing to “look at the situation
from a broad, global perspective, and carefully consider how we can safeguard the national
interests that China has developed in this complex and disorderly region.” 337 China’s interests
in Mali included investments in agriculture and in the construction industry. Prospecting of oil
in Northern Mali, and threats that the Tuareg rebellion could spread to Niger where China has
uranium and oil interests added to Chinese anxiety over the Malian conflict. So in order to
safeguard those broad interests, Li Jian and Jin Jing proposed that China focus on economic
construction, livelihood issues and infrastructure development in order to present itself as a
‘constructive, cooperative and responsible major power.’
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The discord among Chinese foreign policy makers and academics reflected the underlying
conflict between protection of its interests abroad and maintaining the non-intervention
principle. In order to balance those two conflicting imperatives, instead of supporting the
military in Mali, which would have been interpreted as unilateral military intervention, Beijing
opted to actively participate in UN-authorised peacekeeping and peace-enforcement
operations.338 When the U.N. Security Council extended United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)’s mandate “to protect the United Nations
personnel, notably uniformed personnel, installations and equipment and ensure the safety,
security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel,”339 China
grabbed the opportunity.
For the second time in its UN peacekeeping history since 1990, China sent a separate
protection unit to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali to protect both Chinese and other
international UN personnel. Official Chinese statements referred to them as ‘security forces’
from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), but in actuality they were a combat troop authorised
“to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of
deployment.”340 Previously, China had “sent a peacekeeping force consisting of 395 personnel
to the Mission, of which there is a 170-person police unit, a 155-person engineering unit and a
70-person medical unit”341 to MINUSMA. However, as put by Earl Conteh-Morgan (2001), the
sending of the combat troops by China under the UN peacekeeping and enforcement operation
reflected “a shift from a strict adherence to the doctrine of state sovereignty and the principle
of non-intervention.” In an editorial published in the South China Morning Post, Minnie Chan
also concurred that “sending troops to Mali, in West Africa, indicated a major shift in China’s
peacekeeping approach.”342
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Seen from the historical trajectory of the 1970s total rejection of international peacekeeping,
hesitant participation in the 1980s and then sustained involvement since the 1990s,343 China’s
deployment of combat troops in Mali reveals a major shift from the doctors, military observers,
and engineers it deployed before. That it happened a few months after a similar deployment in
South Sudan implies a changing perception in Beijing concerning intervention in foreign
intrastate armed conflicts. Previously, China had a policy that the PLA does not operate in
foreign territory, as doing so would amount to intervention in those foreign countries. But as
put by Hanauer and Morris (2014, p. 44) there is a growing realisation in Beijing that
peacekeeping provides its security and military personnel the opportunity to gain combat
experience in volatile countries, creating avenues to subtly protect its nationals and interests
abroad in a non-threatening, legitimate manner.
Accordingly, China’s involvement in the multilateral intervention in Mali has been explained by
several authors as being motivated by four factors: (1) securing natural resources; (2)
maintaining trade and economic benefits or interests; (3) exposing its troops to international
operations; and (4) projecting itself as a responsible global power. Empirical evidence suggests
the first two points played a major role in China’s intervention in Mali, even though it had no
significant direct economic interests in Mali to the magnitude comparable to South Sudan and
Libya. It has regional economic interests, and strong interests in the Uranium deposits in
Northern Mali and parts of Niger adjacent to the parts controlled by the Tuareg in Northern
Mali. In Mali, unlike South Sudan and Libya, China’s economic and strategic interests were
regional such that the risk of transnational spread of the Malian intrastate armed conflict into
neighbouring countries where it controlled large stakes in Uranium and other strategic
commodities compelled China to intervene and support interventions by other powers in order
to control the conflict. “In Mali and the broader Western African region, China is especially
interested in protecting Chinese civilians, their economic interests, and to contribute to
regional stability as the best condition to protect their economic interests.”344 Thus, as put by
Vincenzo Bove, et al., “the risk of transnational spread of a civil war can make states with
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strong interests in a region intervene to contain the conflict” (2015, p. 2). Also, the renewal of
oil explorations in Mali gives it an interesting dynamic that has attracted intervention not just
from China but also France which previously ignored past Tuareg rebellions that occurred
before oil exploration began in the mid-2000s (Bove, et al., 2015, p. 3).
As put by Ted Galen Carpenter, the vice-president for Defence and Foreign Policy Studies at
Cato Institute, China’s intervention in Mali, as is the case in other African countries, is driven by
its growing economic stake and increased presence of Chinese nationals, thus “Beijing wants to
promote greater stability in countries where businesses and people may be at risk.”345 While
this is an immediate motivation, the underlying cause is the gradual change in China’s
perception of intrastate armed conflict in Mali as being a threat to its interests there. This
explains why in just over a year, Chinese engagement in the Malian intrastate armed conflict
went from an indifferent and passive response to rebellion and coup d’états in Mali since 1960,
to expressions of concern over military takeover of the government by Captain Sanogo; then
from support for French military intervention to sending 500 combat troops under the
multidimensional and integration UN peacekeeping operation, MUNISMA, which is authorised
to take all necessary “steps to prevent the return of armed elements” to northern Mali (Shinn
2013). It appears that as the intrastate armed conflict intensified, the conflict’s threat to
Chinese interests in Mali and the region increased, compelling Beijing to improvise its
intervention accordingly.
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CHAPTER 7: China in South Sudan intrastate armed conflict:
assertive and proactive intervention?
7.1 Introduction
Still reeling from the devastating effects of Libya’s intrastate armed conflict – the loss of billions
of dollars’ worth of projects and assets, and biggest evacuation of overseas citizens in its recent
history - China found itself confronted by yet another intrastate armed conflict. This time,
hardly two years after the Libyan armed conflict and a year after the coup d’état in Mali, the
conflict was in South Sudan, Africa’s newest nation. To China, South Sudan had been a
challenge even before it existed as a sovereign state. The complexity of its war of
independence from the Sudan, the subsequent split, and then the war between the two Sudans
over oil transit fees and revenue sharing all contributed to making the South Sudan intrastate
armed conflict more devastating to China’s interests in that country. Chinese oil companies
were also still coming to terms with the complexities of working with the two antagonistic
Sudans in their interdependent oil sector. Already they had suffered extensive losses due to oil
production disruptions during the Juba-Khartoum war hardly a year before. On top of that
problem, the intrastate armed conflict between the government of South Sudan and forces
loyal to the country’s former vice-president Riek Machar threatened to wipe out what was left
of the country’s oil industry – which is largely dominated by China’s own state-owned
enterprise, CNPC.
Apart from economic losses, the crises in Libya and Mali had already exposed the inadequacies
of Beijing’s foreign policy strategies, especially the efficacy of its non-intervention principle
when faced with intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. The stakes were therefore high for Beijing
when the South Sudan intrastate armed conflict broke out in December 2013. Just as in Libya,
China had invested billions in the South Sudan oil sector; furthermore, it had to show its
citizens as well as other global powers that it was able to handle such situations as a
responsible global power. It is upon this background that this chapter explores China’s
intervention in South Sudan’s intrastate armed conflict. This chapter starts by tracing historical
relations between China and southern Sudan actors since Sudan’s independence in 1956. It
then examines China’s pragmatic foreign policy strategies, first in transforming its antagonistic
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relationship with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) into an amiable one, and
then in balancing its triangulated relationship with Khartoum and Juba. All in all, the argument
advanced in this chapter is that unlike in the case of Libya and Mali, China’s intervention in
South Sudan’s armed conflict was proactive, deliberate and assertive, suggesting that its
perception of African intrastate armed conflicts as threatening to its external economic
interests is evolving.

7.2 Background of China-South Sudan relations
Relations between China and South Sudan are a case of ‘enemies turning to friends’.346
Antagonism between the two started in 1955 when the southern rebellion against the
Khartoum government broke-out. The antagonism then ended in 2005 with formation of a
government of national unity under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 347 framework.
In the course of that forty-year period, two civil wars were fought – with a decade-long peace
period (1972 - 1983) in-between. The first civil war, from 1955 to 1972, was between the
government of Sudan and the Anya-Nya movement, which represented people of the southern
Sudan. After a ten-year long armistice, in 1983 the second civil war (1983-2005) pitting the
government of Sudan against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) started. In the
second civil war, the Anya-Nya movement was succeeded by the SPLM in its struggle for
greater autonomy and subsequent independence of southern Sudan. That period of southern
Sudan’s war for self-determination is what Daniel Large refer to as the inimical period of ChinaSouth Sudan relations. The amiable period followed the gaining of independence by South
Sudan in 2011; while the period in-between signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in
2005 and South Sudan becoming an independent sovereign state in 2011 marked the
transitional period of their relationship from being ‘enemies to friends.’ What this long and
convoluted historical background of China-South Sudan relations means is that in order to gain
346

Large, D 2011, ‘Southern Sudan and China: Enemies into friends?’ in D Large & LA Patey (eds.), Sudan
looks east: China, India and the politics of Asian alternatives, James Currey, New York, pp. 157-175.
347
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was an amalgamation of six agreements signed between 2002
and 2004 by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. The
following constituted the CPA: (1) The Protocol of Machakos (20 September 2002); (2) The Protocol of
Security Arrangements (25 September 2003); (3) The Protocol of Wealth Sharing (7 January 2004); (4)
The Protocol of Power-Sharing (26 May 2004); (5) The Protocol of the Resolution of Conflict in Southern
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile States (26 May 2004); (6) The Protocol on the Resolution of
Conflict in Abyei (26 May 2004). Source: United Nations Mission in Sudan n.d., The background of
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement, viewed 23 January 2016,
https://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515

160

a comprehensive understanding of China’s intervention in South Sudan’s intrastate armed
conflict, it is critical to first explore relations between China and southern Sudan’s liberation
war movements, the Anya-Nya and SPLM within the context of China-Khartoum relations.
On 18 August 1955, four months before independence of the Sudan, the Equatorial Corps, a
southern military garrison composed of mainly southern Sudanese soldiers mutinied, against
the government of Sudan in protest to what it saw as over concentration of power in the North,
and disenfranchisement of the South. That mutiny marked the beginning of Sudan’s first civil
war. Southern soldiers who rebelled were joined by others forming a southern Sudan rebel
group known as the Anya-Nya movement. For seventeen years the group fought for greater
autonomy and independence of the Christian-animist black Africans in southern Sudan from
the ‘Arab’ Muslims in the north. Politically, culturally, and religiously the North identified with
the Middle Eastern and North African countries while Southerners were predominantly black
Africans identifying with sub-Saharan Africa, particularly their East African neighbours.
Between 1960 and 1972, the North-South intrastate armed conflict became more
internationalised. Arab states, and communist countries such as the Soviet Union, East
Germany, and Yugoslavia, including China, provided the government of Sudan with military
weapons. Their support for Sudan was based on two considerations: General Jaafar
Mohammed Numayri’s communist ideology, and Cold War geopolitical considerations. Britain,
being the former colonial power and architect of the political structure that had largely
resulted in political and economic alienation of southerners, also supported the government.
As foreign powers flocked to render support to Khartoum, the Anya-Nya movement struggled
to get backing, even from China which at that time supported national wars and liberation war
movements in Africa. It was only after the Six-Day war between Israel and Arab countries that
the Anya-Nya movement started getting meaningful military and administrative assistance
from the Israeli government and the Israeli Defense Forces.348
China’s response to southern Sudan’s Anya-Nya movement was at odds with its actions in
other parts of Africa where it supported liberation war movements fighting for selfdetermination. Citing constraints from its foreign policy of non-intervention in the internal
affairs of other countries, Beijing “never advanced any rhetorical or material support to Anya348
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Nya rebels”349 even though their struggle met the criteria for a ‘people’s war’ similar to what
China supported in other African countries.350 To China, the intrastate armed conflict between
the Anya-Nya and the government of Sudan was an internal issue that it could not interfere
with. Be that as it may, China’s actions in other countries negate the ‘non-intervention in the
internal affairs of other states’ argument. For example, during the Nigerian civil war, China
supported rebels who sought secession of eastern Nigeria (‘Biafra’) from the Federal Republic
of Nigeria.351 Short of according them diplomatic recognition, the People’s Republic of China
gave various forms of support and aid to the secessionists, 352 and urged them “to persevere in
the struggle and wage a people’s war till victory was achieved” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 235).
Similarly, in Zaire, now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo, China supported
opposition groups that fought against the Congolese government following the ouster of
Patrice Lumumba in September 1960.353 Accordingly, Beijing’s argument that it was constrained
from supporting the Anya-Nya by its non-intervention principle was not convincing to
southerners.
In addition, “even if China had wanted to support the guerrilla fighters in the south, a rational
calculation of interests involved in other areas would have weighed against such support,
especially as there was no guarantee of success for the fighters” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 174).
With no reasonable prospects of success for the Anya-Nya rebellion, China was not willing to
risk its friendly diplomatic relations with Sudan. But prospects of Anya-Nya’s success were by
no means the only reason Beijing never extended any assistance to them. The essential reason
was that geopolitical considerations and national interests played a critical role in Beijing’s
selection of which African liberation war movements to support, particularly with regards to
Sudan. Its main geopolitical concern was dissipating the Soviet Union’s influence in newly
independent African countries and undermining Taiwan by increasing the number of African
countries it had diplomatic relations with. The Anya-Nya movement and its struggle against the

349

Large, D 2011, ‘Southern Sudan and China: Enemies into friends?’ in D Large & LA Patey (eds.), Sudan
looks east: China, India and the politics of Asian alternatives, James Currey, New York, p.159.
350
Ogunsanwo, A 1974, China’s policy in Africa: 1958-71, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.72.
351
Larkin, BD 1973, China and Africa, 1949-1970: The foreign policy of the People's Republic of
China, University of California Press, California, p.178.
352
Porter, BD 1986, The USSR in Third World conflicts: Soviet arms and diplomacy in local wars 19451980, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.91.
353
Larkin, BD 1973, China and Africa, 1949-1970: The foreign policy of the People's Republic of
China, University of California Press, California, p.180.

162

Sudanese government was in no way going to assist China in achieving those geopolitical
objectives.
In that respect, having established diplomatic relations with China in 1959, and as one of the
first four independent African countries to have recognised the People’s Republic of China,
Sudan was strategic to China’s ambitions of increasing its influence in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region. Moreover, Sudan’s geographical location, as well as its religious
and political leaning toward the ‘Arab – Muslim’ MENA countries made it even more
instrumental to China’s geopolitical expansion objective. Accordingly, supporting a secessionist
movement against the Sudanese government would have jeopardised their friendly diplomatic
relations and put at risk China’s interests in the newly independent North African Arab states of
Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and the Arab world in general.354 So seriously did China take its
geopolitical interests and relations with Sudan that when the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) threatened to support the southern Sudan rebels, the Chinese government expressed
grave concern and “announced its readiness to help the Sudan against any foreign intervention
aiming at undermining it” (Ogunsanwo 1974, p. 174).
Notwithstanding, the first Sudan civil war ended in 1972 when the Anya-Nya movement and
the government of Sudan signed the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA). Among other things, the
agreement granted regional autonomy to southern Sudan, and incorporated Anya-Nya forces
into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and government bureaucracy. However, in the late 1970s,
President Numayri declared Sudan an Islamic State and introduced Islamic law even in the
South – effectively withdrawing southern Sudan’s autonomy over its own internal affairs. In
addition, when oil and other mineral discoveries were made in areas bordering North and
South Sudan, Numayri unilaterally attempted to “redefine the boundaries between North and
South, so that the oil rich area around Bentiu, the fertile lands of Renk, together with the nickel
and uranium deposits all fall into northern territory” (Scott 1984, p. 69). As it became obvious
to southerners and other foreign parties interested in investing in Sudan’s mining and energy
sector that the major oil and mineral deposits were located in southern Sudan, “oil and its
exploration became a burning political issue” (Scott 1974, p. 70). The result was another revolt
by southern army officers in May 1983. This time the struggle against the Sudanese
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government was led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) under the
leadership of charismatic Colonel John Garang de Mobar.355
China’s policy regarding SPLM/A in the second civil war the same as it was with the Anya-Nya in
the first civil war. However, the discovery of oil and other valuable mineral resources increased
the strategic importance of Sudan to China, further endearing Khartoum to Beijing, and
diminishing any possibilities of positive relations between Beijing and SPLM. Chances of Beijing
even considering assisting the SPLM were dealt a heavy blow when China’s National Oil
Companies (NOCs) took advantage of the departure of Western oil companies such as Chevron,
Talisman, Lundin and OMV from Sudan due to pressure from their governments and global
human rights activists. Chinese NOCs were not bothered by Khartoum’s bad human rights
record, support for terrorism and perpetration of war crimes and genocide in Darfur, so they
quickly grabbed the opportunity and dominated Sudan’s oil sector. In fact, Sudan became
China’s leading foreign oil project; and as put by Chen Fengying of the China Contemporary
International Relations Institute in Beijing, Sudan represented in practice China’s strategy of
going for oil in places where American and European companies were not present.356
As Chinese oil companies expanded their investments in Sudan’s oil sector, oil revenue surged.
In turn, Khartoum increased its military budget, enabling the Sudan Armed Forces to purchase
more arms to fight the SPLM. “Prior to the increase in oil revenues in the late 1990s and early
2000s, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) had consistently complained about its lack of financial
and material means to wage war effectively against the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A)” (Large 2007, p. 4). But with the oil revenue from Chinese oil fields
flowing in, China assisted the government of Sudan to set-up and operate three military
weapon factories near the Sudanese capital city of Khartoum.357 In addition, China also became
Sudan’s major weapons supplier. From the early 1990s, China had been supplying Sudan with
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SCUD missiles, ammunition, tanks, helicopters and fighter aircraft,358 but as alleged by the
Human Rights First not only did it increase its weapons supply, it also breached an international
arms embargo against Sudan by supplying it with light weapons in the years that Khartoum’s
war against the SPLM intensified.359 Refuting allegations that China had breached the arms
embargo against Sudan, foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang maintained that conventional
weapons exported from China to Sudan were of a very limited quantity, constituting a small
portion of Sudan's military import.360 However, the implication was that the growth of Sudan’s
oil sector as a result of Chinese oil investments became deeply entwined with patterns of
violence in South Sudan.361
The apparent symbiotic relationship between Chinese oil companies and the government of
Sudan made Beijing’s claims of non-intervention in Sudan’s intrastate armed conflict
implausible. As put by Irene Panozzo, “China’s foreign tenets of state sovereignty, territorial
integrity and non-interference in internal affairs had translated into the defence of Khartoum’s
position against the southern struggle for self-determination and possible independence”
(2015, p. 177). Making things even more complicated for China to profess non-intervention in
Sudan is that Sudan Armed Forces often used air strips at the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating
Company (GNPOC)’s oil installations to launch attacks against the SPLM/A. The Sudanese army,
as well as army-backed militias, also provided security to Chinese workers and oil installations
located in southern Sudan, where SPLM/A and other groups operated. As a result, the
prevailing opinion among ordinary southern Sudanese, SPLM/A, and other rebel groups was
that China was part of the conflict, but fighting on the side of the government of Sudan. Lam
Akol, a rebel commander in the Sudan People's Liberation Movement United (SPLMU), who
had previously served as Sudan’s transportation minister from 1998 to 2002, encapsulated that
perception when he said: “the Chinese have every reason not to lose these oil fields, and that is
why they are committed to fighting the war by supplying the Sudan government the
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wherewithal.”362 In concurrence, Deng Awou, a former commander in SPLA said: “the suffering
of the [South Sudan] people is on the hands of the Chinese” (Kline 2010, p. 64).
Southern Sudanese perceptions that China was an active participant in their conflict against the
government of Sudan were confirmed by the director of Middle East and North African Studies
at Shanghai International Studies University, Professor Zhu Weilie. Professor Zhu argued that in
Sudan, China had to balance its interests in order to protect the supply of oil from Sudan, and
that meant militarily supporting Sudan’s war against the SPLM. The implication was that
“during the last ten years of the north-south civil war, China had been considered in the south
as the enemy’s best friend and financier because of Beijing’s investments in Sudan’s oil sector,
its arms sales to Khartoum and its political backing of the NCP’s rule” (Panozzo 2015, p. 177). In
light of the above, prior to 2005, China-SPLM relations were as the proverbial ‘a friend of an
enemy is an enemy’.
Up until signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between SPLM and the government of
Sudan, China was unperturbed by SPLM’s negative opinions regarding its relations with
Khartoum. For Beijing, as long as the government of Sudan guaranteed the security of Chinese
oil workers and installations, and as long as the oil was flowing with little or no interruption
from SPLM, it did not matter what SPLM or southerners thought. Basically, its strategy was to
ignore the Sudanese civil war for as long as it did not interfere with its oil operations separating, as alluded to by China’s deputy foreign minister Zhou Wenzhong, business from
politics. In that respect, Beijing considered the SPLM-Khartoum civil war as an internal affair
with which it was not in a position to interfere (Kurlantzick 2007, p. 222). In like manner, Zhang
Dong, China’s Ambassador to Sudan asserted: “China never interferes in Sudan’s internal
affairs.”363 That exactly is what Khartoum had hoped for from Beijing, especially considering its
isolation by Western countries. So, in an interview, Sudan’s mining minister Awad Ahmed Al-Jaz
said: “[The] Chinese are very nice, they don’t have anything to do with any politics or problems.
Things move smoothly, successfully. They are very hard workers looking for business, not
politics” (Goodman 2004). It was therefore under those circumstances that China consolidated
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its position as the foremost investor in Sudan’s oil industry despite the majority of the oil
reserves being in southern Sudan.

7.3 The genesis of Beijing – SPLM relations
In 2005, there was a paradigm shift in SPLM and government of Sudan relations, which
compelled China to recalibrate its relations with the SPLM. On 9 January 2005, representatives
of the two parties appended their signatures to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) not only ending two decades of North-South conflict, but also ushering a new Juba-BeijingKhartoum triangular political, economic and diplomatic dispensation. As a compilation of
several agreements signed between the antagonists from 2002, the CPA covered issues ranging
from the sharing of oil wealth between North and South, to setting up of a Government of
National Unity comprising the Sudan’s Islamist National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM.
But most importantly, the agreement made provision for southerners to decide at the end of a
six-year transitional period whether to remain united with the North or secede into an
independent state. It was the referendum that jolted China into considering establishing
contacts with SPLM while maintaining ties with Khartoum.
Although it appeared obvious that southerners would choose secession, the National Congress
Party, China, and some SPLM leaders hoped for unity of the two Sudans. Considering 70
percent of Sudan’s oil fields were located in southern Sudan and that China had invested in oil
fields located in oil-rich Muglad and Melut basins straddling the North-South border,364 it was
mostly out of economic interests that Khartoum and China preferred the status quo – that is,
one-Sudan-two-systems under NCP’s dominance. In particular, as noted by Anne Itto, SPLM’s
deputy secretary-general, following her visit to China in August 2009, Chinese government
officials feared that if southern Sudan seceded, there would be insecurity and their assets in
the form of pipelines and billions worth of other oil investments would go to waste.365 Apart
from oil interests, secession of southern Sudan risked putting “China’s foreign policy tenets
under strain” (Panozzo 2015, p. 179) – it threatened to plunge Beijing into a quagmire of how
to strategically court SPLM after so many years of hostilities between them.
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On the other hand, driven by a nationalist agenda, John Garang, leader of SPLM and First VicePresident in Sudan’s Government of National Unity, advocated an all-inclusive united Sudan366
under the “one-country-two-systems model, whereby the people of southern Sudan would
decide after six years whether to remain within the Sudan or to opt for independence.” 367
Although he appeared to have given the responsibility of choosing either secession or unity to
southerners, Garang was as unapologetic in his support for a united Sudan as he was in his
opposition to secession. In one of his passionate speeches he declared in 1992 that “if anybody
wants to separate even in the North, we will fight him because the Sudan must be one. It
should not be allowed to disintegrate or fragment itself.”368 On that, Garang was on the same
page with China because in meetings with SPLM, Chinese government officials emphasised
continued support for “Sudan’s peace, unification and development.”369 However, the vision of
a ‘one-country-two-systems’ model in Sudan that John Garang propelled gradually faded370
with his death in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005. Salva Kiir Mayardit, the man who
succeeded him as both SPLM leader and Sudan’s First Vice-President in the Government of
National Unity, was pro-secessionist, and therefore the campaign for southern Sudan
independence gained momentum.371

7.4 China-SPLM courtship: Building relations for a mutually beneficial
future?
Prior to the CPA, SPLM and China had no known official contact. Official relations between
China and the Sudan had all along been north-centric and focused on Khartoum-Beijing
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engagement. “Khartoum tightly controlled relations with China from the centre, largely
preventing its ally from having contact with the Southern rebels (International Crisis Group
2012, p. 2). Conceivably for economic and geopolitical considerations, Beijing reciprocated by
exclusively dealing with the Khartoum government (Large 2011b, p. 54). The second reason is
that China claimed to have been precluded from making official contact with the SPLM because
its relations with Sudan were dictated by the Five Principles on Peaceful Co-existence, in
particular, the non-interference principle which prohibits China from making contact with
opposition political parties in other countries. What China’s leaders could not acknowledge
publicly is that its dominant position in Sudan’s energy sector was necessitated by their support
for the Khartoum government in its fight against the SPLM. It was also because China chose to
be indifferent to atrocities committed against southerners and Darfurians by Sudan on the
basis “that business should not be mixed with politics.”372 The third reason, as put by China’s
Defence Minister Cao Guangchuan, is that China’s People’s Liberation Army attached greater
significance to developing relations and cooperating with the Sudanese army on various
issues.373 To that end, China supplied Khartoum with heavy military weapons that in turn were
used to fight SPLM in the south. Because of that, there existed a sense of animosity and distrust
between China and SPLM as they begun to forge official relations after signing of the CPA.
Be that as it may, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement had two major enablement elements
that fostered relations between Beijing and the SPLM. The foremost factor is that it
“legitimised the SPLM and opened the door for the gradual expansion of SPLM-CPC political
relations” (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, p. 80). The second factor is that the agreement enabled
SPLM to transform itself from being a liberation movement into a political party, able and
“willing to consider engagement with all potential external partners, including China” (Large
2011, p. 165). On the basis of these two factors, it was almost obvious to Beijing that under the
CPA framework, the autonomous government of southern Sudan could become a direct
partner “without obliging China to formally deny sovereignty and territorial integrity tenets or
alter its warm relations with Khartoum” (Panozzo 2015, p. 177). Accordingly, as soon as the
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CPA came into effect, Beijing initiated “a ‘dual-track’ diplomatic policy, allowing the
establishment of warm ‘quasi-diplomatic’ relations with Juba well before the south’s
independence” (Panozzo 2015, p. 179).
The first official contact between Beijing and SPLM occurred in March 2005, two months after
NCP and SPLM signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. John Garang, leader of southern
Sudan and First Vice-President in the central unity government, delegated Salva Kiir his deputy
to lead an SPLM delegation that included the head of SPLM economic section Akwal Manak,
chairman of the SPLM external relations Niyal Dheng, and SPLM spokesmen Samson Kwaje and
Pagan Amum to visit China. 374 In Beijing, they discussed possible economic cooperation
between Beijing and Juba. Perhaps due to the untimely death of John Garang, the next official
visit by SPLM bureaucrats to China happened two years after the first one. President Hu Jintao,
who was on a state visit to Khartoum in February 2007, met with and invited Salva Kiir to visit
China.375 Five months later, in July 2007, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Qin Gang
announced the arrival in Beijing of Salva Kiir in his capacity as First Vice-President of the
Government of Sudan.376 It turned out to be a watershed moment in Beijing - SPLM relations.
In a subtle but unyielding warning to the Chinese to take relations with SPLM seriously, Salva
Kiir during his meetings with Chinese government officials in Beijing emphasised the
concentration of Sudan’s oil reserves in southern Sudan territory and the high probability of its
secession from northern Sudan. The veiled warning worked because thereafter there was a reorientation in China’s policy regarding the SPLM, leading to more contact and interaction
between the two.377 In the following year, 2008, the special envoy of the Chinese government
and Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun visited Juba and opened China’s first Consulate in
southern Sudan,378 which according to China’s first ambassador in South Sudan, Li Zhiguo,
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played “an important role in strengthening close exchanges and enhancing cooperation.” 379
Thus, as put by Daniel Large, the CPA was “turning enemies into friends” (Large 2011, p. 165).
Despite several official visits between SPLM and Chinese government and CCP officials, Beijing
remained hesitant to fully engage SPLM before the independence of southern Sudan. The
hesitancy continued even after China was given several assurances by SPLM that in terms of
the CPA, Juba “was entitled to establish its own relations with external actors for purposes of
developing economic relations in support of development programs in Southern Sudan”
(Schumann 2010, p. 111). Substantive political relations still remained slow in coming. Instead,
it was private Chinese businesses and state-owned oil companies already in southern Sudan
that took the lead in developing economic and trade relations with Juba. The situation,
however, changed when China recognised the inevitability of a split of the two Sudans as the
referendum date drew closer. In October 2010, less than three months before the January
2011 South Sudan referendum, a Chinese Communist Party delegation visited Juba to gather
more information about South Sudan, but, clearly China was preparing for a new phase of
relations between China and an SPLM-led South Sudan.
In subsequent meetings between the SPLM and China, several Chinese government officials
including Du Yanling, director-general in the International Department of the Communist Party
of China Central Committee, assured the SPLM that China stood “ready to provide help to the
south within its capacity, no matter what changes will be in the situation” (Boswell 2010).
Considering China’s investments in southern oil fields, the future South Sudan government’s
dependence on oil revenue from Chinese operated oil fields, and the latent capacity of China to
use its veto against South Sudan’s independence, SPLM officials were delighted to get China’s
re-assurance just before the referendum. In return for Beijing’s re-assurance, Anne Itto, SPLM’s
deputy secretary-general and South Sudan’s minister of agriculture, promised Beijing that
“southern Sudan will continue to respect China’s interests in the region.”380 According to the
Sudan Tribune, the SPLM secretary-general Pagan Amum also weighed in, saying “the largest
investment in southern Sudan today is Chinese… They have invested billions of dollars in the oil
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sector, and have a large number of Chinese workers in the oil fields... We have given
assurances to the Chinese leadership delegation to protect the Chinese investments in
southern Sudan, and are desirous to see more investment in the future.”381
Notwithstanding the mutual assurances, there was no telling what the populist government of
South Sudan would do if there was public pressure to punish China for supporting Khartoum
regimes during their struggle for independence. Although the CPA guaranteed security of
existing oil contracts, senior SPLM officials and commanders commonly made reference to renegotiation and revocation of contracts held by Chinese companies as punishment for its role
in disenfranchisement of southerners and lack of support for SPLM’s struggle for independence.
One of those senior figures was Anne Itto. In an interview with the Sudan Tribune, she claimed
to have warned the Chinese government that “if they want to protect their assets, the only way
is to develop a very strong relationship with the government of Southern Sudan, respect the
outcome of the referendum, and then we will be doing business.” She then added: “the role of
China [is] to support peace in Sudan, especially to prevail on the NCP not to take the country
back to war again.”382 With the intention of protecting its investments in the South, the Chinese
government intensified engagements with SPLM in the run-up to the referendum, pledging to
respect its choice for self-determination.
What all this meant is that China’s attention to and recognition of the SPLM was necessitated
by an overwhelming need to hedge against risk of losing its oil investments in South Sudan.
Thus as aptly put by Daniel Large, “in engaging the Government of Southern Sudan… Beijing
responded to political imperatives flowing from investment protection concerns produced by
established interests as part of an apparent hedging strategy geared toward the possibility of
Southern secession” (2009, p. 624). In concurrence, Ben Simpfendorfer suggests that in
engaging the SPLM, China reflected “a growing recognition that political regimes can and do
change, and so opening dialogue with opposition movements in conflict with the state is a
pragmatic means of hedging against this risk” (Simpfendorfer 2015, p. 211). Meanwhile, even
though SPLM would have wanted to take revenge against Beijing, it was precluded from doing
so by its overwhelming need for oil revenue from Chinese-operated oil fields to finance the
new state. Hence, “the fact that China already had invested heavily in oil infrastructure made
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China an attractive partner” (Antony and Jiang 2014, p. 80). For that reason, South Sudan found
it imperative to cultivate normal diplomatic relations with China in order not to disrupt the flow
of oil revenue. All things considered, both the SPLM and Beijing’s responses to the political
imperatives occasioned by independence of South Sudan were linked to mutual concerns about
investment projections and hedging against risk rather than political considerations.

7.5 China in independent South Sudan
By the time South Sudan gained independence on 9 July 2011, China had made significant
strides in strengthening bilateral relations. 383 Together with the United States, Britain, and
Russia, it was one of the first major powers to recognise the new country as an independent
sovereign state. To confirm Beijing’s position regarding South Sudan’s statehood, its foreign
minister Yang Jiechi announced China’s official recognition and setting-up of diplomatic
relations with South Sudan at the ambassadorial level on the basis of the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence.384 The Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
between the two countries was signed by Jiang Weixin, China’s minister of housing and urbanrural development, on behalf of the Chinese government; on that same day, the Chinese
embassy in South Sudan was opened.385 To consummate the new diplomatic relations, foreign
minister Yang Jiechi paid his first official visit to independent South Sudan barely a month after
South Sudan’s independence; speaking to the South Sudanese press, he restated China’s
commitment to “step-up friendly exchanges with South Sudan at all levels, particularly at the
high-level, to cement political mutual trust.”386
Beside state-to-state relations, SPLM-CPC party-to-party relations assumed critical importance
in dissipating past antagonistic misgivings and in fostering ‘mutual political trust’ between Juba
and Beijing. Before South Sudan’s independence, party-to-party ties were restricted and took
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place within the confines of the Sudanese government of national unity and in the ambit of the
CPA framework. In essence, China had been restricted from expanding relations with SPLM due
to domestic political tensions between SPLM and NCP, which compelled it to prefer expanding
relations with the NCP.387 Starting from 2005, several SPLM delegations had visited China
initially in their capacity as officials of the government of national unity, and then after
independence as SPLM officials. In 2009, Riek Machar, deputy chairman of SPLM and vicepresident of the government of South Sudan, met Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Standing
Committee of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau, to discuss strengthening of ties
between SPLM and CPC. 388 After independence, the two political parties signed a
memorandum of understanding to strengthen friendship and cooperation, enabling the
Communist Party of China to “receive up to three delegations from SPLM each year to learn
about China’s experiences in various areas.”389
The first SPLM delegation to visit China under the SPLM-CPC memorandum of understanding
left for China in April 2011. Comprising ten SPLM officials on a study tour aimed at
understanding CPC’s experiences in party building, the delegation was led by Antipas Nyok,
SPLM’s Secretary for Political Affairs and Mobilization. In China, the delegation met several
officials of the CPC, including Chao Weidong, deputy-director at the International Department
of the Central Committee of the CPC.390 Six months later, another SPLM delegation led by its
Secretary-General Pagan Amum visited China in October 2011. During their visit, they met with
Wang Jiarui, head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China. At the
meeting, Pagan Amum emphasised the importance his country placed on developing friendly
ties with China, and he reiterated South Sudan’s commitment to promoting “bilateral
pragmatic cooperation in areas such as oil, agriculture, minerals, housing construction,
telecommunications, water conservation and transportation.”391 Speaking of the SPLM-CPC
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relations, Li Changchun, a Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau of the
Communist Party of China, underscored the significance of building and consolidating relations
between SPLM and CPC to suit the new circumstances, that is, the independence of SPLM-led
South Sudan.392
The third SPLM delegation was funded by the CPC to visit China and learn about its financial
management systems. Accordingly, a ten-member delegation comprising ten finance ministers
from ten states of South Sudan as well as high ranking SPLM officials such as Atem Garang, the
party’s chief whip in the National Legislative Assembly, visited China on the study tour.393 The
final SPLM delegation to visit China in 2012 was led by Political Bureau members Mark
Nyipouch and Akol Paul was comprised of fourteen members of the SPLM National Liberation
Council and the SPLM General Secretariat. The ten-day study tour was aimed at learning
various aspects of CPC governance, and the delegates attended lectures at the China Executive
Leadership Academy Pudong met Vice-Minister of the International Department of the CPC Li
Jinjun as well as Director-General of the North Africa Bureau of the International Department
of the CPC Central Committee, Du Yanling. They also visited leading Chinese firms such as
Huawei, Sinohydro and the Export-Import Bank of China.394
Despite the party-to-party and state-to-state exchanges, it was not long before China and
South Sudan’s commitment to cementing mutual political trust was tested. The first major test
was a dispute between Juba and Khartoum over oil transit fees, which quickly escalated into an
interstate armed conflict resulting in South Sudan shutting down oil production, cutting its oil
supplies to Beijing, and effectively jeopardising billions of dollars in Chinese investments.395
Within that context, President Salva Kiir honoured an earlier invitation to visit President Hu
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Jintao in Beijing. 396 In his meeting with President Hu as well as other “Chinese leaders,
including Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Wu Bangguo,
and Vice Premier, member of the Standing Committee of the Political bureau of the CPC
Central Committee Li Keqiang”397 Kiir urged China to rein in Khartoum and assist in resolving
the conflict to ensure continued flow of oil revenue that South Sudan desperately needed.
In addition to seeking China’s intervention in resolving the conflict with Khartoum, President
Kiir conveniently used the Beijing trip to send President Omar al-Bashir a veiled message that
Khartoum no longer had monopoly over relations with Beijing as before – Juba was also getting
closer to Beijing.398 As put by South Sudan’s Information Minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin,
relations between China and the two Sudans were like “a case of a husband with two wives…
[So] there must be some sort of relationship where China can play a positive role, even in this
war” (Raghavan 2012). In response, President Hu confirmed China’s role in taking concrete
action to resolve the conflict. Trying to play into the Khartoum-Juba feud, President Hu stated
that for China, “the top priority is to actively cooperate with the mediation efforts of the
international community and halt armed conflict in the border areas.” 399 On balance, it
appeared President Kiir’s visit to Beijing in the midst of Juba’s interstate armed conflict with
Khartoum reflected a new confidence in South Sudan’s bilateral relations with China and the
strategic importance he placed on China and its ability to resolve conflicts with Sudan, but that
situation was soon tested when South Sudan descended into an intrastate armed conflict of its
own.

7.6 China and the South Sudan intrastate armed conflict
As the Khartoum-Juba intrastate armed conflict subsided, on 15 December 2013 South Sudan
plunged into an intrastate armed conflict of its own pitting the government of South Sudan led
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by President Salva Kiir against forces loyal to the country’s former Vice-President, Riek Machar.
What started as a political power struggle between President Salva Kiir and his deputy Riek
Machar soon took on an ethnic character – dividing the new country’s two largest ethnic
groups – the Dinka and the Nuer – as well as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The
subsequent suspension and arrest of senior SPLM officials400 on charges of an attempted coup
split the SPLM into two main factions and escalated the conflict further. Having escaped arrest
in Juba, Riek Machar declared himself leader of what then became known as the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), and his forces soon took over control
of major parts of Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states.
As the armed conflict gained momentum, the targeting of oil installations in the Unity State and
Upper Nile State dragged China, South Sudan’s major oil investor and leading importer, into the
conflict. At the time of independence, oil revenue had represented 98 percent of South Sudan’s
government revenue, and the majority of which came from Chinese-operated oil fields. With
3.5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves as of 1 January 2014, three times more than Sudan’s oil
reserves, CNPC had a major stake in both Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC), 41
percent share, and 40 percent stake in Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC)
both of which were the major oil companies operating in South Sudan. Sinopec, another
Chinese oil company had a 6 percent stake in DPOC.401 As the conflict raged on, oil fields in
Unity and Upper Nile State were forced to shut down, and the Adar Yale oilfield came under
attack on several occasions. Some of the shutdown was too sudden and done so hurriedly that
machinery was damaged and oil leakages were severe, causing both economic losses and
damage to the environment. Apart from the loss of 45,000 bbl/day of oil produced at fields in
Unity State, “satellite images taken by the U.S. – funded Satellite Sentinel Project show[ed] that
key oil infrastructure was severely damaged, including oil storage tanks and manifolds” (EIA
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2014, p. 11). As a result production dropped by almost 20%,402 a further decline from an
already reduced percentage of South Sudan’s oil to China’s total imports when it split from the
Sudan and when it voluntarily shut down oil production during the interstate armed conflict
with Sudan. The table below shows the effect of the intrastate armed conflict on oil production
in South Sudan.
Figure 7.1: Unplanned oil disruptions in Sudan and South Sudan, 2012-2014

To enhance oil production and also avoid further disruption due to conflicts with Khartoum,
CNPC had reluctantly agreed to partner with the government of South Sudan to construct
refineries at Bentiu, located in Unity State and in “South Sudan’s second planned 10,000bbl/day refinery in the Upper Nile near Blocks 3 and 7,”403 but that too was forced to stop due
to the armed conflict–causing innumerable financial and production loses to the Chinese oil
companies.
Besides oil companies, Chinese private and state-owned construction and telecommunication
companies that were active in South Sudan found their operations threatened by the armed
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conflict as well. Media reports suggested that more than 100 Chinese companies were
operating in South Sudan in sectors related mainly to petroleum, construction, and
communications as of December 2013. Chinese companies with major projects in South Sudan
at the time of the armed conflict included Zhong Hao Overseas, a privately owned construction
firm in Beijing that built water and sanitation facilities, housing for government officials, a
hospital and roads in South Sudan. State-owned Sinohydro Corporation dominated South
Sudan’s engineering and infrastructure sector; it also “provided a water plant in Western
Equatorial, a thirty-seven kilometer road in Malakal and high-way construction linking the
North and the South” (Antony and Jiang 2014, p. 81). China Harbour Engineering Corporation
also won the tender to renovate Juba International Airport, estimated to cost US$1.6 billion.
ZTE set up the Sudan Telecommunication Network through a 200 million Euro loan from China
Exim Bank.404 Although some of these companies had completed their projects at the time of
the intrastate armed conflict, the majority were forced to either suspend operations or scale
down operations.
In what also turned out to be a repeat of the Libyan experience for Chinese workers, several
Chinese companies had to evacuate their workers. For example, China National Petroleum
Corporation “evacuated 97 of its staff in December 2013 because of the conflict.”405 Its main
oilfields located in the Unity State and Upper Nile State regions under the control of Riek
Machar’s rebel fighters were forced to shut down.406 Not wanting to endanger its workers, the
CNPC announced in December 2013 that it was arranging for the orderly evacuation of its
workers from the affected oil fields to Juba, the capital city of South Sudan.407 As put by Luke
Patey, the evacuation of CNPC workers from the Palogue oilfield, South Sudan’s largest oilfield,
led to extensive loses in production, affecting both the South Sudanese government and the

404

Wang, X & Lu, X 2014, ‘Investment in South Sudan: The opportunity and the challenge coexist’,
People’s Daily, April 16, viewed 24 July 2015, http://en.people.cn/102774/8599301.html ; Embassy of
People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Zimbabwe 2011, China announces diplomatic ties with
South Sudan, 9 July, viewed 6 March 2015, http://www.chinaembassy.org.zw/eng/xwdt/t841090.htm
405
‘97 Chinese workers evacuated from South Sudan to Khartoum’ 2013, People Daily, 25 December,
viewed 27 December 2013, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8495532.html
406
‘S. Sudan provides assurances for safety of Chinese oil workers’ 2015, Sudan Tribune, 15 January,
viewed 16 January 2015, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article53658
407
Rose, A & Chen, A 2013, ‘China to evacuate South Sudan oil workers to capital’, Reuters, December 20,
viewed 20 December 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/southsudan-unrest-chinaidUKL3N0JZ24K20131220

179

CNPC because as he puts it “without Chinese and other foreign staff, a limited number of South
Sudanese technicians… struggled to keep production levels high.” 408
Aside from economic implications of the intrastate armed conflict in South Sudan on China’s
interests, the conflict tested President Hu’s commitment to upholding peace and security in
Africa. At the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
China had presented the Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015), underscoring for the first time the
importance of China-Africa cooperation in the fields of peace and security. A specific clause in
the Beijing Action Plan had acknowledged efforts of the Chinese government’s Special
Representative for African Affairs, who actively engaged in mediation efforts in Africa’s
hotspots, and “welcomed his continued constructive role in peace and security endeavors.”409
It is not a coincidence that the commitment was made hardly a year after the Libyan crisis that
resulted in loss of significant Chinese investments. In many respects the commitment to peace
and security in Africa signified a growing recognition in China that intrastate armed conflicts
threatened its economic interests on the continent. The South Sudan intrastate armed conflict
was therefore the first test to China’s commitment to assist in resolving peace and security
issues in Africa.

7.7 Unilateral and multilateral mediation
In comparison with its ambivalent intervention in the Libyan intrastate armed conflict, China’s
intervention in South Sudan was multi-dimensional, assertive, and definite in its character. But
it also set it on collision with its non-intervention principle which precluded it from having
contact with opposition parties in other countries, especially in warring situations. Soon after
the South Sudan armed conflict broke out on 15 December 2013, China’s ambassador to
Ethiopia convened a clandestine meeting at an Addis Ababa hotel with representatives of rebel
forces led by Riek Machar. To support claims that the meeting was supposed to be off-therecord, Zhong Jianhua, China’s special envoy to South Sudan claimed in a CCTV interview on 1
March 2014 that China had not made direct contact with the rebels. He said, “we also sent
messages to the rebels indirectly, telling them we are willing to help achieve peace… I’m now
408
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trying to establish direct contact with the rebels to express our will and help achieve a
ceasefire.”410 An IGAD official privy to that meeting questioned its motive especially considering
the timing, absence of South Sudan government officials, and of course China’s nonintervention principle.411 He then opined that from his assessment China wanted to gather
information and intelligence on the goings on in South Sudan in order to determine its course
of action rather than mediate the conflict. But still that might not have been the reason to only
meet rebel forces in Ethiopia rather than officials of the government of South Sudan; China
wanted to get assurances from Riek Machar that Chinese assets located in oilfields his forces
had captured on the onset of the conflict were going to be secure. In concurrence with that
assessment, the International Crisis Group notes that China circumvented IGAD in order to
protect its oil infrastructure, which was its main priority (2015, p. 19).
The IGAD official was not far from the truth because it was not coincidental that the Addis
Ababa hotel meeting was convened soon after President Kiir publicly admitted losing control of
Unity State and Jonglei amidst claims by Riek Machar that his forces had taken over control of
oil fields in Unity and Upper Nile State.412 The Upper Nile and Unity State oilfields were
strategic to China, the government of Sudan, and Riek Machar rebel forces because as put by
Luke Patey, these fields represented 80% and 20% of oil production, respectively. It is those
considerations that propelled the Chinese ambassador in Ethiopia to convene an urgent
meeting with Riek Machar’s representatives. For Riek Machar, capturing those oilfields, and
announcing that he was going to divert oil revenue from Juba and deal directly with Sudan in
implementing the cooperation agreements413 which China helped broker between Juba and
Khartoum in 2012, increased his bargaining leverage, weakened President Salva Kiir’s
government by cutting its main source of revenue, and attracted the attention of the Chinese
government.414 A report published by the International Crisis Group alleges that because of the
strategic importance of Unity State and Upper Nile State oil fields to China and Khartoum,
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“their security was the subject of an independent agreement between Sudan, China and the
SPLM/A-IO” (International Crisis Group 2015, p. 11). If this is true, then by its own definition,
China intervened in South Sudan’s war by entering into an agreement with a rebel force for
protection of its oil fields there.
In less than two weeks of the intrastate armed conflict, China announced the arrival of its
official special envoy in South Sudan. Zhong Jianhua, a diplomat considered to have extensive
knowledge of Sudan and South Sudan was appointed China’s special envoy to South Sudan. In a
statement, foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said “on behalf of the Chinese
government, special envoy Zhong Jianhua is currently visiting South Sudan and neighboring
countries, and actively carrying out mediation efforts. China is willing to continuously enhance
communication and coordination with all the relevant parties and jointly push for restoration
of stability in South Sudan.”415 After wide consultations with parties to the conflict and other
relevant stakeholders such as the Khartoum government, Zhong Jianhua, China’s Special
Representative on African Affairs, participated in talks held in January 2014. As a result of the
negotiations, a ceasefire agreement between South Sudan’s warring parties was signed. In fact,
Harry Verhoeven maintains that “Chinese diplomats took unprecedented steps in publicly
pressuring belligerents Salva Kiir and his former vice president, Riek Machar, to sign a ceasefire
agreement” (2014, p. 64). Thrilled by the role Beijing had played in brokering the ceasefire
agreement, Zhong Jianhua confirmed the role Chinese diplomats from embassies in Ethiopia
and South Sudan had played in early attempts toward ceasefire monitoring. He then proudly
acknowledged the emerging engagement of China in peace and security initiatives in Africa,
admitting that though it was a new experience for China, it was indeed “a new chapter for
Chinese foreign affairs,”416 seemingly implying that starting with South Sudan, China was ready
to take on the challenge of actively resolving African conflicts.
No sooner than the ink was dry on the ceasefire agreement, fighting resumed. Riding on its
ceasefire-brokering experience, China offered to continue mediating between the warring
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parties, risking a further departure from its non-interference principle.417 But this time, partly in
response to queries that China was departing from its non-intervention tradition due to its
engagement with rebel forces in South Sudan, Beijing creatively fitted its South Sudan
mediation within its foreign policy objective of sustaining its economic development and
protecting overseas citizens and national interests from external threats, of which the
intrastate armed conflict in South Sudan was one. The explanation was sufficient to silence
dissenting voices in China assured Chinese citizens worried that the Libyan experience was
going to be repeated in South Sudan, and most importantly, pre-empted concerns in Africa that
China was moving toward unilateral intervention in African countries’ internal affairs.
Nevertheless, in pursuit of the above national core objectives, Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited
Addis Ababa where the fighting parties were holding peace negotiations, and urged both
parties to cease fighting and resolve the conflict amicably. BBC reported that he even offered
to mediate personally between the warring sides.418
The swiftness with which China’s ambassador to Ethiopia organized the meeting with Riek
Machar’s representatives; and with which Beijing dispatched its special envoy to Juba suggests
a rising concern in Beijing that “challenges confronting peace and security in Africa are
increasing”419 and that the increase in conflict and insecurity was detrimental to its economic
interests. Given that China now considered the emerging intrastate armed conflict in South
Sudan as threatening its economic interests in that country, it was increasingly prepared to
take rapid and decisive intervention even though the action would violate its own nonintervention principle. Secondly, the sending of a special Chinese envoy to South Sudan
reflected a new perception within China’s foreign policy elites that it was imperative to engage
all parties in a conflict, whether government or opposition, in order to mitigate losses. This
meant even engaging opposition forces first, particularly in cases where they controlled areas
with strategic Chinese assets and investments. In many respects this policy implied a
substantial shift in how China perceived intrastate armed conflicts in African countries – from a
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perception that they were non-threatening, as was the case in early stages of the Libyan armed
conflict, to a perception that they threatened its core national interests in foreign countries,
thus requiring assertive intervention.

7.8 China as the ‘go-between’
Leaving nothing to chance, China convened several meetings with parties to the South Sudan
conflict. In July 2014, South Sudan’s Vice-President and Deputy Chairman of SPLM, James Wani
Igga, requested a meeting with China’s foreign minister Wang Yi in Beijing. From their
discussions at that meeting, it emerged that the South Sudanese vice-president intended on
giving assurances to Beijing that “the government of South Sudan will do its utmost to ensure
the safety of the Chinese personnel and agencies in the country” – a concern which foreign
minister Wang Yi had also raised in their meeting. In response, Foreign Minister Wang Yi
expressed China’s willingness to continue playing a positive role in resolving the conflict in
South Sudan.420 Following on to that meeting, foreign minister Wang Yi met members of the
SPLM-IO in Beijing in September 2014, before meeting South Sudan government
representatives in Khartoum.
In January 2015, China, working with IGAD, facilitated a meeting of foreign ministers and
representatives of the warring parties in Khartoum. Although the meeting was held under the
‘Special Consultation in Support of South Sudan Peace Process’ led by IGAD, and was attended
by foreign ministers of China, Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as representatives of
Riek Machar, China was praised for facilitating the meeting. South Sudan’s foreign minister
Barnaba Benjamin said: “we welcome the Chinese role which we believe is constructive and
seeks to resolve the conflict in South Sudan. We hope these consultations, under China's
patronage, would put the IGAD-led negotiations on the right track.”421 His counterpart, the
chief negotiator of the rebels, Seyoum Mesfin, said that “we have no objection toward what
China is doing and we believe the Chinese role is in the interest of the initiative of the IGAD
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which is patronizing the negotiations between the two conflicting parties in South Sudan.”422
The same sentiments were echoed by Sudan’s foreign minister Ali Karti, who pointed out that
“China, as a permanent member state in the UN Security Council, is working seriously and
sincerely to end the conflict in South Sudan. It is acting on the base of its international
responsibility and not to achieve any other purposes.”423
A common feature in China’s mediation efforts and bilateral talks with South Sudan’s
government officials and rebel forces was a persistent demand that they guarantee protection
of Chinese assets and economic investments, and ensure security of Chinese nationals in South
Sudan. For instance, following reports of rebel attacks on oil facilities, the South Sudanese
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) announced on 16 January 2015 that “oil fields have never been
under control of anybody. They have been under full control of the SPLA and the general
command assured the oil companies in Adar and Faluj that their protection is 100%.”424 That
announcement was a response to pressure from China, which requested assurances at a
meeting held in Khartoum between China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi and his South
Sudan counterpart, Barnaba Mariel Benjamin, that South Sudan was committed to protecting
Chinese oil workers and assets. According to the South Sudanese Minister of Information,
Michael Makuei Leuth, the meeting was initiated by China and was attended by members of
the opposition faction led by former president Riek Machar. After the meeting, Barnaba Mariel
Benjamin told the media that “I think it is a very, very important thing – that they (the Chinese)
wanted the assurance that these institutions are properly protected and not to be destroyed in
any form.”425 This statement corroborates an AU diplomat’s suspicions that this ‘supposedly
IGAD-led’ meeting was a parallel meeting organized and designed by China to protect its oil
investments in South Sudan.426
The assurances were a confirmation of earlier commitments made in a telephone conversation
on 14 April 2014 when the Foreign Minister of South Sudan, Barnaba Marial Benjamin, and
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China’s Minister of Commerce, Gao Hucheng stated that Chinese enterprises were still
operating in South Sudan and that the “government of South Sudan could take forceful
measures to protect the safety of lives and properties of Chinese people and enterprises, and
render more facilitation and guarantee for business production and operation, material
transportation and personnel entry and exit.”427 The use of language that seemed to imply a
command to South Sudan’s government to ‘take forceful measures to protect’ Chinese citizens
and property in South Sudan suggests a more assertive China confident in its ability to pressure
the Juba government into protecting its economic interests.
As noted by Luke Patey, the author of The New Kings of Crude: China, India and the Global
Struggle for Oil in Sudan and South Sudan, “China’s concern regarding South Sudan is not
energy per se but rather a corporate investment from a major Chinese national oil company in
jeopardy.”428 Luke Patey’s argument is supported by Zhong Jianhua, who reiterated several
times in an interview with CCTV that both the South Sudanese government and the rebels
should “ensure the safety of Chinese citizens and firms,” adding that “we [China] told them to
try to avoid damaging the property of Chinese firms, and ensure the safety of Chinese citizens
under any circumstances.”429 Foreign Minister Wang Yi had refuted that notion, arguing that
“China's mediation of South Sudan issues is completely the responsibility and duty of a
responsible power, and not because of China's own interests.”430 While that might have been
part of the reason, the major one was, as he had admitted earlier, that “war and conflicts hurt
the oil industry…, an area in which China, Sudan and South Sudan have worked closely
together.”431 He had then argued that the mediation was not meant for China to benefit alone it was a mutually beneficial intervention aimed at getting a win-win solution to the conflict. It
was therefore apparent that China’s efforts toward direct mediation in the South Sudan civil
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war “runs parallel with its interest in ensuring billions of oil investments in South Sudan stay
out of harm’s way.”432 This policy was confirmed by Ma Qiang, the Chinese ambassador to
South Sudan, who told Reuters that “we have huge interests in South Sudan so we have to
make a greater effort to persuade the two sides to stop fighting and agree to a ceasefire.”433
To force the belligerents in South Sudan to cease fire, and in a marked departure from its
‘business is business, no politics involved’ precept that it had used to defend selling weapons to
Khartoum, in its war against the SPLM before South Sudan’s independence, China took a more
assertive but firm position. It halted the sale of US$38 million worth of arms to the South Sudan
government by its state-owned arms manufacturer China North Industries Group Corporation
(NORINCO). According to Lan Kun, an attaché at the Chinese embassy in Juba, the Chinese
government decided it was not appropriate to deliver the consignment of weapons to South
Sudan, therefore “No more weapons are heading to South Sudan… There are some media
reports that were alleging that the Chinese government was behind this business operation
and wants to undermine this peace process. That is totally untrue.”434 The Chief of the Political
Section in the Embassy of China in South Sudan reiterated that since the beginning of the
armed conflict, the Chinese government ordered all relevant Chinese companies to halt
weapons trade with South Sudan (Gridneff 2014). The South China Morning Post described
China’s embargo on sale of weapons to Juba by Chinese companies as indicative of a swap of
“its reserved diplomacy for a hands-on approach to help resolve a… rebellion in South Sudan
that threatens Beijing’s oil investments.”435

7.9 Multilateral intervention – leveraging on IGAD
To legitimize its bilateral engagements and mediation efforts, China leveraged its participation
in the IGAD mediation processes. Chinese Ambassador to the African Union Xie Xiaoyan worked
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with the U.S., Norwegian, and U.K. diplomats within the IGAD plus framework to resolve the
conflict. As reported in the South China Morning Post in June 2014, “the permanent Chinese
presence at the Addis Ababa talks and their frequent lobby chats and closed-door consultations
with diplomats from the United States, Britain and Norway – the main Western backers of
newly independent South Sudan – show China’s more proactive approach.”436 The coming in of
China to renewed IGAD-PLUS437 mediation talks following breach of the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement between Salva Kiir forces and Riek Machar’s “will provide as well the much-needed
role of China as it has strategic economic interest in South Sudan” (Deng 2015).
According to an official at IGAD, China has been actively involved in the mediation process in
South Sudan in different capacities and to a varying extent, but not always to the satisfaction of
other IGAD-PLUS members, that is, the United States, Norway and Britain. A Norwegian
diplomat in Addis Ababa who had extensively participated in the IGAD meetings on South
Sudan dismissed China’s presence in IGAD as a nuisance, arguing that it never meaningfully
contributed to the peace deliberations. He suspected China only came to the meetings to
gather information and keep abreast with latest developments in South Sudan’s conflict. The
same remarks were recounted by several IGAD officials and diplomats from Uganda. For
instance, in an interview, an IGAD high ranking official complained that although China was
heavily involved in the mediation process and peace monitoring mechanism, and had seconded
some Chinese officials to be part of the peace monitoring mechanism, it provided funds off the
record to rebels to protect their investments. Her argument was that China was in IGAD simply
to protect its oil investments. However, she quickly added that Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and
Uganda also had interests in South Sudan. Nevertheless, as admitted by Zhong Jianhua,
mediation of African intrastate armed conflicts in multilateral frameworks was still a new
experience for China, and therefore it often could not balance its interests with the common
objective of bringing peace to South Sudan.
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7.10 Multilateral intervention –UN Peacekeeping as a platform
To complement its mediation and bilateral engagements with South Sudan belligerents, China
used its position in the United Nations Security Council to leverage its influence on multilateral
interventions. Previously, China had sent engineers, doctors and other non-combat personnel
as part of the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS), and the UN Mission in
South Sudan (UNMISS) as from 9 July 2011. But an announcement that China had agreed to
send battalion troops under the auspices of the U.N. was probably the most significant
intervention made by China in South Sudan’s civil war. The PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Wang Yi, reported at the High-Level Meeting on U.N. Peacekeeping that:
“China will send a 700-strong infantry battalion to the UN Mission in South Sudan
(UNMISS). This will be the first Chinese infantry battalion to participate in a
peacekeeping mission. China is considering sending helicopters to the UN
Peacekeeping Operation. This would be the first-ever involvement of Chinese airmen in
a peacekeeping mission. China is ready to send more civilian policemen, including
forensic experts and criminal detectives, to peacekeeping operations. China will
continue to support, to the extent of its ability, efforts to strengthen peacekeeping
capacity building of African countries, including the establishment of African Capacity
for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC).”438
According to the PRC Defence Commander Wang Zhen, the battalion deployed to South Sudan
in 2014 was “equipped with drones, armored infantry carriers, antitank missiles, mortars, light
self-defense weapons, bulletproof uniforms and helmets, among other weapons.”439 Several
media reports suggested that the deployment was meant to protect Chinese oil workers and
facilities in South Sudan. This was probably true because the UN Security Council Resolution
extended the mandate of UNMISS to include protecting and deterring violence against civilians,
including foreign national and oil installations. However, as reported in The Wall Street Journal,
Chinese troops under the UNMISS peacekeeping “are now concentrated not in oil rich states,
but in Wau of Western Bahr el Gazel state” (Zhou 2014). Notwithstanding this fact, threats to
its economic interests and citizens in South Sudan was a dominant motivation for China’s
deployment of the combat troops under the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission.
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7.11 Conclusion
The case of South Sudan suggests that China’s foreign policy strategy, non-interference
principle, and perception of African intrastate armed conflicts as threatening to its national
interests is evolving. In addition, its ability to transform hostile relations with South Sudan
during the struggle for its independence since 1955 into friendly or at least workable relations
in 2005 and its intervention in South Sudan’s intrastate armed conflict reflects two essential
points regarding the non-intervention principle: Foremost, the non-intervention principle is
designed to protect China from foreigners meddling in its internal affairs; and secondly, it is
meant to enable China to gain competitive advantage against rival powers440 and woo potential
partners, particularly in the developing world. China’s relations with South Sudan reflect the
efficacy of that strategy when it is applied with pragmatism. As stated earlier, China’s
intervention behaviour in South Sudan was guided by “a distilled pragmatism that serves the
country’s direct interests.”441 Together with the mutual benefit and win-win rhetoric, the noninterference principle, in the case of South Sudan was a “little more than a camouflage
concealing China’s private interests and the pursuit of profoundly different goals.”442 In this
context, it would be simplistic to talk of China’s foreign policy being guided by the principle of
non-interference, when in effect, “it has never remained a passive on-looker when its interests
are at stake;”443 furthermore as noted by Ma Qiang, the Chinese Ambassador to South Sudan,
in an Al Jazeera interview in June 2014, “non-interference does not mean standing by when
people of a country are facing disaster.”444 For that reason, the question that should preoccupy scholars is not whether China interferes in the domestic affairs of African states or not,
but when it does and what forms interference takes and with what consequences. This is a
critical departure from the current dominant discourse on China’s non-interference principle
vis-a-vis its external behaviour in Africa.
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Earlier on, it was argued that China takes a pragmatic approach to protecting its national
interests abroad. It was suggested that the approach is wrapped-up in abstract and ambiguous
statements of policy that are aimed at enhancing its foreign behavior maneuverability and
“ability to maintain the policy of noninterference which facilitated business with various
countries.”445 By seeking to maintain its cordial relations with developing countries such as
South Sudan that are riddled with political instability while at the same time safeguarding its
national interests (Chinese national and companies operating in those countries), China’s
intervention is camouflaged in the non-interference rhetoric, which allows it to intervene in the
internal armed conflict in South Sudan in a non-threatening manner. It should be noted that
SPLM has in the past been suspicious of China and Chinese oil companies whom they regarded
as accomplices of the Khartoum government; for instance, in February 2012, South Sudan
deported an official of CNPC for failing to abide by its regulations. China thus had to tread
carefully.
Undeniably, as security threats faced by Chinese companies and nationals working in politically
volatile countries became grave, China is being compelled to devise more strategies of
protecting its foreign interests. That does not mean that China’s non-interference principle is
evolving; rather, it suggests that it is becoming more useful in securing China’s direct interests
vis-a-vis the contemporary risks threatening China’s national interests. As noted by Zhong
Jianhua, there has been “no change of policy as Beijing had now realised that tackling conflicts
had become necessary for advancing Beijing’s historical policy of promoting African
development.”446 In employing the non-interference principle as a tool for securing its interests
abroad, the actual security strategies of intervention are the ones that are evolving. Compared
to the security strategies of Africa’s traditional partners such as the United States of America
and the European Union, China’s strategies are still “comparatively far less developed.”447
Furthermore, the extent of China’s engagement in peace and security in Africa is still unclear.448
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Consequently, there is need to “examine the challenges that both policies face, in terms of the
need to adjust to the ever-changing national, continental and global environments”449 and to
explore the motivations and objectives for China’s non-interference principle in Africa.
Responding to questions raised by readers of the China Daily newspaper, Li Shaye, DirectorGeneral of African Affairs in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 27 February 2013
admitted that “with the expanding cooperation between China and Africa, China's interests in
Africa are growing bigger and bigger, so political unrest in Africa will be affecting China to a
much bigger extent.”450 The cumulative effect is that despite a strong official adherence to nonintervention, China’s stance on intervention in foreign countries is undergoing a process of
softening (Kassim 2014, p. 35). A major responsibility of a great power is, according to Yan
Xuetong, the ability to protect its national interests and citizens in foreign countries. The
conflict that China was confronted with in Libya was the mounting need to protect its foreign
interests and nationals with its emphasis on adherence to the principle of non-intervention in
the Libyan conflict. But because protecting one’s interests and citizens in another country
entails intervening in the affairs of that country, there was a dilemma in China’s “direct
involvement in, and responses to, international crises, conflicts and their resolutions” (Kassim
2014, p. 32). Hence, as China recalibrates its perception of threats emanating from intrastate
armed conflicts in its African partners, it is also rethinking how it should best respond to crises
in those countries.

449

Kambudzi, AM 2013, ‘Africa and China’s non-interference policy: Towards peace enhancement in
Africa’, in MG Berhe and H Liu (eds.), China-Africa Relations: Governance, Peace and Security, Institute
for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa, p.29.
450
‘Lu talks with readers of China Daily website’ 2013, China Daily, 27 February, viewed 21 October 2013,
http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t1017775.htm

192

CHAPTER 8 - Conclusion: Trends and patterns of China’s
intervention in Africa
8.1 Introduction
This chapter assesses trends and patterns of China’s intervention behaviour in African
intrastate armed conflicts. The assessment is based on this thesis’ discussion of the historical
evolvement of China’s intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts as its relative economic
power, and perception of threats to its interests abroad changed over time. The conclusion
made in Chapter 4 is that the general trajectory of China’s intervention behaviour can be
explained by its position in the international system, measured by its relative economic power.
This is because as China’s relative economic power increased, it expanded its economic
interests and political influence abroad; and when it decreased from the middle of the Ming
dynasty to the end of the Century of Humiliation, and during the Cultural Revolution and Great
Leap Forward, its overseas interests in Africa also decreased due to the inability to maintain
and protect them. While that is useful for explaining China’s intervention in African intrastate
armed conflicts, increase or decrease of relative economic power does not in itself copiously
explain specific variations in China’s intervention behaviour. This is because as postulated by
neoclassical realism, and as explained in Chapter 3, specific variations in a state’s foreign policy
can only be explained when systemic factors such as the increase in a state’s relative economic
power are translated through domestic level variables.
Following onto that conclusion, Chapters 5 to 7 examined China’s specific interventions in
intrastate armed conflicts that started between 2011 and 2013 in Libya (2011), Mali (2012), and
South Sudan (2013) – in particular, the three chapters explored how changes in China’s
perception of intrastate armed conflicts as being threats to its interests there shaped its
intervention behaviour. In the three chapters, the discussion of China’s intervention in each of
the three countries’ armed conflicts began with a historical analysis of their political, economic
and diplomatic relations with China since their respective independence. Having established
those basic fundamentals of their bilateral relations with China, the thesis then examined the
impact of the intrastate armed conflicts that ensued in the three countries on China’s economic
interests there. The general findings, which are discussed in detail below, are that China’s main
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motivating factor in intervening in the three countries’ internal conflicts is to protect its
nationals and economic interests, which were affected by intrastate armed conflicts in the
three countries. In all three cases, China’s intervention was more pronounced when the
intrastate armed conflicts threatened its interests suggesting that the perception of intrastate
armed conflicts as being a threat to its foreign interests was the domestic level factor that
influenced its intervention behaviour.
Based on conclusions made in Chapters 4 to 7, the overall argument advanced in this thesis has
been that China’s intervention behaviour in African intrastate armed conflicts is a result of the
combined effect of an increase in its relative economic power, which compelled it to expand its
interests into politically volatile countries in search for raw materials and markets to keep the
engine of its economy on the trot, and changing perception that intrastate armed conflicts in
Africa were a threat to its interests there. On the basis of this argument, this chapter assesses
the trends and patterns of China’s intervention in Africa drawing extensively from arguments
made in the previous chapters, and the more than twelve interviews conducted with Chinese
and African diplomats, political leaders and scholars. It then discusses how China’s intervention
behaviour in African intrastate armed conflicts challenges existing conventional understandings
of intervention as a foreign policy tool used by Western great powers to safeguard their
strategic interests abroad. It then concludes by making a case for an innovative (re-)definition
of intervention in other states’ internal affairs that enables an analytical assessment of the
emerging intervention practices of non-Western rising global powers.

8.2 Emerging trends and patterns
8.2.1 Interpretation and implication of the non-intervention principle
increasingly becoming flexible
The first trend is that China’s interpretation of the non-intervention principle is becoming more
flexible and that flexibility is intricately dependent on its relative economic position in the
international system. The effect is that China now interprets the non-intervention principle
broadly and flexibly when its relative economic power is on the increase than when it is in
decline. This is so because China expands its economic interests abroad when its relative
economic power is higher, which exposes those overseas interests to threats. This point was
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made in previous chapters where it was argued that due to the lateral pressure, as China’s
domestic economic grew exponentially, its relative economic power increased, enabling it to
expand its economic interests abroad, including to some volatile countries such as South Sudan,
Mali and Libya. As armed conflicts broke out in those countries China found itself entangled in
their internal conflicts, compelling it to devise strategies to intervene and protect its interests.
China’s foreign affairs minister, Wang Yi, made a similar observation on 9 March 2016 when he
said, “like any major country that is growing, China’s overseas interests are expanding… So it
has become a pressing task for China's diplomacy to better protect our ever-growing overseas
interests.”451 In seeking to protect those interests, which involves intervention, China has
shown from the case of Libya, Mali and South Sudan that it is “willing to be more flexible on the
questions of both host countries’ consent and non-interference in other countries’ internal
affairs” (Mariani 2015, p. 258).
While it is apparent that rising powers with expanding global interests will inevitably be
compelled to protect those interests, and in the process intervene in other states’ internal
affairs, China is an exceptional rising power. The official Beijing policy is that China does not
interfere in the internal affairs of other states. This creates a puzzle because protecting its
economic interests or nationals abroad will invariably involve a degree of intervention in the
internal affairs of the concerned state. Balancing those contradictory objectives is what has
resulted in a mismatch between Beijing’s foreign policy in theory and its foreign policy in
practice. On the one hand, China claims that the non-intervention principle forms the
cornerstone of its foreign policy, and is unchangeable, but as discussed in previous chapters,
China is nevertheless intervening in conflicts that threaten its interests. The resultant effect is
that there seem to be a concerted effort by Beijing to flexibly interpret the non-intervention
principle in a manner that justifies its intervention behaviour in Africa, in order to maintain its
‘identity’ as a non-interventionary power, distinct from Western powers.
What enables the vacillation of the interpretation of the non-intervention principle by China
from strict and rigid to flexible is foremost the manner in which the principle is formulated and
articulated by the People’s Republic of China. Like most Chinese foreign policy principles, the
principle of non-intervention is more of a maxim than something clearly expounded and
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articulated principle, hence there is no clarity on whether it is just a principle or a policy. The
pervasiveness of the lack of clarity is such that Chinese foreign policy scholars refer to it as
either a principle or a foreign policy, with some using the two terms interchangeably. This may
seem inconsequential, but it has had a fundamental effect on the analysis of China’s external
intervention behaviour because principles are different from policies.
Sonia Lucarelli defines principles as “normative propositions that translate values into general
‘constitutional’ standards for policy action” (2014, p. 10). On the contrary, policy consists of the
“development and conscious pursuit of some preferred goal or goals” by a government through
selective political action.452 The action may “include observable behaviors by countries…, or
verbal pronouncements that do not necessarily lead to follow-up action” (Kaarbo et al. 2002:4).
The most notable distinction between principle and policy was given by United Kingdom’s
former Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain when he said:
“You can lay down sound and general propositions. You can say that your foreign policy
is to maintain peace…; you can say that it is to use your influence, such as it is, on
behalf of the right against wrong… you can lay down all these general principles, but
that is not policy. Surely, if you have a policy you must take the particular situations
and consider what action or inaction is suitable for those particular situations. That is
what I myself mean by policy, and it is quite clear that as the situations and conditions
in foreign affairs continually change from day to day, your policy cannot be stated once
and for all, it is to be applicable to every situation that arises” (Chamberlain 1937, p.
33).
As put by Chamberlain, there is a clear distinction between principles constituting the
normative superstructure that guide statesmen in the exercise of foreign policy, and foreign
policy which is political action that though related to is not determined by such normative
superstructures.
The implication is that in its current formulation, the Chinese government puts across nonintervention as both a foreign policy that can evolve based on particular situations, and also as
a principle that applies to all situations alike, and is unchangeable. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China collectively describes the Five Principles of Peaceful
Co-existence as “the basic norms in developing state to state relations transcending social
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systems and ideology.”453 At the 60th Anniversary of the initiation of the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence, President Xi Jinping said “In the new era today, the spirit of the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, instead of being outdated, remains as relevant as ever; its
significance, rather than diminishing, remains as important as ever; and its role, rather than
being weakened, has continued to grow.” He then reiterated the official People’s Republic of
China’s rhetoric that “China neither interferes in other countries' internal affairs nor imposes its
will on others” – declaring that the Five Principles are enshrined in China’s Constitution and are
the cornerstone of its foreign policy.454 However, in contradiction to the supposed sanctity and
unchangeable nature of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, he declared that “all good
principles should adapt to changing times to remain relevant.” 455 Yet, as put by Neville
Chamberlain, principles do not change, policies do. So while articulating it as a principle,
Chinese leaders in actual effect take the non-intervention principle as a foreign policy that is
adaptable to changing times – giving China subtle maneuverability in its implementation.
The maneuverability is reflected in arguments made by Chinese government officials in
supporting their country’s intervention or non-intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts.
In the case of South Sudan where China, contrary to its policy of not meeting opposition groups
or rebel forces in foreign countries, met Riek Machar, the leader of a rebel force fighting
against the South Sudanese government, Zhong Jianhua said: “I think for the past two or three
decades we were quite rigid about non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries…
When you talk to a rebel force that means stepping into internal affairs” (Fabricius 2014).
However, when a journalist referred to that as a change of policy, Zhong Jianhua’s aide
“pointed out that there had been no change in policy as Beijing had now simply realized that
tackling conflicts had become necessary for advancing Beijing’s historical policy of promoting
African development” (Fabricius 2014). In that case, one would wonder whether China’s
newfound interest in tackling conflicts in Africa does not mean a change in policy that once
precluded it from intervening in other states’ internal affairs.
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Regarding the intrastate armed conflict in Libya, China’s Ambassador to the United Nations Li
Baodong said: “China always opposes the use of force in international relations. During Security
Council consultations on Resolution 1973, China and some other Council members raised some
specific issue. Regrettably, however, there is no clarification or answer to many of these issues.
China has serious concerns over some elements of the resolution.” 456 Still, despite ‘no
clarification’ on the specific issues that China had raised, it still cast a vote of abstention on
UNSC Resolution 1973 approving a ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya and authorizing ‘all necessary
measures to protect civilians despite it being against its non-intervention principle. China’s
argument was that it was merely following the wishes of the African Union and the Arab league
and that it was compelled by ‘special circumstances in Libya.’ However, when the Arab League
supported a UN Security Council that sought to approve intervention in Syria, China vetoed it.
“What this means is that China allows itself the greatest room to maneuver, free to endorse or
oppose the actions of a regional grouping, depending on its interests” (Ching 2012).
In South Sudan and Mali, for the first time in its history, and in a radical shift to its policy
against having the People’s Liberation Army troops operating in foreign lands, China sent
combat troops under the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission instead of the usual nonmilitary personnel. Retired Major General Xu Guangyu was at pains to explain that the dispatch
of these forces was not a shift in Beijing’s non-intervention principle. He was quoted in the
South China Morning Post as saying “China's combat troops will abide by the UN's
peacekeeping regulations. Soldiers are allowed to open fire only for self-defence purposes, and
never take positions to help either party during a civil war.”457
Overall, the formulation of China’s principle of non-intervention is such that its interpretation
can be manipulated depending on China’s position in the international system – enabling
“China to semantically update its critique of the existing international order to resonate with
evolving conceptions of the system” (Richardson 2012, p. 47). When it seeks to gain access into
Africa, identify with the developing world, or constrain intervention into its own internal affairs
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by other states, it extols the non-intervention principle, but when it best suits its interests, it
flexibly interprets the principle, enabling it to justify its intervention in other states’ internal
affairs. Thus, as argued by Frank Ching “China's principle of non-interference in another
country's internal affairs is alive and well, subject to its own interpretation of whether a
regional grouping's decision regarding a member country is in China's interests” (2012).

8.2.2 As China’s relative economic power increases, its external intervention is
increasing
Another major finding of this study is that generally, China’s intervention in foreign intrastate
armed conflicts is historically first determined by its relative economic power – because as
postulated by the lateral pressure theory, it expands its interests abroad in times when its
relative economic power is on the increase as it searches for new markets and resources. The
consequential pattern is that China tends to intervene in foreign intrastate armed conflicts
when its relative economic power is higher, and vice versa. This pattern has been persistent
since imperial China. In its heyday as the Middle Kingdom, superior in its technological
advancement and economy, which contributed approximately 35% of the global economy,
China was the centre of its own ‘global’ tributary order. With such a grander relative economic
power, Chinese emperors had the latent right of intervention in the internal affairs of other
nations. Although the right to intervene was rarely exercised, the awareness of the right and a
tendency to intervene when circumstances demanded it was notable.
When the relative economic power decreased, as other states developed at a faster pace than
China, the latent right to intervene in the internal affairs of surrounding nations was lost.
Instead, in times of inferior relative economic power it was China that became subject to
external intervention in its internal affairs. This was the case during the century of humiliation
when China was relegated to the peripheries of the global pecking order of states. Combined
with the effects of being forcibly incorporated into the European-dominated Westphalian
international system of states where relative economic and military capabilities mattered more
than cultural supremacy, China lost its claim to the ‘Heavenly Mandate’ and to being the
Middle Kingdom at the core of its own global order, and with it, the latent right of intervention
in other states’ internal affairs. Thus, the cyclic pattern: “when Chinese power prevailed, the
empire was able to force its tribute system and its language of diplomatic discourse on
surrounding peoples. When the empire was weak, the Chinese perception of the world had
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little effect on the course of events. The ultimate fact is the fact of power” (Schwartz 1968, p.
278).
Benjamin I. Schwartz’s observation that the ultimate fact in China’s foreign policy behaviour is
relative power resonates with the trajectory of its external intervention behaviour in intrastate
armed conflicts in Africa. Thus, in order to understand how China interprets its nonintervention principle, there is need to “review and compare several lists of historical
intervention events to capture the phenomenon over time and to become aware of the
variation in the way intervention is construed” (Feste 2003, p. 178). The descriptive historical
analysis of China’s intervention in foreign conflicts discussed in Chapter 4 suggested that
China’s intervention in other nations’ internal affairs has always been commensurate with its
relative economic power. This is because a state’s interest in foreign affairs, particularly the
internal affairs of other states, rises commensurately with growth in its global power.
From the imperial times of the Ming and Qing Dynasty, when China was at the centre of its
global system, “it maintained order in the system and reserved the right to intervene in the
internal affairs of its vassals” (Wang 2011, p. 145; see also Cohen 1973, p. 474). At the prime of
its imperial power, and as the paramount leader of the tributary states, China possessed a
latent right of intervention in their internal affairs, but that went only so far as its relative
economic power enabled. The ‘Century of Humiliation’ was different – China was riddled by
political instability and poverty. From being the most powerful nation in its known world, China
found itself among the peripheral states in the European-dominated Westphalian international
system – “out of step with its long former history as Asia’s premier power and a major global
trader” (Hough and Malik 2015, p. 362). Instead of being the one intervening in the affairs of
other nations, it was the one being subjected to intervention by other states such as Japan, the
Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, France, Portugal and the Netherlands. United States
overt military intervention in China only stopped at the end of the Chinese civil war and
establishment of the communist regime in 1949 (Feste 2003, p. 180).
As discussed in Chapter 4, by the time Mao established the People’s Republic of China in 1949,
China’s understanding of intervention was one of national humiliation, oppression and
exploitation by powerful Western states that played active roles in its internal affairs. To
protect itself from hegemonic global powers that sought to intervene in its internal affairs, Mao
espoused the principles of state sovereignty, equality among states and respect for other states’
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territorial integrity. Non-intervention became the dominant principle upon which China’s
foreign policy was based. But as put by Peter Hough and Shahin Malik, what remained an
overriding logic in Chinese collective mentality is that the century of humiliation was a result of
China “falling behind the Europeans, Americans and Japanese economically in the nineteenth
century when those nations industrialised” (2015, p. 362).
Emerging from the ‘almost-zero’ per capita GDP growth China had from 1800-1950 (Zhu 2012,
p. 103). China’s understanding and experience of external intervention was as a victim of
foreign subjugation. But under Mao, there was limited economic recovery in the highly
unstable years of the mid-1950s and early 1960s. Xiaodong Zhu, a Professor of Economics at
the University of Toronto suggests that from 1950 to 1978 “the average growth rate of real per
capita GDP was a modest 3 percent a year, not much different from the growth rate in the
United States though starting from a much lower base” (2012, p. 106). Consequently, China’s
relative economic power improved albeit not to levels comparable with the economies of the
United States, European states, or the Soviet Union. But compared to countries in the
developing world, especially Africa, China’s relative economic power increased to levels that
enabled it to expand its interests abroad, and exercise influence over them.
While it emphasized the Westphalian principles of respect for state sovereignty and nonintervention in internal affairs of other states mainly to protect itself from external intervention
in its domestic affairs by superior global powers, China did intervene in intrastate armed
conflicts for independence in Africa. Beyond supporting liberation movements, it also
supported dissident armed groups fighting Soviet-aligned governments in independent African
countries. That resulted in the suspension of diplomatic relations with several independent
African countries. For, in Africa and the Third World, Mao’s China had secured its position as
leader of the Third World, and backed by an improving economy, it was confident of its
geopolitical competitiveness in the struggle for influence over Africa and the rest of the Third
World.
China’s intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts receded when its economy faltered
under the combined weight of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and
political squabbles that followed the subsequent death of Mao led China to increasingly
abandon active support for liberation war movements and internationalization of its
revolutionary ideology in Africa. The economy that had been able to support
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internationalization of the revolution to the third world, albeit with great difficulties, was no
longer able to do so, as it failed to rival economic and political support granted to African
countries by the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus from the mid-1960S onward Chinese
intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts slowed down until it was almost negligible
when Deng Xiaoping took over leadership of the country.
The shift in China’s national focus from revolution to economic production under Deng
Xiaoping illustrates the importance and emphasis placed by post-Mao Chinese national leaders
on strengthening China’s relative economic power. As they replaced ideological considerations
with economic interest considerations in the theory and practice of China’s foreign policy, they
argued that China’s contributions to international affairs should be commensurate with its
relative economic power. As discussed in Chapter 4, according to Deng Xiaoping, the
disengagement from Africa and from playing a prominent role in its internal affairs was a
tactical and strategic foreign policy action meant to give China an opportunity to improve its
relative economic power to levels comparable with the United States. From then on, Deng
Xiaoping argued that China’s role and participation in international affairs was going to be
commensurate with its economic power, suggesting that as its economic power increased so
also would the role it plays in international affairs.
Sustained increases in China’s domestic economic since 1978, massively increased its relative
economic power. From having a GNI of US$213 billion in 1980, it reached US$5.752 trillion in
2010 before doubling to US$10.1 trillion in 2014, making it the second largest economy in the
world. Also, in 2013, China became Africa’s biggest trading partner, surpassing the United
States. As was predicted by Deng Xiaoping in 1984, China is now a powerful state, playing a
bigger role in international affairs as well as contributing more to the Third World. “We are
seeing more of China flexing its muscles in Africa, exerting influence on African governments
more than it did before… and that because China is now a big economic power”458 is how a
diplomat at the African Union reflected on the impact of increases in China’s relative economic
power. Another respondent working at IGAD in Addis Ababa concurred, but added that the
“increase in China’s global economic power explains its growing footprint in African civil wars,
especially in South Sudan and Mali where it is getting entangled in regional geopolitical
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dynamics in its quest to protect its interests.”459 China is now “truly powerful, exerting a much
greater influence in the world.” 460 Accordingly, one can conclude that China’s external
intervention behaviour is commensurate with its relative economic power; and that as its
economic interests expand in Africa, China is “putting a premium on strengthening the stability
of African countries, irrespective of their political ideology, especially those that are major
exporters of raw materials or have a significant Chinese presence” (Shinn 2016).
As enunciated by the lateral pressure theory discussed in Chapter 3, as China’s relative
economic power rises, it is increasingly expanding its economic interests in Africa, and its
citizens are also settling and working in Africa. Gary Li concurringly states: “as Chinese
investments abroad increase every year; overseas Chinese have found themselves caught up in
conflicts which has required Beijing to expand substantial resources to extract them” (2015).
Similarly, Irene Chan and Mingjiang Li also argue that “the expansion of Chinese presence
throughout the world calls for more attention to protecting Chinese interests overseas” (2015,
p. 266). The effect is that as some of the African countries plunge into intrastate armed
conflicts, China is being compelled to intervene in order to protect its nationals and interests,
while balancing that imperative with its identity as a non-interventionist power. The underlying
factor is that “the growth of Chinese power and capability has certainly made it probable for
China to adopt a more proactive stance in protecting its nationals and investments in other
parts of the world” (Chan and Li 2015, p. 266). Thus, as put by Bernardo Mariani, “as befitting
its global economic presence and place in the world, China can be expected to play a leading
role in multilateral for a, constructively engaging with critical events beyond a rhetorical
insistence on non-interference, and leading change in the peace and security agenda – not
simply reacting to crises” (2015, p. 267).

8.2.3 Changes in perception of foreign intrastate armed conflicts as threats is
leading to more intervention
Based on the mutability of China’s non-intervention principle, the emerging trend is that China
is taking a liberal interpretation of the non-intervention principle, and deepening its external
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intervention whenever its interests are affected by intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. With
armed conflicts increasingly proving to be detrimental to China’s economic interests in Africa,
there is consensus among Chinese government officials, political leaders, and scholars that
those interests ought to be protected suggesting that they now increasingly perceive intrastate
armed conflicts in Africa to be a threat to their economic interests there. At the Central
Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs461 held in Beijing in November 2014, President
Xi underscored that “we should protect China’s foreign interests and continue to improve our
capacity to provide such protection.”462 Yan Xuetong, a leading international relations scholar
in China, also suggested that China should “adopt active policies to protect its rapidly expanded
national interests.”463 In concurrence, Pang Zhongying (2008), another renowned scholar wrote:
“China needs to carefully consider its right to intervene in humanitarian crises and severe
attacks on Chinese interests or nationals.” What, however, differs among them is how China
ought to protect its foreign economic interests from intrastate armed conflicts in Africa.
Those who subscribe to self-help realist notions expect a rising power like China to back up its
“economic forays with a projection of military might.”464 But President Xi, in keeping with the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, in particular the principle of non-interference in other
countries’ internal affairs, contends that China should “promote peaceful resolution of
differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation, and oppose the
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wilful use or threat of force.”465 The official rhetorical opposition to militant approaches to
protecting its foreign interests is what is mostly construed as China’s adherence to the nonintervention principle, yet for those who keep an eye on China’s historical and contemporary
intervention patterns in Africa since the 1950s, the question has never been whether China
intervenes or not, but when does it intervene and how, especially when “Chinese nationals and
investments in the region [Africa] are threatened or there are interruptions in the flow from
Africa of critical raw materials that support China’s economy” (Shinn 2016).

8.2.4 No opposition to intervention by Western global powers
Based on the above patterns, one of related emerging trends is that China is gradually relaxing
its opposition to intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts by Western global powers
such as the United States, France, and NATO. According to Kjell Engelbrekt Beijing is
demonstrating “flexibility and an acceptance of the notion that handling of challenges to peace
and security may be ‘delegated’ to authoritative transnational bodies in the regions concerned”
(2014, p. 51). David Shinn (2013b) concurs: “as threats to Chinese interests in Africa increase,
there has been a steady strengthening of its willingness to cooperate with others” Furthermore,
“while it still adheres to the principle of non-interference, China no longer opposes
international intervention organised by the West, as long as the intervention is legitimate and
justifiable” (Pang 2008). Yang Razali Kassim agrees that “since the late 1990s China’s attitude to
international intervention entered a process of change… China no longer simply challenges or
opposes international intervention initiated by the West” (2014, p. 33). The shift is typified in
China’s consent to adoption of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, allowing the
international community to take all means necessary including military intervention to protect
civilians in countries were the state is unable to. Since then China has supported, directly and
indirectly unilateral intervention and multilateral intervention led by Western powers in
countries such as Sudan, Mali, and Libya.
In the case of Libya, China allowed the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions,
asset freezes and a no-fly zone against the Gaddafi regime. The no-fly zone in Libya was heavily
lobbied for by France, in order to decapitate Gaddafi’s air force which gave it strategic
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advantage over the NTC. As discussed in Chapter 5, Chinese foreign policy makers and
diplomats at the United Nations were aware of the intended objective of the no-fly zone, and
as put by Li Baodong, in deliberations leading to adoption of Resolution 1973, China had raised
those concerns. But, regardless of its concerns against military intervention in Libya not being
addressed, China abstained from voting, giving its tacit approval to the NATO-led military
intervention in Libya. As argued in Chapter 5, the main reason for Chinese support of the
multilateral intervention in Libya is that the Gaddafi regime had rebuffed all attempts toward a
political settlement of the armed conflict, further endangering Chinese businesses, assets and
nationals in Libya.
In Mali, China supported France’s unilateral intervention in Mali because as put by He Wenping,
“the situation in Mali was urgent.”466 What made ‘the situation urgent’ is that the Tuareg and
the Islamists were overrunning Bamako as political bickering in the Transitional Government
continued. The implication of the Islamists taking over Mali is that China was likely to lose
significant investments in the Malian agriculture, and construction sector which it dominated.
Furthermore, French military intervention to retain Malian control of Northern Mali protected
China’s interests in Niger because there was high probability of the Tuareg rebellion spreading
into Niger where other Tuareg people are. In Niger, China’s state-owned SINO-U had invested
US$300 million in a uranium mine at Azelik; CNPC had invested over US$5 billion to develop oil
reserves and to build a refinery and pipeline in eastern Niger (Shinn and Eisenman 2010:246).
Both Azelik and eastern Niger are adjacent to Northern Mali which was under the control of
Islamists and is believed to have significant oil reserves (Boeke and Shuurman 2015, p. 806). By
supporting French intervention in Mali, China sought to have its interests protected at minimal
cost to itself, and thus it found it pragmatic to support the intervention.
Another emerging trend is that China is using multilateral institutions to intervene in African
intrastate armed conflicts. As argued above, until the 1990s China had a general mistrust of
international organisations such as the United Nations which it considered extensions of United
States’ hegemony. “Until the early 1970s, the Chinese government often criticized the UN as a
faced and instrument of Western domination of the world” (Wang and Rosenau 2009, p. 14).
But with the increase in its position in the international system as its relative economic power
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increased, China is increasingly embracing these institutions and exploiting them to its
advantage. Its actions in the three intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan
suggests a trend that China is increasingly using its position in the United Nations Security
Council to protect its interests against armed conflicts in Africa, which entails intervention in
the countries’ internal affairs. Through the U.N. Security Council, China is taking deliberate
actions that attempt “to influence designated behaviour of individuals in another nation
without engaging in a continuing contest of violence” (Feste 2003, p. 191). This strategy fits
into its objective of seeking to influence the outcome of intrastate armed conflicts in target
countries through influence rather than force. Furthermore, in the camouflage of multilateral
interventions, China maintains its legitimacy and identity as a power that does not intervene in
the internal affairs of other states.
China’s gradual relaxing of its opposition to intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts by
Western global powers such as the United States, France, and NATO is motivated by two
factors: Beijing’s perceived global power status, and pragmatism. The increase in China’s
relative economic power has effectively boosted Beijing’s self-awareness as a global power.
Combined with the expansion of its interests abroad, China is also simultaneously realising the
limitations to its unilateral capabilities to protect those interests. This is where its pragmatism
comes in. If it is not able to fully protect its foreign interests alone, then when Western powers,
multilateral institutions and the United Nations take the initiative to resolve armed conflicts in
areas where China’s interests are threatened, there is little or no reason to object. Thus as
argued in the case of Mali, Libya and South Sudan, as long as China’s foreign interests are
secured through action taken by Western governments, the United Nations or other
multilateral organisations, China is increasingly supporting such action because it serves its
interests. In addition, intervention by multilateral institutions and the United Nations although
instigated and led by Western powers is often considered legitimate intervention. Because of
that veneer of legitimacy, China is increasingly supporting their intervention since its foreign
interests will be secured at minimal cost to Beijing. At the same time, if there is backlash
against intervention by Western powers as was the case in Libya, China will simply abdicate
responsibility and exonerate itself. Either way, China stands to benefit from Western
intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts that threaten Beijing’s interests there.
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8.2.5 China is increasingly using UN Peacekeeping Operations to intervene in
Africa
In line with the trend of using multilateral institutions to intervene in the internal affairs of
other states, China is also increasingly using non-threatening multilateral intervention methods
to protect its interests abroad. This changed is partly in line with the country’s “larger foreign
policy strategy, during the past two decades, of supporting multilateral solutions rather than
unilateral actions to address strategic threats” (Hirono and Lanteigne 2012, p. 1). One such
method is the contribution of peacekeeping and peace monitoring forces to United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. In the past China was opposed to peacekeeping operations,
which it considered intervention in other states’ internal affairs. Shogo Suzuki notes that China
“viewed PKOs with the utmost suspicion, frequently denouncing them as tools of US or Soviet
imperialism, and refusing to make any financial or human contributions” (2012, p. 29). Yet since
its first civilian observers contribution to the UN Peacekeeping mission in Namibia in 1989,
China has risen to become the highest personnel contributor among the UN Security Council
members, and the 8th largest contributor of police, UN Military Experts on Mission, and troops
(3 042 in total) to UN Peacekeeping operations as of 30 April 2016,467 demonstrating “how far
its foreign policy in this regard has shifted and changed in a relatively short period of time”
(Huang 2012, p. 16).
Its financial contributions to UN Peacekeeping operations also increased from 4% in 2012 to
6.64% in the 2014-2015 period,468 making China the 6th largest financial contributor to UN
Peacekeeping Operations. The highest five are: United States (28.38%); Japan (10.83%); France
(7.22%); Germany (7.14%); and the United Kingdom (6.68%).469 In December 2015, Wang Min,
China’s deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, told Xinhua that China’s
contributions for the 2016-2018 period will increase to 7.9%, and will be expected to further
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increase to 10.2% in the following next three years.470 In a major surprise, during his UN
General Assembly speech on September 2015 President Xi Jinping announced:
China’s decision to establish a 10-year, US1 billion Chin-UN peace and development
fund to support the UN’s work, advance multilateral cooperation and contribute more
to world peace and development… China will join the new UN Peacekeeping Capability
Readiness System and thus has decided to take the lead in setting up a permanent
peacekeeping police squad and build a peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops…
China will provide a total of US$100 million of free military assistance to the African
Union in the next five years to support establishment of the African Standby Force and
the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis.471
In May 2016, barely a year after President Xi made that announcement, China’s permanent
representative to the UN, Liu Jieyi, signed an agreement with Edmond Mulet, UN SecretaryGeneral's chef de cabinet, regarding a multi-year US$200 million contribution by China toward
the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund. As reported in Chinese press, the two parties
agreed that the US$200 million will be hosted at the UN, which will set up a committee made
up of personnel from China and the UN.472 When fully implemented, these initiatives will make
China one of the largest human and financial contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations; and
as put by Wang Min, “the increase is an objective reflection of China’s national strength in the
international system.”473
Pang Zhongying asserts that China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations reflects a shift
in its foreign policy of non-intervention in other states. Wang (2013) describes it as a drastic
shift “from ardent opposition in the 1970s to avid support in the 2000s.” Marc Lanteigne
attributes the shift to “China’s growing global diplomatic, strategic and economic interests, as
well as the country’s increasing acceptance of “responsibility to protect” (or R2P, known in
Chinese as baohu de zeren) principles, [which] all prompted a revisiting of the robust
peacekeeping question…, including whether China would be in a position to send combat
forces in addition to support and engineering personnel” (2014, p. 8). China is therefore
embracing “the current constellation of international institutions, rules, and norms as a means
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to promote its national interests,”474 such that “the growth of Beijing’s peacekeeping role
seems, however, to have been accompanied by a subtle shift in China’s position on state
sovereignty” (Tardy and Wyss 2014, p. 9), putting “it in a position to help protect Chinese
interests in Africa” (Shinn 2016).
With the exception of Libya, in addition to non-military personnel, China contributed combat or
security troops with peace enforcement responsibilities to MINUSMA in Mali, and UNMISS in
South Sudan. Previously, China had been content with sending engineers, doctors and other
non-military personnel. Both Missions are ‘multidimensional and integrated’ UN missions that
take place in unstable situations characterised by ongoing armed conflicts where they have a
mandate to use force. Unlike peacekeeping operations that normally require the consent to the
target state, peace enforcement operations “are not based on consent and are deployed to
create – rather than maintain peace” (Heldt and Wallensteen 2007, p. 10). Furthermore,
because they are aimed at rebuilding a state, which includes holding of elections, reform and
restructuring of the legal, judiciary, security sector, these ‘multidimensional and integrated’ UN
missions “are nothing short of attempts at nation-building, that seek to remake a state’s
political institutions, security forces, and economic arrangements” (Bertran 1995, p. 389). They
invariably “entail a substantial degree of top-down social engineering..., [they] are problematic
in that they may constitute a violation of the sovereignty of the host state” (Suzuki 2012, p. 32).
Accordingly, China’s peacekeeping operations in Mali and South Sudan are as defined by Birger
Heldt and Peter Wallensteen as “third-party state interventions that involves the deployment
of military troops and/or military observers and/or civilian police in a target state… Is neutral
towards the conflict parties, but not necessarily impartial towards their behaviour” (Heldt and
Wallensteen 2007, p. 11).
The puzzle is that China portrays itself as a ‘responsible global power’ that respects state
sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. But, as put by Shogo
Suzuki, “China’s decision to get involved in various PKOs since the end of the Cold War
contradicts these self-professed principles… [because] they entail a considerable erosion of the
host state’s sovereignty” (2012, p. 32). Yet by supporting and actively participating in nontraditional peacekeeping operations, the use of force, and the ‘use of all means necessary’ to
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fulfill their mandate, gnaws at other states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. The
deployment of the People’s Liberation Army soldiers under the UN missions in Mali and South
Sudan demonstrates, as already noted by Marc Lanteigne, that “China continues to make use
of its support for UN peacekeeping operations not only to advance its strategic agenda but to
offer an alternative approach to traditional intervention by great powers” (2014, p. 9). In the
case of South Sudan, a diplomat at the African Union suggested that China had vigorously
attempted to have the UN troops assigned to protect oil refineries and other Chinese assets in
South Sudan. Although they eventually were stationed elsewhere, what the Chinese lobby
meant is that it viewed the UN Peacekeeping mission in South Sudan as a tool to protect its
interests there rather than as an altruistic attempt at maintaining peace.
In concurrence, Pang Zhongying states: “China has gradually realized that peacekeeping
missions can help to secure a peaceful international environment, which works in China’s
national interests as the country begins to build a sound external environment for its long-term
economic growth and social development” (2005, p. 81). Although arguing that Chinese
peacekeepers are not always deployed in resource-rich countries, or that they are a “strategic
prerequisite to resource access,” Bernardo Mariani agrees that “broadly, China’s involvement
in peacekeeping stems from the recognition that China’s plans for economic growth and
modernization are increasingly linked to a stable, secure and peaceful world, and that UN
peacekeeping operations work in China’s national interest” (2015, p. 256). UN Peacekeeping
operations are therefore a convenient balance and pragmatic tool for expanding its influence
over the duration and effect of intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. “These operations suggest…
a move towards a new model which bridges the gap between more traditional UN
peacekeeping and the more forceful Western-led humanitarian interventions” (Cottey and
Bikin-Kita 2006, p. 29); as “China aligns its foreign policy with its expanding global interests”
(Hille 2013).

8.2.6 From passive and inactive to assertive and proactive intervention
approach
Another emerging trend is that China’s approach to intrastate armed conflicts in Africa have
cautiously, selectively, and incrementally evolved from being inactive and passive, to being
proactive and assertive in defense of its economic interests. The passive and inactive approach
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in Libya is to a greater extend related to the perception in Beijing that armed conflicts in Africa
did not affect its interests there. But with the impact that the Libyan conflict had on its
nationals and investments there, there has been a radical shift toward a more proactive and
assertive approach, which was the case in Mali, but more so in South Sudan. This is also
because China realizes, unlike before the Libyan case, that its economic development requires
energy and primary commodities in Africa, and that its ability to access those resources and
sustain its economic growth is tied to stability in those African countries. Accordingly, “peace
and security in Africa is suddenly China’s interest too” (Allison 2015).
The shift toward assertive and proactive intervention is also because as China’s relative
economic power increases, and as its interests in Africa become entrenched, it is assuming
greater global responsibilities in order to create a conducive international environment for its
advancement. Since 2010, China overtook the United States to become Africa’s biggest trading
partner. With the second largest economy in the world, and with interests and influence
extended beyond its borders and immediate Asian region, there is also an expectation that it
should play a major role in global governance. Although it denies it is a major global power,
choosing instead to describe itself as a developing country, there is global consensus, and
consensus within China as well, that it is a major global power. The pursuance of ‘major-power
diplomacy’ by China especially under President Xi Jinping suggests a growing confidence and
acceptance among China’s leadership of its new global power status475 and it “is increasingly
confident in casting itself as a great power” (Yang 2009, p. 31). That acceptance of China’s
“status as one of the only two major powers and its attendant responsibilities (and the
responsibilities of other states to China) is clear and being translated into China’s foreign policy
actions and intentions” (Cook 2015, p. 114). Accordingly, there is increased domestic and
international consensus on the “impracticability of keeping a low profile and non-interference,
as China faces the inevitable need to protect its overseas interests either in a proactive or
passive way” (Chan and Li 2015, p. 258-259).
Another factor contributing to the shift toward assertive and proactive intervention is that
China’s relations with African countries are transitioning from being influenced by ideology and
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the Sino-Soviet rivalry over geopolitical influence in independent Africa to being influenced by
economic interests. This “shift on foreign policy orientation is also tied to larger systemic
processes that affect the nation’s proclivity for foreign engagement and its capability for such
activity. This allows the question of national interests and capabilities to be separately
examined rather than take them as given characteristics of autonomous agents” (Feste 2003, p.
186). Unlike in the past when it did not interfere with conflicts in Mali, and South Sudan due to
ideological and geopolitical considerations, the burgeoning of economic and trade relations
with these countries compels it to intervene in cases where its interests are threatened. In such
cases, as illustrated in Libya, Mali and South Sudan, China takes a liberal interpretation of the
non-intervention principle, justifying its intervention in those countries’ internal armed
conflicts and allowing other global powers, and multilateral organisations to intervene.
In most African countries, the protection of China’s economic interests and nationals are
guaranteed by the host African government. In many respects this fact absolved China of the
responsibility to protect its interests in cases of political instability and armed conflicts erupting,
as long as the host state remained intact. This explains why China delayed intervention in Libya
and was historically indifferent to insurrections and coup d’états in Mali – it considered the
regimes in the two countries to be strong enough to guarantee the safety of its citizens and
assets there. The emerging transition from passivity to proactive intervention in African
intrastate armed conflicts that is discussed in this study is therefore motivated by the failure of
African governments to protect Chinese interests and nationals in the event of intrastate
armed conflicts breaking out. So, even though China demanded that the governments of Mali
and Libya protect its economic interests there, they still failed to force China to take action to
protect them. The case was different in South Sudan. In hindsight, given the failures of the
Malian and Libyan governments to protect Chinese economic interests, in South Sudan China
was both assertive and proactive in intervening in the conflict and protecting its nationals and
economic interests.
From the above discussion it has been argued that as shown from the cases of Libya, Mali, and
South Sudan, China has moved from ambivalent intervention to reactive multilateral
intervention and to proactive bilateral intervention. What, however, remains scope for further
research is whether China will remain proactive and assertive in its intervention in African
intrastate armed conflicts. If it remains on the above intervention trajectory, it can be argued
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that China’s future intervention in African intrastate armed conflicts will remain influenced by
Beijing perception of the threat imposed by the armed conflict on its interests abroad. Where
its interests are affected materially, China will be more proactive and assertive in its bilateral
and multilateral intervention, but where its interests are not significantly affected, it may be
passive and reactionary because as shown in this study, Beijing’s intervention is mainly
motivated by its perception of threat caused by a foreign intrastate armed conflicts on its
interests.

8.3 Implications for understandings of intervention
Apparent from this study is that the nature and method of China’s intervention in African
intrastate armed conflicts does not squarely fit into the dominant IR understanding of
intervention as a non-consensual action, usually military in nature taken by a great power
against another state. Part of the reason is that the dominant understanding of intervention is
consistent with the dictionary definition of intervention as a ‘noun of action’ that explains “the
action of intervening, ‘stepping in’, or interfering in any affair, so as to affect its course or
issue,”476 which suits realists arguments. This conceptualisation of intervention as a nonconsensual concrete action by a sovereign state is also attributable to the behaviourist
approach which is concerned with an operational definition of intervention. As a result, as
argued in Chapter 2, literature on intervention is “pervaded with discussions of military
interventions, propaganda interventions, economic interventions, diplomatic interventions,
and ideological interventions, not to mention customs interventions and other highly specific
actions through which one state experiences the impact of another” (Rosenau 1969, p. 344345). Since the “width of activities this term can cover”477 is inexhaustible, understanding
intervention in that sense makes it imprecise and ‘extremely ambiguous’478 - conveying diverse
meanings to different actors and scholars.
Current understandings of intervention place state sovereignty at the centre of the
intervention discourse. Although principles such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) attempt
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to limit state sovereignty, the reality is that the current global system is still essentially a
sovereign order in which sovereign states constitute the core units that at times mandates or
delegate their individual and collective right to act to multilateral institutions. However, since
multilateral organisations, be they Regional Organisations (ROs) or International Organisations
(IOs) are also part of the sovereign order, intervention can no longer be limited to acts by
sovereign states. ROs and IOs such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations (UN), etc. are known to have
intervened in several intrastate and interstate armed conflicts on behalf of their sovereign
member states. This means that states that are either opposed to intervention in the internal
affairs of other states, or those that lack the material capabilities to unilaterally intervene in
foreign conflicts can do so through multilateral institutions. 479 What this suggests is that a
contemporary definition of intervention ought to take into consideration the linkage between
sovereign states and multilateral institutions. This is particularly important when analysing
interventions by rising powers which in most cases do not yet possess the capabilities or the
political will to conduct unilateral interventions, but that instead use regional and international
organisations to achieve their intervention objectives in foreign conflicts.
Secondly, contrary to the notion that intervention only consist of action rather than inaction, it
can be argued that by not taking action in cases where if action had been taken a different
outcome would have been reached, states actually intervene. Peter Schraeder explains this
view in a hypothetical situation: “if Israel were attacked simultaneously by and subjected to an
extended military conflict with all its Arab neighbors, complete U.S. neutrality most likely would
ensure Israeli defeat” (Schraeder 1989, p. 2). So even if the United States would not have
directly intervened, by withholding its support for Israel, it would have intervened because its
inaction would have affected the direction, duration and outcome of the conflict. Another
notable example is China’s tacit support for an imposition of a no-fly zone in Libya which
significantly tilted the balance of power in the Libyan armed conflict against the Gaddafi regime
leading to its downfall. If China had used its veto in the United Nations Security Council, the nofly zone that incapacitated the Gaddafi’s air force would not have been imposed and a different
outcome might have obtained. By abstaining, China effectively determined the duration and
possible outcome of the conflict. Using abstention from voting in the UNSC resolution 1978
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(2011) that imposed a no-fly zone against Libya paved the way for military intervention by
NATO was part of China’s strategy of intervention in foreign intrastate armed conflicts through
inaction. As put by Wu Zhengyu and Ian Taylor, “abstention is an expedient strategy for China,
since it precludes both criticism from the West regarding obstructionist opposition to
contentious peace operations and criticism from the developing world, allowing China either to
disassociate itself from controversial operations or to remain in accordance with its doctrine of
non-interference even with respect to popular peace operations” (2012, p. 11). Thus,
intervention is not confined to actions by sovereign states and International Organizations such
as the United Nations. It also includes their inaction.
Thirdly, intervention can be defined as an action or inaction undertaken by a sovereign state or
an intergovernmental actor of the international system, the purpose of which is to affect the
duration, direction or outcome of an intrastate armed conflict. Implicit within this definition is
the non-consensual nature of the action or inaction taken by the intervening actor. The widely
held view is that where there is consent, there is legitimacy, therefore the act is not considered
as amounting to intervention. As a result, intervening actors strive to get the consent of the
target of the intervention to avoid the controversies of non-consensual intervention. The
challenge with consent is that it is difficult to determine whether it has even been given
voluntarily by the appropriate authority or whether it has even been given in the first place. In
the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo versus
Uganda) case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered arguments by Uganda that its
armed forces were in the DRC at the invitation of the latter even though it was clear that the
DRC government did not have effective control of major parts of the country. Similarly, states
whose foreign policy is against intervention use consent to justify their intervention in other
states. For instance, China argues that it is mediating the conflict in South Sudan at the
invitation of the parties involved; and therefore its actions are not intervention. Susan D. Wing
describe it as intervention by invitation (2016, p. 71). But even when interventions are
consensual or by invitation they also “subvert the managerial capacity of the state vis-a-vis the
welfare of its citizens” (Conteh-Morgan 2001). Accordingly, the challenge with making consent
or its absence central to the conceptualization of intervention is that the same act, or inaction
taken with the objective of affecting the direction, duration or outcome of an intrastate conflict
may be an act of intervention or not by merely determining whether consent was given by the
target state.
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The issue of whether or not there was consent potentially leads to inconsistency and lack of
precision in the meanings attached to intervention – the understanding of intervention will be
‘structured by pre-existing vocabularies’ and dependent on what states say intervention is and
is not. As observed by Christian Reus-Smit, “just as meanings attached to words can change
over time, actors can use different words to refer to the same thing;” 480 making the
conceptualization of intervention subjective and dependent on state interests. For example,
the United States’ support for rebel movements in Nicaragua was considered as intervention
whereas China’s support of liberation movements in Africa was seen as ‘friendly’ support.
Some may argue that the purpose of intervention and the relationship between the intervening
actor and the target of intervention determines whether an action is considered to be an act of
intervention or not. As an example, the government of South Sudan welcomed China’s
mediation efforts in the country’s civil war, saying: “we welcome the Chinese role which we
believe is constructive and seeks to resolve the conflict in South Sudan;”481 but when the
United States attempted to aid the process by imposing sanctions on those forces that could
threaten the stability in South Sudan, the South Sudanese government accused the United
States of meddling in its internal affairs,482 yet the objective of the sanctions was to compel
unwilling opposition and government leaders to respect the peace agreement signed in Addis
Ababa. It cannot be argued that the United States had an ill-motive in forcing parties to abide
by a peace agreement they had agreed upon. As shown in these two examples, if the
conceptualization of intervention is left to the whims of states to decide, then anything can
either be intervention or not depending on the actors involved. It would simply make the
concept more subjective and unscientific, giving it a “perplexing vagueness of meaning”
(Winfield 1932, p. 236).
In an attempt to suit different circumstances, but in no way different from the above, Martha
Finnemore suggests that “to qualify as intervention states had to use the term to describe the
activity. Those involved had to understand that they were engaging in something called
‘intervention’ and had to use the term when writing to and talking with one another at the
480
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time” (Finnemore 2003, p. 11-12). As previously argued, rather than avoiding vagueness and
subjectivity in defining ‘intervention’, Martha Finnemore adds to the confusion and amplifies
the term’s vagueness. Intervening states always justify their actions and do not usually refer to
their actions as interventions. President Hollande framed his country’s 2013 military
intervention in Mali “as repayment of the country’s historical debt toward Mali and this as a
more acceptable framework of gift and counter gift between states and peoples” (Wing 2016, p.
72). Even more, states such as China that claim strict adherence to the principle of noninterference never describe their actions as intervention even in cases where they are. In cases
when it does intervene, along the same lines as President Hollande, China describes the
intervention as mutually beneficial for the country it would have intervened in. Accordingly, the
conceptualization of intervention should go beyond the “telltale terminology… [because states]
often engage in practices, and make justificatory claims, without describing what they are
doing, or arguing their cases, with recognizable signature terms (‘intervention’, ‘sovereignty’,
‘rights’, ‘responsibilities’, ‘democracy’, etc.)” (Reus-Smit 2013, p. 1059). Therefore, there is
need for a conceptualization that “form the basis for a general theory of intervention”483 by
analytically distinguishing ‘acts of intervention’ from states’ intentions, interests and
justifications.
Based on the above discussion, it is apparent that unlike the United States, China does not
openly regard itself as a global power, Chinese soldiers are still largely confined within Chinese
boundaries except those deployed under the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Mali
and South Sudan; and above all, Beijing still portrays its foreign policy as non-interventionary,
and does not regard its behaviour as intervening in the internal affairs of other states. The
common understanding of intervention as an intrusion by a sovereign state into the domestic
affairs of another sovereign state is based on three assumptions: (1) intervening actors and the
targets of intervention are sovereign states; 484 (2) intervention consists of action rather than
inaction; and (3) intervention is non-consensual, meaning the target of intervention is opposed
to it;485 therefore the term does not explain China’s activities in Africa and across the globe.
Based on that understanding of intervention, it would be difficult to describe China’s ‘actions’
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in the intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan as intervention. Traditional and
conventional conceptualizations of intervention as a non-consensual intrusion by a sovereign
state into the domestic affairs of another sovereign state therefore do not articulate China’s
emerging behavior in African intrastate armed conflicts
Unlike the United States and France that have a propensity to unilaterally intervene militarily or
impose sanctions against African countries, China tends to prefer using multilateral institutions
to effect pressure on warring parties to either protect its interests or affect outcomes of the
intrastate armed conflicts. As discussed above, this policy has enabled China to avoid being
perceived as ‘interventionist’ when in actual effect it uses its position in multilateral institutions
such as the United Nations Security Council to intervene through action or inaction (votes of
abstention, giving tacit approval for interventions) in African intrastate armed conflicts. As
noted by Courtney J. Fung, in cases such as Sudan where “host states can block peacekeeping
missions from actually deploying by refusing consent or rejecting potential troop contributions,
China’s perceived reputation as an ‘anti-intervention’ state can [and has] been a competitive
advantage to getting the host state to accept China’s troop contribution” (2015, p. 2). Hence
troops deployed by China are not considered as intervention forces, while troops from the
United States or France are considered intervention forces - the same action with the same
impact, but perceived differently. What this means is that conventional Western-centric and
realist oriented conceptualizations of intervention in foreign conflicts as being a foreign policy
tool used by great powers that possess immense military capabilities to unilaterally intervene
in foreign countries do not assist in analyzing the evolving nature of China’s intervention
behavior in Africa.
In addition, China is subtly but creatively employing its economic, political and diplomatic
influence on African states and critical stakeholders to determine the duration, direction and
outcomes of their intrastate armed conflicts. Using its dominance in the South Sudan oil sector,
and South Sudan’s reliance on China for revenue, China was able to compel the warring parties
in South Sudan to guarantee protection of its assets and oil-facilities. In Libya, it used the
strategy of abstention to affect the direction and outcome of the conflict; and in Mali as well as
in South Sudan it employed ‘non-threatening’ UN peacekeeping to create a conducive
environment in which its economic interests and nationals’ safety is guaranteed. In all cases,
China’s actions and inactions, whether multilateral or unilateral, consensual or non-consensual
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affected the duration, direction and outcome of the respective intrastate armed conflicts. And,
this is not just peculiar to China, but also to other a non-Western rising power such as India,
Brazil and South Africa that frown upon military and ‘non-consensual’ intervention in other
states’ intrastate armed conflicts.
In order to capture Chinese external intervention behaviour, the focus should not be on its
actions in foreign intrastate armed conflicts, but on the impact of such actions. Cognizant of the
impact of China’s actions and engagement in intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali, and
South Sudan, it can be argued that intervention ought to be understood as being political,
military, economic or diplomatic actions or inactions undertaken by a governmental or
intergovernmental actor of the international system [with or without consent of the target
state], the purpose of which is to affect the direction, duration or outcome of an intrastate
armed conflict (Rioux & Bucher 2003, p. 7). The ultimate test for whether an action or inaction
taken by one state regarding a conflict in another is intervention or not should be whether that
action or inaction, taken unilaterally or multilaterally, with or without consent affects the
duration, direction and outcome of the conflict. This is a test that can be replicated in other
cases involving rising powers, or even existing great powers that seek to maintain legitimacy
and avoid criticisms that they are intervening in another state’s internal armed conflicts. As put
by Karen Feste, the definition of intervention can be extended “to include various forms of
involvement and assistance by an external state in an ongoing civil war (e.g., U.S. commitments
to Greece in the 1940s and covert aid to Afghan resistance fighters in the 1980s)” (2003, p. 178).
Similarly, Earl Conteh-Morgan (2001) also broadly conceptualizes intervention to include “both
coercive/military forms of intervention, and non-military coercive forms of intervention.”
Accordingly, in determining whether an action or inaction amounts to intervention or not, for
China, the most important factor is to determine whether it affected the duration, direction or
outcome of the intrastate armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and South Sudan.
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